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Abstract
The published work submitted herewith involves the application of Relevance theory (as a
theory of verbal communication) to the description of Galician and Spanish, and to
translation. The phenomena studied within these areas are examined from the point of view
of language use. This allows us to see them together as instantiations of language and thus as
being theoretically and fundamentally of a kind. As a result, they are also subject to the same
principles of communication. The theoretical approach used and applied throughout is that of
Relevance theory. This approach allows for an explanatory theory of verbal communication,
which encompasses the two areas under study and thus provides a unitary theoretical
framework to account for the phenomena examined. The various aspects of language
description and translation explored here are therefore seen as instances of verbal
communication to be studied precisely under a single general theory (and not as instances of
different fields that should be examined by different theories).
This submission is structured in three parts. The first part involves an introduction to the
publications submitted, which includes a brief literature review. I his review provides an
overview of the most important approaches to communication, including the code mode, the
Gricean approach and the approach adopted here, namely, Relevance theory. 1his
introductory part also includes a discussion ol the overall coherence ol the publications
submitted, together with their impact and contributions in the wider context of the field of
study.
The second part of this submission deals with applications of Relevance theory to the
description of Galician and Spanish in a range of areas, including prepositional direct objects,
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presuppositional effects, interpretive use of language, and non-declarative sentences. In all
these cases, current approaches are reviewed and critiqued, and alternative accounts are
provided as applications of the theoretical framework provided by Relevance theory.
The third and final part of this submission deals with applications of Relevance theory to
translation in a number of areas, including interlingual interpretive use of language,
interlingual enrichment, interlingual impoverishment, and degrees of acceptability in
translation. One of the main themes in common between all these areas is the notion of
discrepancy between original and target texts in translation. It is shown that many of these
translation discrepancies arise from the gap found in verbal communication between what is
encoded and what is communicated. Some of the most important types of gap that exist in
verbal communication are examined in detail and their impact on translation explored
throughout.
6
PART I:
Preliminary
Introduction: Applications of Relevance Theory to
the Description of Galician and Spanish
and to Translation
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I . Introduction
The research publications submitted herewith involve applications of Relevance theory (as a
theory of verbal communication) to the description of Galician and Spanish, and to
translation. The purpose of this introduction is to set out the case for the submission as a
whole, including its coherence, contribution, and overall context. All the work submitted is
single-authored and has been published in internationally refereed research journals and
books (including JOURNAL OF PRAGMATICS, BULLETIN OF HISPANIC STUDIES,
BABEL, and GALICIAN REVIEW, amongst others), and, additionally, has been presented at
competitive, refereed, international conferences. Each of the publications submitted has been
through a refereeing process involving the approval of at least two independent scholars who
have underscored the originality and impact of the work involved. In addition, the prima facie
case for the submission has been approved by two independent external assessors (Dr.
Victoria Escandell-Vidal, an internationally recognised expert in the field, currently teaching
in Spain at the UNED University, and Dr. Jill Hill, Head of Modem Languages at the
University of Buckingham). The main languages involved in the research submitted here are
Galician and Spanish, though data from other languages (such as English, German and
Italian) are also included.
The unifying force behind the research submitted is three-fold: (a) the areas of research
explored in both the language description and translation sections are seen as instantiations ol
language use; (b) they are both, consequently, seen as falling under the common remit of
verbal communication; and (c) both of them are therefore studied together under a single
unified theoretical model (i.e. Relevance theory, which is one of the main contemporary
theories in semantics and pragmatics covering the study of verbal communication). I he
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diversifying factor lies in the range of areas of theoretical application covered. In this respect,
one of the main contributions of this thesis lies in the application of Relevance theory to a
diverse, yet theoretically coherent, set of communicative phenomena (within language
description and translation). These applications, in turn, provide further evidence for the
validity of the theory used, particularly through its application to a wider set of linguistic data
and languages.
The first section of the research focuses on applications of Relevance theory to the
description of Galician and Spanish in the following areas: (a) prepositional direct objects, (b)
presuppositional effects, (c) interpretive use of language, and (d) non-declarative sentences.
In these areas the main contribution and originality of the research submitted lies in a number
of new applications of Relevance theory. Firstly, the phenomenon of prepositional direct
objects is examined from a semantic perspective in Galician and an application of current
theoretical notions based on verb type is proposed. Secondly, an application of Relevance
theory concepts is made to provide evidence for the cross-linguistic equivalence of stress and
word order between English and Galician at pragmatic level. Thirdly, a new analysis is given
of a set of hitherto neglected Galician adverbs by applying the relevance-theoretic notion of
interpretive use. Finally, an application and analysis of current relevance-theoretic accounts
of non-declarative sentences is provided and some proposals are developed which attempt to
contribute to the description of imperative uses of the infinitive in Spanish (including
references to Galician, German and English).
The second section of the research submitted focuses on applications of Relevance theory to
translation in a number of areas, including (a) translation discrepancies, (b) types and degrees
of interpretive resemblance, (c) interlingual enrichment, (d) interlingual impoverishment, and
9
(e) degrees of acceptability in translation. In these areas the main contribution and originality
of the research submitted also involves a number of new applications of Relevance theory.
Firstly, various types of discrepancy in translation are identified and accounted for by
analysing, from a Relevance theory point of view, the role of explicit and implicit content in
communication at utterance level. Secondly, this issue is explored further by looking at
discrepancies at the level of individual concepts and by analysing the various possible
sources of discrepancy arising at this level. Thirdly, the various strategies adopted by
different languages and translators in conveying a given content are investigated in the light
of human communication. In particular, the relevance-theoretic concepts of enrichment and
impoverishment are applied to translation in order to explain those differences (thus
extending the application of existing relevance-theoretic notions to interlingual situations).
Finally, a range of criteria used in judgements of acceptability in translation is investigated
and critiqued, and an alternative approach based on applications of Relevance theory as
single general principle is discussed.
The methods used in the research submitted include (a) analysis of linguistic data collected
from a number of languages, (b) discussion of introspective linguistic data, (c) analysis of
original and translation texts, (d) search for material evidence of applicability of theoretical
distinctions, (e) critical discussion of theoretical frameworks in the light of available
evidence, and (0 application of theoretical distinctions to explain data analysed. All the data
and approaches discussed involve current theoretical paradigms in the field of semantics and
pragmatics developed particularly from the late 1980s, through the 1990s, and up to the
present day, including, especially, applications of the theoretical framework provided by
Relevance theory. All the work submitted is hereby complemented by the required
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introduction which sets out the case for the above research in more detail, especially in
relation to its contribution to the field of study and its overall coherence.
This introduction is structured as follows. Firstly, a brief literature review is provided,
followed by a presentation of the theoretical framework used throughout the research
submitted, i.e. Relevance theory (which is seen as the most up-to-date theoretical approach to
verbal communication). The aim of this section is to provide a more specific context for the
research involved in this submission and to lay the foundations for exploring its impact
within the field of study. Secondly, there is a discussion of the coherence and contribution
made by the work submitted both as a whole and as individual units. The aim of this section
is to show, and focus on, the overall cohesive links between the publications submitted and
the contributions they make in each of the sections presented. Finally, some conclusions are
provided on the basis of the previous discussion, including references to further research and
publications.
To conclude this introductory section, a clarification note may be helpful. The terms he and
she are often used to refer to the speaker and hearer respectively in order to aid the
discussion. No contextual implications are intended in this decision. The term speaker is also
used to cover both speakers and writers, and the term hearer is used to cover both hearers and
readers. Finally, the term sentence is used to refer to abstract linguistic units (i.e. w ''
contextualisation) and the term utterance is used to refer to sentences in use (i.e. with
contextualisation).
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2. Approaches to Verbal Communication: A Brief Literature Review
The research included in the publications submitted herewith involves the use of language in
intralinguistic and interlinguistic communication (i.e. covering language description and
translation respectively). These two areas of study are seen as instances of verbal
communication and thus are subject to the same principles of communication that govern all
utterance interpretation.
From this point of view, the specific relationship between describing language use and
communication seems generally uncontroversial. For we ordinarily use language to
communicate, thereby making the connection between the two an everyday occurrence. As
Grundy (1995:177) states, "language would not be what it is if it were not used to
communicate with." By contrast, the relationship between translation and communication
does not generally seem to be so uncontroversial. Some (see e.g. Newmark 1981, 1988; or
Steiner 1975) have seen translation not primarily as an act of communication, but as an art.
From this point of view, Steiner has argued, "what we are dealing with [in translation] is not
a science, but an exact art" (Steiner 1975:295). However, in more recent times this view of
translation has been superseded by ideas which both place the practice of translation firmly
within verbal communication and make it more amenable to scientific study. Thus, Hatim
and Mason (1997:vii) state, "we look at all kinds of translating as essentially acts of
communication in the same sense as that which applies to other kinds of verbal interaction."
Gutt (2000:23) also argues along the same lines: "translation is indeed best handled as a
matter of communication." This line of enquiry, which sees translation as an instance ol
verbal communication, is the position adopted in the research submitted here.
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One of the advantages of seeing both the description of language use and translation as
instances of verbal communication is that only one overall approach to linguistic
communication is needed in order for us to study the two areas. This will, in turn, provide one
of the other main cohesive links between the publications submitted, i.e. the use of Relevance
theory as a unified theory, covering both language use description and translation. To arrive
at this unified point, however, the theory of verbal communication has experienced important
shifts in the last 50 years, which are reviewed briefly in what follows.
Prior to the 1960s, it was widely believed that communication was a matter of encoding and
decoding information, both in the intra- and interlinguistic cases. This approach to
communication was known as the code model (see e.g. Shannon and Weaver 1949; Lyons
1977:36; Sperber & Wilson 1995:4). The code model was adopted throughout history from
the time of Greek philosopher Aristotle (see e.g. Aristotle 1963), through to the 17 th century
by French linguists Arnauld and Lancelot in their seminal French grammar Grammaire cle
Port-Royal (1963), and finally into modern times by Swiss linguist Saussure (1974) in his
structuralist approach to linguistics. However, a number of important problems were found
with this code model of communication (particularly since the publication of Syntactic
Structures by Chomsky in 1957), which eventually led to its demise. At the centre of these
problems was the realisation that the code model was descriptively inadequate to account for
verbal communication, and that it failed to notice both the gap between language and thought
in communication as well as the role played by inference in bridging this communicative gap.
This led researchers, since the 1960s, to pay closer attention to the role of inference in verbal
communication, which has resulted in a revolution in the study of linguistic communication.
The main proponent of these changes was Grice (see e.g. his reprinted works in Grice 1989),
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who developed a new approach to verbal communication based on inference, resulting in an
improvement on the code model. He showed that communication is not a straightforward
event of encoding and decoding messages. Instead, he argued that in utterance interpretation
there is a gap between what is encoded and what is communicated, and that this gap cannot
be filled by more encoding, but rather by inference and making certain assumptions about the
standards of communication adhered to by communicators. He proposed an overall
cooperative principle and a number of maxims, which he claimed participants normally
follow in verbal communication and which help them in retrieving the meaning conveyed in
communicative exchanges (for a fuller introduction to his approach, see e.g. Grice ibid.;
Levinson 1983, chapter 3). Many of Grice's ideas are still adopted today, to the extent that
his followers are referred to as neo-Griceans and have carried out work in a range of areas,
including reference assignment (Huang 1991, 2000); implicatures (Levinson 1983, 1987,
2000); scalar implicatures (Horn 1984); and temporal relations (Lascarides and Asher 1991,
1993).
Although Grice's ideas revolutionised the study of verbal communication, by giving
inference a greater role in the communicative process, a number of problems were found with
his approach (see e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1995; Blakemore 1987, 1992). Some of the main
problems had to do with the Gricean approach being too vague in its definitions, lacking
universality, and being too unconstrained. It became clear that some new system was needed
to solve these problems and to take some of the fundamental ideas of Grice forward into a
new phase. This challenge was taken up by Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995), who developed
one of the concepts proposed by Grice, namely, the notion of relevance, into a new theory of
verbal communication. This new approach has become known as Relevance theory. It claims
to offer greater explanatory power in accounting for verbal communication and has the added
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advantage that it is equally applicable to both language description and translation. An
overview of this approach is provided in what follows.
3. An Alternative Account of Communication: Relevance Theory
The new approach provided by Relevance theory (see Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 1987,
1990, 1991, 1998, 2002; and Wilson and Sperber 1988a, 1988b, 1992, 1993, 1994) attempts
to solve the problems encountered by the Gricean account of communication. In this respect,
this new theory claims to be explicit in its definitions, universal in its application, and
univocal in its search for the intended interpretation.
The approach to verbal communication offered by Relevance theory provides the main
theoretical coherence to the set of publications included in this submission. It is the overall
and unified theoretical framework applied throughout the research submitted both in the
language description and translation sections. Thus, it plays a key role in the contributions
made here both to the description of Galician and Spanish, and to translation.
The aim in what follows is to contextualise these contributions by providing a brief
discussion of some basic relevance-theoretic concepts. More specific topics related to the
various individual publications submitted are referred to subsequently as the need arises
(particularly in the publications themselves). So, what are the main tenets of this framework?
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3.1. Relevance Theory: A Brief Overview
Relevance theory is a cognitive theory of communication in that it sees utterance
interpretation as being psychologically real. In this respect, it follows the ideas of Fodor
(1993, 1998a,b) who argues that the mind has, broadly, two distinct types of processing
mechanisms: modular systems and a central system. The former are input mechanisms (e.g.
vision, language, taste, etc.) that supply the central system with different types of information
about the external world. In contrast, the central system integrates the various types of input
information to make sense of the world as a whole.
From a Relevance theory point of view, every time the language module is put to use as a
result of an ostensive act of verbal communication (e.g. an utterance), an expectation of
optimal relevance is automatically created. This is a universal expectation, regardless of
cultural differences. In relevance-theoretic terms, this expectation is expressed in the
communicative principle of relevance, which states:
Communicative Principle of relevance
Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own
optimal relevance (Sperber & Wilson 1995:158).
This definition means that whenever we communicate we are giving the hearer some
guarantees that what we are communicating is of some value to her and that therefore it is
worth her while to process it. This is the motivation she has in deciding to continue with the
interpretation of the utterance.
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The specific expectation created by an act of ostensive communication is one of optimal
relevance , which is the driving force behind utterance interpretation. This expectation primes
both speakers and hearers to anticipate that the utterance produced is, in the circumstances,
the most likely one to communicate the thoughts intended by the speaker. This gives them a
benchmark against which to produce and interpret the utterance (i.e. it helps the speaker
decide how to construct it and the hearer how to establish its content). Thus, optimal
relevance is the standard expected by hearers from speakers in communication and is defined
as follows (Sperber & Wilson 1995:270):
Optimal Relevance
An utterance (as an ostensive stimulus), on a given interpretation, is optimally
relevant if and only if:
(a) The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee's
effort to process it.
(b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the
communicator's abilities and preferences.
At the core of this definition are the two notions of effort and effect (i.e. cost and reward) in
utterance interpretation, which allows us to make two generalisations. On the one hand, the
definition claims that any utterance interpretation process must aim at not wasting the
hearer's effort (i.e. the communicative stimulus must be sufficiently easy to process). On the
other hand, it must provide the hearer with adequate contextual effects (i.e. it must be
sufficiently rewarding in its benefits). In general, given that in utterance interpretation we use
both the input (utterance) and the context (contextual assumptions) in order to derive
interpretations, the double objective involved in meeting effort and effect criteria can be
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achieved by helping the hearer in two ways: (a) by using utterances easily processed and
contextual information easily accessible (thus lowering the processing cost) and (b) by giving
rise to cognitive benefits (i.e. improving the hearer's representation of the world and thus
increase the stimulus' effects).
Most of the emphasis within Relevance theory has been put on the effect side of processing,
as this involves both the content side of the interpretation and its effects on an individual's
representation of the world. This has made it possible to establish that the cognitive benefit of
an utterance can be of three main types: (a) strengthening an existing assumption about the
world; (b) contradicting and eliminating an existing assumption; or (c) producing new
contextual implications. However, in order to achieve any of these cognitive benefits, we
need to combine the input with contextual assumptions. In general, a context (i.e. a set of
contextual assumptions) which, in combination with the input information, gives rise to a
large number of effects will be, other things being equal, preferred over another one with
fewer effects. Equally, an utterance with low processing costs, other things being equal, w ill
be preferred over another with higher processing costs. These considerations guide both the
speaker and the hearer in verbal communication processes and play an important part in the
body of research submitted here.
Before the derivation of cognitive benefits takes place though, we must first establish the
semantic content of the sentence used (i.e. the output of the language module), as this is a
necessary step in identifying the contextual effects intended. In verbal communication, the
output of the language module involves semantic representations (ot sentences). Ihese
representations are not normally fully determinate or truth-conditionally evaluable (i.e. they
are incomplete and thus do not tell us something sufficiently determinate about the world for
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us to evaluate whether a given statement is true 111the world or not). They can only become
fully determinate by being developed into full propositional forms. As Gutt (2000:26) notes:
verbal communication involves two distinct kinds of mental representations:
semantic representations that are the output of the language module of the
mind, and thoughts with propositional forms that are derived from semantic
representations by further processing.
As will be seen below, the first publication of this submission deals with representations at
the semantic level, before any pragmatic processing takes place. In this respect, this
publication discusses the type of representation which, in Fodorian terms, results from the
processing of the language module. This semantic representation is then processed further to
become a fully developed propositional form (i.e. a full thought), which is one of the key
topics discussed in a number of other publications in this submission.
The development of semantic representations into full propositional forms involves three
main sub-tasks (see Sperber & Wilson 1995:185; Blakemore 1992; Carston 2000): (a)
disambiguation, (b) reference assignment and (c) enrichment (for a more detailed discussion
of these concepts, please see the individual publications below). These tasks involve an
inferential process which takes as input (a) the semantic representation itself and (b)
contextual assumptions accessible to the hearer. The inferential combination between the two
is governed by pragmatic principles and results in the propositional form communicated by a
given utterance. This inferential process bridges the gap between the two levels ol
representation (semantic and conceptual) and has a number of communicative consequences
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for the description of language use and translation, which are explored in several of the
publications submitted below.
The ideas presented thus far constitute some of the central tenets of Relevance theory.
However, since Sperber and Wilson's proposal was first published in 1986, a large amount of
research has been carried out in developing the theory further (see e.g. Yus 1998). This
research has covered a wide range of areas, including reference assignment (Matsui 2000),
semantics (Blakemore 1987), discourse connectives (Blass 1989), and translation (Gutt
1991/2000), amongst others. Equally, there have also been reviews and critical evaluations of
the theory, including a multiple review in the journal The Behavioral and Brain Sciences
(10.4, 1987) and single reviews by Levinson (1989), Mey and Talbot (1988) and Seuren
(1987), amongst others. In this respect, many of the criticisms made against the theory seem
to have been misunderstandings of the framework (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1995:255).
Nonetheless, one of the main and persistent objections levied against Relevance theory has
been the difficulty in falsifying it (see e.g. Cohen-Foster 2000:3). However, rather than being
a criticism, this seems to show the robustness of the framework in that it appears to fare well
against potential counterarguments and in applications to new fields. A more productive way
of looking at this objection is to continue to test the theory against new data and areas of
study, which is one of the epiphenomena of the work submitted here (as well as one of its
resulting cohesive links). In this respect, the applications of the theory carried out in the
publications submitted contribute both to the testing of the soundness of the theory and to the
extension of its applicability to new areas of study and to new languages (an aspect which is
discussed further in the publications below).
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In what follows, two aspects of this submission are examined in turn. Firstly, the overall
coherence of the body of work submitted is discussed, focussing on the main cohesive links
between the publications presented. Secondly, the specific contributions made within each
section and publication are examined in detail.
4. Overall Coherence: Relevance Theory as a Unified Approach to the Description of
Galician and Spanish, and to Translation
The main overall coherence of the set of publications submitted here lies in the application of
Relevance theory, as a single unified theory, both to the description of Galician and Spanish,
and to translation. This central cohesive theme can be broken down into a number of more
specific common links, which are discussed in turn in what follows.
Firstly, the two main areas of research, i.e. intra- and interlinguistic uses of language, are seen
as instances of verbal communication. As mentioned earlier, in the case of intralinguistic use
of language this seems to be uncontroversial, as language is widely believed to be ordinarily
used to communicate (see e.g. Grundy 1995). In the case of interlinguistic uses of language
(i.e. translation), the situation didn't use to be as clear-cut in the past, but current research
increasingly acknowledges the importance of studying translation as an instance of verbal
communication (see e.g. Hatim &. Mason 1997; Gutt 1991, 2000). In this respect, Hatim and
Mason (1997:1) state: "translating is looked upon as as an act of communication which
attempts to relay, across cultural ami linguistic boundaries, another act of communication."
Gutt (2000:198) makes the same point more generally: "issues of translation are [...] at heart
issues of communication." The research submitted here provides further evidence for this
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position and shows that it is possible to study inter- and intralinguistic uses of language as
applications of the same theory of verbal communication. In doing so, it also provides one of
the main cohesive links between the publications included in the two main parts of this
submission.
The second cohesive link relates to the way in which descriptions of language use and
translation can be studied as manifestations of the same underlying theoretical concepts. In
particular, if these two areas of research fall under the same area of study, then it should be
possible to have one single theory covering both fields. This is precisely what Relevance
theory offers as a unified theory of verbal communication. More specifically, it allows us to
study both intra- and interlinguistic instances of verbal communication as manifestations of
the same underlying concepts. In this respect, Blakemore (1992:39) argues, "[t]he search for
relevance is something that constraints all communication, verbal and non-verbal." So, from
this point of view, instances of language use, as cases of verbal communication, will be
governed by the principle of relevance and w ill be described accordingly. This is equally
applicable to translation. As Gutt (2000:198) argues, "the principles, rules and guidelines of
translation are applications of the principle of relevance." He goes on to argue that "given the
general framework of relevance theory, no special, additional concepts or theoretical tools are
needed to accommodate translation" (ibid.:237). This means that the same concepts already
available within Relevance theory, as a theory of verbal communication, are indistinctly
applicable to intra- and interlinguistic phenomena. This interchangeability in the application
of theoretical concepts is shown in the publications submitted in both sections below, such as
for example in the indistinct use of relevance-theoretic notions of explicit and implicit
content, enrichment, and interpretive use of language, amongst others.
The third main cohesive link between the publications submitted involves the application of
Relevance theory concepts in a progressive fashion. That is to say, the publications in each
section deal with the application of theoretical notions from the more basic communicative
level of analysis to the more general, following the incremental processing line involved in
the derivation of utterance interpretation. Thus, the publications submitted in both sections
deal first with the impact of communication at individual concept level (word level), then at
propositional level (sentence level), and finally at implicative level (implicit level). This
progressive application reflects the ordered stages involved in utterance interpretation and the
unified, relevance-theoretic, approach adopted within both language description and
translation. The possibility of applying the same progressive, staged, analysis in both areas
also provides further evidence for the interchangeability of Relevance theory across different
areas of study more generally. It also helps us make our application of Relevance theory to
the description of Galician and Spanish more systematic in both monolingual and translation
contexts.
A fourth cohesive link between the publications submitted involves their role in providing
further evidence and testing scenarios for Relevance theory across diverse areas of study and
languages. In this respect, the research submitted provides further overall confirmation for the
robustness and soundness of the theory particularly as a result of applying it to a wider set of
data in monolingual and translation areas, as well as to new languages. This involves
individual concepts of the theory as well as its role as a unified approach to all verbal
communication. The range and diversity of areas covered also provides greater opportunities
to attempt to falsify the claims made by the theory (which seems especially important given
the difficulties some researchers have found in falsifying it, and the resulting criticisms this
has caused).
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Finally, another key cohesive link between the publications submitted is the languages
studied. In this respect, the focus of application lies mainly in Galician and Spanish (though
reference to other languages such as English, German and Italian is also made when
appropriate). As a result, this set of publications contributes to, and expands, the study and
description of both languages by applying Relevance theory to a number of areas in both
intra- and interlinguistic contexts, such as the interpretation of individual concepts, the
conveyance of stylistic effects at sentential level, and the impact of contextual information on
the explicitly and implicitly communicated content, amongst others. As this application is
mirrored in both sections, it creates a cohesive parallelism between the two areas of study
both cross-linguistically and thematically, and underlies the importance of using a unified
approach to study them.
So far we have discussed the main cohesive links between the publications submitted. In the
next section, the contributions made by the various publications are examined in more detail.
5. Contribution: Applications of Relevance Theory to the Description of Galician and
Spanish, and to Translation
The main contribution of the set of publications submitted here lies in the application of
Relevance theory to the description of Galician and Spanish, and to translation. As far as the
first part is concerned, the main overall contribution lies in the application of Relevance
theory to a number of areas involving intralinguistic uses of language, thus expanding and
improving current descriptions of Galician and Spanish. The areas of application include
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semantic representations, prepositional form and presuppositional effects, interpretive use of
language, and non-declarative sentences. In each area, the main contribution involves
providing critical appraisals of current analyses of the data concerned and applying
Relevance theory as an alternative approach to the description of the linguistic phenomena in
question.
As far as the second part is concerned (i.e. translation), the main contribution lies in the
application of Relevance theory to a range of areas involving interlinguistic communication
(particularly in Galician and Spanish) with a view to expanding and improving our
knowledge of the impact of communicative processes on translation phenomena. The areas of
application include interlingual communicative discrepancies, interlingual enrichment,
interlingual impoverishment, and degrees of acceptability in translation. In each area, the
main contribution involves an analysis of the impact of communicative processes on
translation and the application of Relevance theory to account for the resulting effects on
translation processes and output.
In what follows, these general contributions are discussed in greater detail particularly in
relation to each section and the publications submitted thereof. First, let us start with the
language description section.
5.1. Contribution to the Descr.",:1i: of Galician and Spanish: / , , at ions of Relevance
Theory
The main contribution in this section involves expanding and improving the description of
Galician and Spanish as a result of applying Relevance theory to a range of linguistic
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phenomena in the two languages. These applications involve a number of main stages in
utterance interpretation, which deal with some of the key ordered steps required to arrive at
an optimal utterance interpretation (following a progressive line of semantic and pragmatic
development). Each publication makes a number of specific contributions, which are
discussed in more detail in what follows.
The main contribution of the first publication involves the application of several linguistic
concepts to the description of Galician, particularly in relation to the analysis of prepositional
direct objects and their impact on the semantic representation of sentences. This publication
makes a number of specific contributions. Firstly, it surveys and critiques current analyses of
this type of direct object (see e.g. Alvarez et al 1986; Costa Casas et al 1988; and
Monteagudo 1992), all of which treat the semantic meaning of prepositional and non-
prepositional direct objects indistinctly. Secondly, it examines a wider range of data than
previously considered in the analysis of prepositional direct objects, which enables us to
provide a more descriptively adequate account of the phenomenon. Thirdly, it develops and
proposes an alternative approach by applying existing theoretical concepts, including a
differentiated semantic account of both prepositional and non-prepositional direct objects. In
doing so, it corroborates current relevance-theoretic predictions involving cognitive
processing effort and effects. Fourthly, it examines the resulting contrasts between Galician
and other languages (such as Spanish and English) in relation to the types of linguistic
semantic meaning that can be conveyed arising from the use of prepositional direct objects.
Finally, it attempts to establish the semantic limits of the type of verb that allows, in
principle, the use of prepositional direct objects. This overall line of research is continued in
the second publication of this section, which examines aspects of the next processing stage
involved in utterance interpretation, namely, the development of prepositional forms.
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In this respect, the next publication makes a number of further contributions, particularly as a
result of applying Relevance theory to the cross-linguistic functional equivalence of word
order and stress in Galician and English respectively. More specifically, it examines the
presuppositional effects these communicative phenomena give rise to in the development of
the prepositional form (i.e. the fully explicit thought taken to have been communicated by the
utterance of given sentence). In doing this, it makes several specific contributions. Firstly, it
explores the cross-linguistic relationship between stress and word order in English and
Galician respectively. Secondly, it provides further ev idence for the functional equivalence at
pragmatic level between these two cross-linguistic communicative strategies. Thirdly, it
applies the theoretical framework provided by Relevance theory to account for this
phenomenon, particularly one based on the notion of relative cross-linguistic processing cost.
Finally, it provides the basis for further cross-linguistic comparisons and theoretical
applications between English and Galician at pragmatic level.
The contributions discussed so far (involving semantic representations and presuppositional
effects) are complemented in the next publication of this section, which deals with the next
stage in utterance interpretation, i.e. attitudes towards the prepositional content
communicated. More specifically, this publication deals with the application of the relevance-
theoretic notion of language use to a set of Galician adverbs (please see individual
publication for more details on these adverbs). In this discussion a number of contributions
are made to current descriptions of Galician. Firstly, it is shown that traditional grammatical
analyses of these adverbs do not capture their true semantic meaning. Secondly, arguments
are put forward in favour of a new account based on the application of the relevance-theoretic
notion of interpretive use of language, which seems to capture their meaning more accurately.
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Thirdly, Relevance-based criteria are provided for distinguishing the group of adverbs studied
from other types of adverb as well as for establishing their internal semantic differences. In
doing this, linguistic evidence is also provided for the differences predicted by Relevance
theory between some of the different types of interpretive use available. Finally, this
publication explores new lines of enquiry into the prediction and analysis of more subtypes of
language use through further application of relevance-theoretic concepts, particularly in
relation to possible subtypes of adverbs that could enable us to express more specific types of
interpretive resemblances.
The last publication of this section continues to explore the borderline between semantics and
pragmatics (which is where the successive processing steps examined in the previous
publications were located). In this case, the research involves semantic and pragmatic aspects
of non-declarative sentences. In particular, its main contribution lies in the application of
Relevance theory to the imperative use of the infinitive in Spanish (including examples from
other languages). In doing this, it makes a number of specific contributions. Firstly, it
discusses a survey of accounts of non-declarative sentences in general and the imperative use
of the infinitive in particular. Secondly, it provides an application and critique of current
relevance-theoretic analysis of imperative uses of the infinitive (Sperber and Wilson 1995,
1988). Thirdly, it provides a wide range of data of the imperative use of the infinitive
particularly from Spanish (but also from other languages), which seems to show that this is an
extended phenomenon. Finally, it explores the differences between ordinary imperative uses
and imperative uses of the infinitive. This includes possible lines of enquiry to find solutions
to the problems faced by current analyses, particularly by involving the notion of explicature.
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This publication completes the discussion of the main contributions made by the research
submitted within the language description section. In what follows, the discussion is turned to
the contributions made by the publications submitted in the translation section.
5.2. Contribution to Translation: Applications of Relevance Theory
The main contribution here lies in the application of Relevance theory to the study of
discrepancies and acceptability judgements in translation (particularly, but not exclusively, in
relation to Spanish and Galician). In what follows, this overall contribution is discussed in
more detail and then the specific contributions made by each of the publications in this
section are discussed in turn.
The contributions made in this section are a result of seeing translation as an instance of
communication and therefore as being subject to the same communication principles as other
types of language use. T his provides one of the main links with the discussion thus far in that
translation is not seen as being fundamentally different from other forms of verbal
communication and thus follows from the same relevance-theoretic principles adopted in the
rest of this submission. The only particularity is that translation involves cross-linguistic
communication, i.e. the use of at least two languages. Apart from this difference, the concepts
discussed in this section have fundamentally the same theoretical status within the framework
used as those considered in the previous section. This fundamental connection also provides
further evidence for the importance of a theory of communication which is robust enough to
capture the various existing forms of verbal communication (both intra- and interlinguistic).
The framework developed within Relevance theory provides such an approach, as seen thus
far.
29
Within translation, the main proponent of the application of Relevance theory to translation
issues has been Gutt (1991/2000). The contributions made by the research submitted here add
to Gutt's work, but result from looking at different aspects within the field of translation. In
this respect, one of the main contributions of the publications submitted involves the
application of Relevance theory to account for discrepancies between original and target texts
in translation (in particular those discrepancies which result from gaps between encoded and
communicated information in verbal communication). In doing this, this research provides
evidence for the existence of different types of communicative gap and of resulting textual
discrepancies between original and target texts. Moreover, it is shown that the gap between
what is encoded and what is communicated is crucial to understanding how discrepancies
arise in the process of translation and in explaining the resulting textual differences.
Similarly, it is claimed that these discrepancies may help us explain how we make
judgements i ' t the degrees of acceptability in translation.
The contributions made here are possible, because the translator is viewed as an interpreter
(i.e. hearer/reader of the original text), who at the same time is a communicator (i.e.
speaker/writer of the target text), and thus is subject to the principles governing utterance
interpretation. Thus, one basic assumption here is that if we are to understand the process ot
translation, we must first look at how the translator interprets the original text, since this is
going to determine the way he translates the original text into the target text. In other words,
we can only understand his translation decisions if we understand the (semantic and
pragmatic) interpretive processes he undergoes in order to construct his interpretation of the
original text.
As in the previous section, the publications are presented and discussed not necessarily in
chronological order of publication, but rather in an order which best fits their conceptual
progression. Thus, the publications which present more basic notions (e.g. discrepancies at
word/conceptual and prepositional level) are discussed first and those which deal with more
general, evaluative, concepts are discussed subsequently (e.g. acceptability). This order also
mirrors both the overall processing progression involved in utterance interpretation (e.g. from
the processes activated in the recovery of individual conceptual content and prepositional
forms to considerations of acceptability of interpretations) as well as the stages followed in
the study of pragmatic interpretation within the theoretical approach used (i.e. Relevance
theory).
So, at what stage in the process of utterance interpretation does the translator find the first
gap between encoded and communicated content? The answer to this question is explored in
the first publication of this section, which deals with the discrepancies arising from the gap
between individual words and the associated concepts communicated in utterance
interpretation. In this respect, the main contribution of this publication is to apply Relevance
theory to interpretation processes at individual word/concept level, including the resulting
consequences for translation. In doing so, this publication makes a number ot specihc
contributions. Firstly, it identifies (through the application of Relevance theory) different types
of discrepancy between original and target texts as consequences of pragmatic interpretation.
This contrasts with past research in this area (see e.g. Baker 1992; Munday 2001), where no
attempt was made at investigating the type of pragmatic process involved (thus leaving the
crucial pragmatic processes undergone by the translator unexplored, focussing instead on surface
equivalences between original and target texts). Secondly, this publication provides an account,
based on applications of Relevance theory, of translation discrepancies that arise specifically
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from pragmatic interpretation at the individual word and concept level. Thirdly, it provides
evidence for the dual pragmatic role that translators play in the translation process, as hearers
and communicators, and the consequences this may have for discrepancies between original and
target texts. In doing this, it contributes to translators' awareness of the types of process that may
affect their decisions in the translation process. Finally, it provides criteria based on Relevance
Theory for articulating judgements of acceptability in translation, as well as for establishing the
basis for a systematic study of discrepancies between original and target texts.
The discrepancies arising from the differences between what is encoded and what is
communicated at w ord concept level, are explored further in the second publication of this
section, where a wider set of data is examined. This publication makes a number of further
contributions in this area. Firstly, it applies relevance-theoretic notions discussed in the
previous publication to wider contexts and examines the effects of a third type of interpretive
resemblance (i.e. echoic use) on translation discrepancies. This line of enquiry contrasts with
past research in the area (see e.g. Baker 1992; Hatim and Mason 1997), which has looked at
related phenomena, hut only in the form of quotations or borrowings (i.e. without considering
the pragmatic and cognitive processes undergone by the translator both as addressee and
communicator, an issue which the current publication attempts to investigate). Secondly, this
publication develops the application of current relevance-theoretic concepts further in this
area and provides evidence for the existence of another type of interpretive resemblance,
namely, concept widening, which seems to be the opposite ol concept narrowing (please see
individual publications for a discussion of these notions). Finally, it explores how the
application of Relevance theory and, in particular, the notion of degrees in interpretive
resemblance between original and target texts may allect judgements ol acceptability.
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So far only discrepancies at the word/concept level have been considered. The next
publication in this section takes the discussion forward by examining discrepancies at the
next level of utterance interpretation, i.e. the propositional level. In particular, its main
contribution lies in the application of the relevance-theoretic notion of pragmatic enrichment
to the development of full propositions in translation and its consequences for interlinguistic
textual discrepancies. In doing this, this publication makes a number of specific
contributions. Firstly, it applies the relevance-theoretic concept of pragmatic enrichment to
translation in order to explore textual discrepancies arising from the use of implicit contextual
information. This contrasts with past research in the area, where there has been no discussion
of this type of underlying pragmatic process. Instead, the focus in the past has been on
making texts more "idiomatic" through expansion processes (see Baker 1992; Hatim and
Mason 1997; Munday 2001), without accounting for the type of developmental, cognitive,
processes undergone by translators and their attendant interpretive consequences. Secondly, it
develops the concept of interlingual pragmatic enrichment as a specific application of general
relevance-theoretic enrichment processes to translation. In doing this, it explores the various
possible types of interlingual enrichment that may exist in translation practice and predicts
the existence of the opposite process in translation, namely, interlingual impoverishment
(which is explored in the following publication of this submission). Thirdly, it provides a
range of data with exemplifications of various subtypes of interlingual enrichment, as further
applications of Relevance theory. Finally, it explores the boundary between interlingual
enrichment, which is licensed from a pragmatic point of view, and other types ot enrichment
that go beyond a completion of the propositional form intended by the original author.
Given the existence of interlingual enrichment in translation, it is not surprising also to find
the opposite process, i.e. interlingual impoverishment, which is precisely the topic discussed
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in the next publication of this section. In this case, the main contribution lies in applying
Relevance theory to account for the impoverishment of texts in translation and the resulting
stylistic changes caused (including the consequences of these processes for translation
acceptability). In doing this, this publication makes a number of specific contributions. Firstly,
it applies Relevance theory to account for various types of discrepancy which result from the
mismatch in degrees of cross-linguistic explicitness (thus causing translation impoverishment).
Secondly, it argues that the application of Relevance theory allows us to establish two subtypes
of pragmatic impoverishment in translation: one due to interlingual grammatical differences and
the other to contextual differences. This contrasts with past research in the area (see e.g. Santoyo
1989), where translation impoverishment has only been investigated to denounce glaring
omissions in the target text of whole passages from the original text. This type of translation
phenomenon falls outside the type of pragmatic impoverishment studied here, which involves
communication of the same propositional import, but using different stylistic strategies. Thirdly,
it explores the pragmatic and stylistic consequences of lowering the level of explicitness cross-
linguistically by applying the theoretical framework provided by Relevance theory. Finally, it
provides an account of the consequences of pragmatic impoverishment for judgements of
acceptability in translation based on relevance-theoretic notions.
The last point mentioned, i.e. judgements of acceptability in translation, is studied in more detail
in the last publication of this section. In particular, its main contribution lies in the application of
Relevance theory to explain acceptability judgements in translation. In doing so, this publication
makes a number of specific contributions. Firstly, it provides a review and a critique of current
accounts of acceptability judgements in translation. Secondly, it applies the relevance-theoretic
notion (and types) of interpretive resemblance to translation acceptability. Thirdly, it examines
the applications and differences between direct and indirect translation in relation to
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acceptability judgements in translation. Finally, it explores the application of the principle of
relevance as an overall alternative criterion in the evaluation of acceptability judgements in
translation.
(>.Conclusion
The main contribution of the publications included in this submission lies in the application
of Relevance theory to the description of Galician and Spanish, and to translation. The
common ground between these areas follows from two main interlinked assumptions. On the
one hand, the intra- and interlinguistic uses of language involved here are seen as instances of
verbal communication. On the other, they are both, consequently, seen as being studied under
a single, overall, and unified theory of verbal communication. In this submission, the unified
approach adopted throughout is Relevance theory, which seems to offer the greatest
explanatory power, whilst at the same time covering both areas of study. This approach
shows that intra- and interlinguistic uses of language can indeed be accounted for by the same
explanatory theory and that, as a result, there is no need to resort to two separate theories to
explain the communicative phenomena involved in the two areas.
The approach adopted here is inferential in nature and provides an alternative overall account
to earlier approaches, such as the code model and the Gricean framework, which faced
various problems and, ultimately, proved to be inadequate as theories of verbal
communication. Relevance theory, on the other hand, seems to provide an approach which
not only appears to resolve earlier problems, but it also allows us to explain a wide range ol
intra- and interlinguistic communicative phenomena under a unified framework.
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The theoretical coherence invested on the submitted publications is further evidenced by the
involvement of similar communicative and interpretive processes in both monolingual and
translation data. In this respect, the publications submitted in the two areas deal indistinctly
with the application of common theoretical notions such as, for example, the relationship
between words and concepts, the retrieval of the proposition expressed, and interpretive use
of language, all of which are applications of the theoretical machinery of Relevance theory.
Further cohesive links between the publications submitted result from the focus on Galician
and Spanish as the main languages of study and description; from the progressive application
of Relevance theory within the various processing stages of utterance interpretation; and from
the testing of the theory that results thereof.
The main contributions of this submission involve a number of applications of Relevance
theory to the description of Galician and Spanish, and to translation. Thus, in the language
description section, traditional analyses of prepositional direct objects in Galician have been
critiqued and alternative accounts have been developed through the application of current
theoretical notions. Equally, the pragmatic equivalence between stress placement and word
order has been analysed in relation to English and Galician. Additionally, traditional semantic
analyses of a set of Galician adverbs have been argued against and an alternative account has
been developed, which proposes a new type of adverb in Galician based on the application ol
the relevance-theoretic notion of interpretive use of language. Finally, the account ot non-
declarative sentences provided by Relevance theory is applied to imperative uses of the
infinitive in Spanish, giving rise to some critical appraisals for further development.
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In the translation section, the publications submitted also make a number of specific
contributions by applying Relevance theory to translation phenomena. In particular, the
impact of communicative gaps (arising from the difference between what is encoded and
what is communicated) has been examined in detail and a number of more specific
contributions have been made. It is shown that the difference between encoding and
communication can cause discrepancies in translation at various levels, particularly in
relation to words/concepts and propositions. At the individual word/concept level, a number
of processes found in verbal communication are examined, including concept loosening and
narrowing as well as interpretive uses of language. Their consequences for translation are
also explored in detail. At the propositional level, new applications of theoretical concepts are
carried out to articulate the discrepancies caused by enrichment and impoverishment in
translation. Finally, the consequences of overall discrepancies found between original and
target texts are studied in relation to issues of acceptability judgements in translation. In this
respect, there is an investigation into what are the crucial criteria that guide our judgements of
acceptability. It is found that considerations of relevance play a central role into whether or
not we find a given translation acceptable.
Further research in both areas of study will provide more opportunities to apply the
theoretical framework used throughout to new phenomena and thus test its theoretical
soundness and robustness further. In this respect, a number of areas of further research can be
identified, such as exploring the use and impact of new types of prepositional direct object,
investigating new interlinguistic equivalences at pragmatic level, and identifying new types
of interpretive resemblance; and, in relation to translation, establishing new types of
discrepancy between original and target texts resulting from differences between encoded and
communicated content. Some of these (and other) areas have already been explored in new
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research and publications (to appear), including the application of Relevance theory to the use
of formulaic expressions in translation, anaphoric reference assignment in Galician, discourse
markers, and the interpretation of reflexive anaphora in VP-ellipsis in second language
acquisition. In this subsequent work, some reanalysis of current relevance-theoretic views has
been required in order to account for the full range of data considered (e.g. in relation to
discourse markers).
Finally, as far as the overall presentation is concerned, the publications included in this
submission are presented in two parts: one involving publications related to language
description and the other involving those related to translation. The publications have been
ordered not in chronological order, but rather in an order that mirrors conceptual progression,
utterance interpretation processes, and attendant theoretical stages within Relevance theory.
As far as the layout is concerned, each publication has been photocopied directly from its
published format onto A4 paper to provide a homogeneous presentation and to facilitate the
binding of the whole submission.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In Galician some transi t ive verbs can take their direct object ei ther with the
preposi t ion en ' in /on ' or without i t . These verbs tend to indicate some kind of
act ion and include an implici t reference to the endpoint of the event descr ibed.
However , in their t reatment of this phenomenon most grammars of Galician
simply mention the possibility of prepositional direct objects, without explaining
the effects brought about by the introduct ion of the preposi t ion in a sentence or
determining the specif ic type of act ion verb that l icenses the use of the preposi t ion.
In this ar t ic le , an at tempt is made to resolve these issues and to look more
closely into the semantics of the phenomenon. I t is argued that , contrary to what is
suggested in most grammars, the inclusion of the preposi t ion does bring about a
semantic change to the interpretat ion of the sentence in which i t is used and is not
just a mere syntact ic permutat ion, as is general ly suggested. I t is shown that the
preposi t ion causes important changes to the meaning of the verb phrase, including,
crucial ly , a change in the verb type. This analysis is corroborated by further
evidence relat ing to the use of this type of structure in contrast ing contexts . The
l icensing condi t ions for the preposi t ion are shown to arise from the verb and the
direct object , both of which must be compatible in appropriate ways, as wil l be
apparent below.
The art ic le is organized as fol lows. Firs t ly , a br ief presentat ion of verb types is
provided. Secondly, a review is presented of exis t ing accounts of the phenomenon
under discussion. In part icular , this includes a cr i t ique of the proposals put
forward in their grammars by Alvarez et al . , ' Costa Casas et al . , 2 and in passing
the Conversat ional Grammar of the Inst i tuto da l ingua Galega. ' Thirdly,
arguments are presented for an al ternat ive semantic analysis of the preposi t ional
direct object s t ructures with en. Final ly , some conclusions are drawn from the
discussion.
2. A RFVIEW OF EXIS TING WORK
2.1. VERB TYPES ACCORDING TO SITUATION TYPES
Both Alvarez et al. and Costa Casas et al. claim that the verb plays a crucial role in
determining whether or not the preposi t ion en can introduce direct objects (see
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below). Both al lude to verbs of process and durat ion as the determining factors in
the grammatical use of the preposi t ion with direct objects . Their discussion
therefore brings into play the not ion of verb type, which wil l be brief ly introduced
here.
Verbs have been tradi t ional ly classif ied according to the type of si tuat ion they
descr ibe and the temporal constraints they impose on sentence structure . Although
the classif icat ion to be used here has come under some cri t ic ism, 4 four types of verb
have general ly been proposed to account for both the type of si tuat ion denoted and
the range of temporal s t ructures al lowed by the various verb types. The four
si tuat ion and verb types are as fol lows:
(1) a) STATES:
Xoan esta na casa
Xoan is at home
b) PROCES SES:
Xoan trabal lou moito onte
Xoan worked a lot yesterday
c) ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
Xoan comeu unha mazan
Xoan ate an apple
d) ACHIEVEMENTS:
Xoan reconeceu a Pedro
Xoan recognized Peter
States descr ibe si tuat ions which do not change in t ime, so, for example, the gerund
is not normally al lowed in conjunct ion with this type of verb (e .g . one cannot say:
John is being at home). Processes , on the other hand, do take place in t ime? and
encode change, so they can be used in conjunct ion with the gerund (e.g. one can
say: John was working a lot) . Accomplishments are si tuat ions which have an
outcome (i .e . some kind of resul t ) , but which require t ime to be accomplished (e.g.
one can say: John ate an apple in two minutes , where two minutes is the durat ion
of the event ; or : John was eat ing an apple) . Achievements , on the other hand, are
si tuat ions which, whils t having an outcome, do not take place over t ime (e.g. one
cannot say ei ther : John was recognizing Peter ; or : John recognized Peter in two
minutes , meaning the durat ion of the event took two minutes) . Let us now turn to
the Galician cases .
2 .2 . ALVAREZ ET AL.'S PROPOSALS
2.2.1. PREPOSITIONAL DIRECT OBJECTS
Understandably for a grammar of i ts character is t ics , Alvarez et al. do not go into
much detai l about the phenomenon under discussion in this ar t ic le . They claim
that en can be used 'af ter verbs which express an act ion in progress ' in order to
introduce direct objects . Their character izat ion centres on the not ion of act ion as
opposed to that of s ta te . This account could therefore be summarized as fol lows:
(2) Alvarez et al.'s Account
a) Verbs Must Indicate Action
b) Action Must Be in Progress
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I t would thus be expected that verbs which carry a feature [+ process/
achievement/ accomplishment] would al low this type of structure , as al l these
three verb types share the idea of act ion as part of their meaning. 8 Let us see
whether this is the case. Consider the fol lowing pairs of examples: 9
(3) a) Maria comeu queixo toda a tarde [+ process] 10
Mar'ta ate cheese all afternoon
b) Maria comeu no queixo toda a tarde
Mar'ta ate cheese all afternoon
(4) a) Maruxa sachou patacas [ + process]
Maruxa dug out potatoes
b) Maruxa sachou nas patacas
Maruxa dug out the potatoes
(5) a) Xoan coseu a roupa a semana pasada [+ accomplishment]
Xoan sewed the clothes last week
b) Xoan coseu na roupa a semana pasada
Xoan sewed the clothes last week
(6) a) Uxia leu o l ibro onte pola tarde [+ accomplishment]
Uxia read the book yesterday afternoon
b) Uxia leu no l ibro onte pola tarde
LJxia read the book yesterday afternoon
In al l these examples there are act ion verbs [comer, sachar, coser and ler), which
al low the inser t ion of the preposi t ion, as predicted by Alvarez et al . ' s hypothesis .
Moreover , the construct ion with the preposi t ion is favoured by some authors as
being more Galician. The fol lowing is s ta ted in the Conversat ional Grammar of
Galician referred to ear l ier : ' the construct ions [with the preposi t ion] [ . . . ] are more
Galician, we therefore recommend their preferent ia l use. ' 11 Compare now the
above examples to the fol lowing ones in which the underl ined preposi t ion en is not
al lowed:
(7) a) Xavier posuiu un coche [ + state]
Xavier owned a car
b) * Xavier posuiu nun coche
Xavier owned a car
(8) a) Maria amaba o seu coche [ + state]
Mar'ta loved her car
b) * Maria amaba no seu coche
Mar'ta loved her car
In these two cases there are verbs of state . As predicted by Alvarez et al.'s
character izat ion, the sentences are not acceptable when used with the preposi t ion.
They are ungrammatical .
Interest ingly, their account , in introducing the element of act ion in progress,
would also explain another fact , provided that we take in progress to mean
durat ive . In part icular , i t would explain why the use of some verbs of act ion, in
conjunct ion with the preposi t ion, resul ts in ungrammatical ly , as shown below:
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(9) a) Ana entendeu a presentacion alemana [+ achievement]
Ana understood the German presentation
b) * Ana entendeu na presentacion alemana
Ana understood the German presentation
(10) a) Xose encontrou a casa [+ achievement]
Xose found the house
b) * Xose encontrou na casa
Xose found the house
In both of these cases the sentences include verbs of act ion (as opposed to verbs of
state) , but they are of the achievement type. Achievement verbs, as seen earl ier , do
not include temporal durat ion as one of their features . Therefore , they cannot
l icense the use of the preposi t ion, because the preposi t ion requires a durat ive
act ion in order to be l icensed. Consequent ly , the sentences are ruled out .
From the discussion so far , i t can be concluded that Alvarez et al.'s character-
izat ion of this phenomenon is part ly syntact ic , in that they claim that the
phenomenon affects t ransi t ive verbs, but also part ly semantic , in that i t involves
durat ive act ion verbs. From the point of view of a Vendler ian approach, 1- i t can be
concluded that only verbs which descr ibe processes or accomplishments l icense the
use of the preposi t ion. This means that there is some common ground between the
descr ipt ive and theoret ical approaches (Alvarez et al . ' s and Vendler 's respect ively) .
Flowever , does the account proposed by Alvarez et al . explain this construct ion
ful ly? The answer to this quest ion is explored in the next sect ion.
2.1.2. PROBLEMS WITH ALVAREZ ET AL.'S ACCOUNT
Alvarez et al.'s account does in fact raise two problems. The firs t re la tes to the fact
that they do not say whether the addi t ion of the preposi t ion makes any difference
to the semantic and/or pragmatic interpretat ion of the sentences in which the
preposi t ion is found. Is i t just a syntact ic al ternat ive? For example, are (4a) and
(4b) synonymous? Or, does i t give r ise to extra effects in the interpretat ion? For
example, are (4a) and (4b) not synonymous? Clear ly , any account of this
phenomenon, par t icular ly one that includes semantic cr i ter ia , must explain what
contr ibut ion the preposi t ion makes to the interpretat ion of the sentence. Otherwi-
se , i t is not a proper semantic account .
The second problem mentioned above is that some verbs which involve an
act ion in progress of the type Alvarez et al . have in mind do not al low the use of
the preposi t ion. Consider the fol lowing examples:
(11)* Xoan descr ibiu no cadro [+ process]
Xo 'an described the painting
(12) * Mart in comentou na pel icula [+ process]
Martin commented on the film 1
(13)*? Xulio cantou na cancion [+ process]
Xuho sung the song
(14) *? Xoana bai lou na salsa [ + process]
Xoana danced the salsa
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In these examples we have act ion verbs ( describir, comentar, cantar, bailar), hut
the resul t ing sentences are clear ly ungrammatical . Judging by these resul ts , to
claim that we can use the preposi t ion en with verbs denot ing act ion in progress ( i .e .
durat ive verbs: processes or accomplishments) is not enough to explain the
grammatical use and semantic interpretat ion of this type of construct ion.
So, are there any other cr i ter ia proposed by tradi t ional grammars which could
account for these f indings? Costa Casas et al . do in fact give some further ideas
regarding the use of this construct ion. Their claims are considered next .
2 .2 . COSTA CASAS ET AL.'S PROPOSALS
Costa Casas et al. discuss this construct ion very brief ly , but they introduce what
may ult imately be an important dis t inct ion, as wil l be shown below. They claim
that the preposi t ion en ' can introduce direct objects which indicate an endpoint ,
when accompanying verbs in which their lexeme expresses durat ive act ion ' . 15
Their main contr ibut ion is , in effect , separat ing and specifying the semantic
condi t ions that apply to the verb and the direct object , which together l icense
the use of the preposi t ion. Thus, i f by 'direct object ' they are taken to mean 'verb
phrase ' (as direct objects by themselves cannot have an endpoint) , their claims are
that a) the verb phrase must indicate an endpoint , and b) the verb must indicate
durat ive act ion. This is summarized below:
(15) Costa Casas et al.'s Account
a) Verb Phrase indicates Endpoint
b) Verb indicates Durat ive Action
So, their account makes a subt le dis t inct ion in al locat ing semantic condi t ions
separately to the verb and direct object /verb phrase, which, as stated above, is 'an
innovat ion on the claims made by Alvarez et al . These separate condi t ions can
work independent ly of each other in rul ing out unl icensed sentences.
Thus, the endpoint cr i ter ion would rule out s ta te verb sentences, because in
normal circumstances these sentences do not include an end to the si tuat ion
descr ibed. So, for example, al though the state verb sentences in (7) and (8) are
durat ive—thus fulf i l l ing the second cri ter ion in (15b)—, they do not encode an
endpoint—thus f lout ing the f i rs t cr i ter ion and becoming ungrammatical . 14
The durat ion cri ter ion would rule out achievement verb sentences, because
these sentences do not include durat ion as part of their semantic meaning. So, for
example, al though the achievement verb sentences in (9) and (10) have an
endpoint—thus fulf i l l ing the f i rs t cr i ter ion above—, they do not al low durat ive
elements—thus f lout ing the second cri ter ion and becoming ungrammatical .
In short , a l though the claims made by Costa Casas et al. in relat ion to the direct
object condi t ions are badly expressed in that direct objects by themselves cannot
indicate an endpoint , i .e . they can only do i t in conjunct ion with the verb operat ing
on them, they do provide a clue as to how to character ize the l icensing of the
preposi t ion in this type of construct ion.
Notwithstanding this , the problems that were faced by Alvarez et al. are also
appl icable to the account proposed by Costa Casas et al . In part icular , they do not
explain a) the contr ibut ion made by the preposi t ion to the interpretat ion of the
sentence and b) the ungrammatical ly of sentences including certain process verbs
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as seen above. So, in the l ight of these problems and the various cr i ter ia examined
so far , what new proposal can be developed that would account for the use of
preposi t ional direct objects and at the same time resolve the problems raised in the
previous discussion?
3. A NEW PROPOS AL FOR PREPOSITIONAL DIRECT OBJECTS
So far two features seem to be crucial to the grammatical use of direct object
preposi t ions: a) an act ion verb of a cer ta in type; and b) a durat ive si tuat ion. What
type of act ion verb is required and the precise role played by the direct object are
st i l l open quest ions given the evidence seen thus far . Let us star t by consider ing the
verb type.
I t seems incontrovert ible that the verb which l icenses the use of the preposi t ion
is an act ion verb. Moreover , i t seems that achievement verbs are ruled out
alongside state verbs. This leaves process verbs and accomplishment verbs as the
only candidates for l icensing the use of the preposi t ion. In fact , the use of the
preposi t ion seems to interact in complex ways with these two types of verbs. Let us
look at this interact ion in some more detai l .
Firs t of al l , verbs can change the type of si tuat ion they descr ibe depending on
whether they have a direct object or not . One of the implicat ions of this , f rom a
syntact ic point of view, is that these verbs can behave transi t ively or intransi t ively.
Compare the fol lowing:
(16) a) Maria comeu [ + process] [—transi t ive]
Maria ate
b) Maria comeu o queixo [+ accomplishment] [+ transi t ive]
Maria ate the cheese
In the f i rs t example the verb comer descr ibes a process , as i t involves an act ion but
there is no expl ic i t endpoint . 15 By contrast , in the second example comer is no
longer behaving l ike a process verb, but rather i t has changed into an accom-
pl ishment verb, as now there is an endpoint ( i .e . a resul t /an outcome: the eaten
cheese) . This means that the same verb can descr ibe different s i tuat ion types
depending on the part icular syntact ic and semantic structure in which i t is
integrated. Compare these resul ts to the fol lowing example:
(17) Maria comeu no queixo
Maria ate cheese
In this example the verb should behave l ike an accomplishment , because the
def ini te direct object is present and should thus indicate that there is an endpoint .
However , what is st r iking in this case is that now there is no l inguis t ical ly manifest
endpoint ( i .e . the cheese has not been finished) . The use of the preposi t ion has
changed the verb back to a process verb, and as a resul t has cancel led the otherwise
avai lable endpoint . This creates a paradoxical s i tuat ion from a semantic point of
view, as on the one hand we seem to have an accomplishment si tuat ion, but on the
other the preposi t ion has reverted the si tuat ion back to a process one. The
resul t ing semantic interpretat ion is one in which Maria has been eat ing a
specif ic cheese (resul t ing from the use of the defini te ar t ic le) , but without the
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verb phrase actual ly signal l ing that there was an endpoint (other than the past
tense, which is not par t of the event s t ructure of the verb) . Thus, in the semantic-
interpretat ion of this type of sentence, there is no outcome or resul t , which is
normally associated with an accomplishment . So the preposi t ion creates a hybrid
sentence, having the structure of an accomplishment whils t a t the same time having
the meaning of a process . This contrasts with another process structure:
(18) Maria comeu queixo
Maria ate cheese
In this case, where there is a bare noun as direct object , without a defini te or
indefini te ar t ic le , the interpretat ion is not that of an accomplishment , but rather
that of a process . The difference between this s t ructure and the one with the
preposi t ion is that the former sentence is not about a specif ic cheese. I t is instead
about any cheese. By contrast , the structure with the preposi t ion encodes an
interpretat ion in which the cheese is a specif ic one, but the process has not
f inished.
All these various structures enable Galician to have a range of subt le l inguis t ic
nuances. In part icular there are f ive degrees of l inguis t ic expl ic i tness regarding the
act ion of the verb in relat ion to the direct object , where in English or Spanish there
are four:
(19) Galician
a) Mar ia comeu 1 + process ] [ + non -spec i f ic ] 1 + inde te rmina te ]
b) Mar ia comeu queixo 1+ process ] [ - non--spec i f ic ] ( + inde te rmina te ]
c ) Mar ia comeu no queixo [ + process ] [" non •-spec i f ic ] 1 - inde te rmina te ]
d) Mar ia comeu un queixo [ + accompl i sh . ] ( - non--spec i f ic ] 1 + inde te rmina te ]
e ) Mar ia comeu o queixo [ + accompl i sh . ] 1 - non--spec i f ic ] [ - inde te rmina te ]
Spanish
a) Mar ia comio 1 + process ] 1 + non -spec i f ic ] 1 + inde te rmina te ]
b) Mar ia comio queso 1 + process ] 1 - non -spec i f ic ] 1 + inde te rmina te ]
c ) Mar ia comio un queso 1 + accompl i sh . ] [" non--spec i f ic ] 1 + inde te rmina te ]
d) Mar ia comio e l queso [+ accompl i sh . ] 1 - non -spec i f ic ] [" inde te rmina te ]
English
a) Mar ia a te [ + process ] [ + non -spec i f ic ] [ + inde te rmina te ]
b) Mar ia a te cheese [ + process ] l - non--spec i f ic ] [ + inde te rmina te ]
c ) Mar ia a te a cheese [ + accompl i sh . ] [ - non--spec i f ic ] [ + inde te rmina te ]
d) Mar ia a te the cheese 1+ accompl i sh . ] [ - non -spec i f ic ] [ - inde te rmina te ]
The cont ras t s explored above seem to show tha t the ro le of prepos i t iona l d i rec t
ob jec ts in Gal ic ian is tha t of a l lowing fur ther semant ic in te rpre ta t ions . In
par t icu la r , they a l low the encoding of complex semant ic meanings combin ing
a l te ra t ion of verb type and s i tua t ion , wi th the main tenance of re fe ren t ia l
spec i f ic i ty . This seems to provide an answer to the f i r s t problem encountered by
previous approaches to the phenomenon, which were unable to provide an account
of the cont r ibu t ion of the prepos i t ion to the semant ic in te rpre ta t ion of sen tences in
which they appear . How about the second problem ment ioned above , regard ing
the apparen t imposs ib i l i ty of us ing the prepos i t ion wi th some act ion verbs? Is there
a so lu t ion to tha t problem with in th is new proposa l?
498 B H S , LXXVII (2000) XOSF. ROSALES SEQUEIROS
The verbs that did not al low the preposi t ion (describtr, comentar, cantar,
bai lar) seem to be funct ioning as accomplishment verbs in the examples under
discussion, (11) through to (14) , as there was an outcome (e.g. the song and the
salsa having being sung and danced respect ively) and they were durat ive act ions
(e .g . the singing and the dancing took some time). So, something internal to those
act ions causes the ungrammatical i ty . In fact , what seems to be different between
these four examples and all the others is that they do not involve physical
manipulat ion of an object . In other words, i t seems necessary for the direct
object to be a physical object (e .g . a cheese, a book, clothes , e tc . ) on which the
process can be carr ied out . I t is this semantic feature in the direct object combined
with an accomplishment verb that together l icense the structure . Moreover , the
verb i tself also has to be compatible with the physical feature of the direct object ,
involving some kind of physical manipulat ion of an object , as wil l be shown below.
This new account can be summarized as fol lows:
(22) New Proposal
a) Verb Funct ioning as Accomplishment Verb
b) Verb with [ + physical] feature
c) Direct Object with [ + physical] feature
d) Verb Switching to Process Type
This would explain why examples (11) to (14) are ungrammatical , despi te the fact
that they are accomplishment verbs in a process type structure . The reason for
their ungrammatical i ty is that al l of them fai l some of the cr i ter ia mentioned
above. For example, sentence (11) involves a verb which does not involve physical
manipulat ion of an object . Similar ly , sentence (14) involves a physical act ion but
the direct object is not a physical object . The same reasoning appl ies to the other
two examples .
So far the discussion has concentrated on direct evidence from sentences
incorporat ing the various types of verb descr ibed above. However , is there any
further independent evidence for the al ternat ive analysis proposed in this ar t ic le?
5. FURTHER EVIDENCE
One piece of evidence that seems to corroborate the new analysis proposed in the
previous sect ion (i .e . that there is a semantic difference between the preposi t ional
and the non-preposi t ional construct ions as well as verb type restr ic t ions) is the
interact ion of temporal complements with verb types. Of al l the act ion verb types,
only process verbs al low the use of bare durat ive temporal complements . Consider
the fol lowing examples , where bare durat ive temporal complements are contrasted
with non-bare ones:
(23) PROCESSES:
a) Xoan trabal lou catro horas onte
Xoan worked four hours yesterday
b) Xoan trabal lou durante catro horas onte
Xoan worked for four hours yesterday
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(24) ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
a) * Xoan comeu unha mazan catro horns onte
Xoan ate an apple four hours yesterday
b) Xoan comeu unha mazan durante catro horas onte
Xoan ate an apple for four hours yesterday
(25) ACHIEVEMENTS:
a) * Xoan reconeceu a Pedro catro horas onte
Xoan recognized Peter four hours yesterday
b) Xoan reconeceu a Pedro durante catro horas onte
Xodn recognized Peter for four hours yesterday
In example (23) the bare durat ive complement is acceptable with a process verb. In
the other two examples , however , the complement is not acceptable as they do not
include a process verb. These resul ts are not surpr is ing as processes are uncons-
t ra ined by resul ts or outcomes, in a similar way to the unconstrained nature of
bare temporal complements, whereas accomplishments and achievements are
constrained by resul ts and outcomes, also in a paral le l way to the preposi t ional
temporal complements . This suggests that bare durat ive temporal complements
(e .g . catro horas) should be al lowed with accomplishment verbs, when they are
used in conjunct ion with preposi t ional direct objects . In this case, the verbs would
be switched to process type verbs by the use of the preposi t ion, which would in
turn make i t possible to use bare temporal complements . This , in fact , seems to be
the case, as shown below:
(26) a) Xoan comeu na mazan catro horas
b) *Xoan comeu a mazan catro horas
(27) a) Maria pintou na parede catro horas
b) * Maria pintou a parede catro horas
(28) a) Xoan coseu na roupa catro horas
b) * Xoan coseu a roupa catro horas
This piece of evidence seems to suggest that some sort of verb type change does in
fact occur with preposi t ional direct objects (from accomplishment to process type)
and that , as long as the direct object and verb involve a physical object and act ion
respect ively, the resul t ing structure is l icensed.
Another piece of evidence support ing the analysis proposed above is that verbs
which do not involve physical act ivi ty seem to rule out preposi t ional direct objects ,
even when the lat ter have the [+ physical] feature . Consider the fol lowing
examples:
(29) a) Uxia concebiu o l ibro
Uxia conceived the book
b) * Uxia concebiu no l ibro
Uxia conceived the book
(30) a) Suso visual izou o edif ic io
Suso visualized the building
b) * Suso visual izou no edif ic io
Suso visualized the building
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(31) a) Xcpc comprendeu o prohlema
Xepe understood the problem
b) Xepc comprendeu no problema
Xepe understood the problem
All these examples involve non-physical verbs: concebir, uisualizar and compren-
der, and the resul t ing construct ions are not grammatical . Furthermore, al though
the f i rs t two structures include physical direct objects : o l ibro and o edi f ic io , the
resul t ing sentences are st i l l ungrammatical , precisely because the verbs fai l to meet
the cr i ter ia requir ing physical act ion. This corroborates fur ther the fact that both
the verb and the direct object need to be compatible with the [ + physical] feature .
I t a lso explains the strong intui t ion associated with preposi t ional direct objects
that these construct ions descr ibe act ions which involve sustained physical exert ion
and/or unrelent ing act ivi ty in the act ion performed. This is precisely one of the
hal lmarks associated with the interpretat ion of this type of construct ion.
4. CONCLUSION
In this ar t ic le an at tempt has been made to analyse current hypotheses regarding
preposi t ional direct objects in Galician. I t has been claimed that al though current
ideas regarding this phenomenon have gone some way towards character iz ing some
of the factors involved, they face problems on a number of counts . In part icular ,
current approaches do not explain the difference in semantic interpretat ion between
non-preposi t ional and preposi t ional direct objects . Similar ly , they do not explain
why some act ion verbs do not l icense the use of the preposi t ion.
The proposal presented in this ar t ic le has at tempted to go some way towards
addressing these issues . I t has been proposed that preposi t ional direct objects play
an important role in al ter ing the semantic interpretat ion of sentences. They switch
the semantic interpretat ion from an accomplishment reading to a process reading.
Moreover , they do so without al ter ing the specif ic reference to an object in the
world. As has been seen, this ref lects a contrast between Galician on the one hand
and Spanish and English on the other .
I t has also been proposed that preposi t ional direct objects are l icensed by verbs
that display a complex behaviour . These verbs can in principle funct ion as process
verbs and, therefore , behave intransi t ively, without a direct object . In addi t ion,
they can be accomplishment verbs and, therefore , behave transi t ively, with a direct
object . The crucial point here is that preposi t ional direct objects with en al low
accomplishment verbs to be switched to process verbs and thus effect important
aspectual changes in the semantic interpretat ion of the sentence. If the verbs are
not intr insical ly , or funct ioning as, accomplishment verbs, then the switching
cannot be carr ied out and the preposi t ion is not l icensed. Equal ly , both the verb
and the direct object must include a physical dimension in their semantic meaning
for the preposi t ional construct ion to be al lowed.
Final ly , there are other preposi t ions apart from en which can also introduce
direct objects in Galician, for example, con. However , i t is l ikely that these
preposi t ions affect different aspects of the semantic interpretat ion of the sentences
in which they occur . This would be another l ine of invest igat ion which would
require fur ther research. 19
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INTRODUCTION
In this ar t ic le I want to compare how English and Galician exploi t differ-
ent (para- l inguis t ic and l inguis t ic) s t ra tegies to obtain the same styl is t ic
effects at proposi t ional level . These effects have also been cal led pre-
supposi t ional effects . A presupposi t ional effectcan be broadly defined as
the effect which resul ts from the ordering of assumptions, motivated by
the l inguis t ic form of an ut terance, which funct ion as background in the
interpretat ion of that ut terance (Sperber & Wilson 1995) . More specif i -
cal ly , the effects I wil l be examining here are those which arise from the
interact ion of pragmatics with the analyt ic implicat ions of ut terances, i .e .
entai lments (Levinson 1983: 174) .
Although expressions in English and Galician often have ident ical se-
mantic content , Engl ish usesstress qui te freely to convey subt le differences
in interpretat ion, whereas Galician uses word order with the same effects .
This is a known phenomenon for languageswith varyingdegrees of morph
ological elaborat ion (see, for example, D'Introno et al . 1988) . Here, I
want to provide arguments , within an explanatory framework, for this
contrast between the two languages.
I wil l argue that there is a funct ional equivalence between the interac-
t ion of pragmatics with each of the two strategies mentioned and that this
shows that Engl ish and Galician resort to different communicat ive strate-
gies to achieve the same pragmatic effects . Although this , I hasten to add,
does not mean that there are no other s t ra tegiesavai lableto them to achieve
these or similar resul ts .The pragmatic effects in quest ion are what Wilson
&CSperber (1979) have descr ibed as ' the organizat ion of truth condi t ions ' ,
or in more logical terms and as mentioned earl ier ,of the analyt ic implica-
t ions of a given ut terance. In cogni t ive terms, Engl ish and Galician can
achieve this because there is a cost associated with each of the strategies ,
and that cost is different for each strategy cross- l inguis t ical ly .
This special isat ioncan be understood within a cogni t ive framework that
acknowledges the exis tence of cogni t ive effor t in the interpretat ion proc-
ess , and that spel ls out precisely how the effects ar ise . The framework I
wil l be using is that of Relevance Theory (Sperber &c Wilson 1995) . In
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what fol lows I wil l present the evidence and wil l cont inue by put t ing for-
ward an explanat ion based on the not ions this approach provides .
CROSS-LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE
Both English and Galician have, by defaul t , unmarked final s t ress (Quirk
& Greenbaum 1973: 406; Costa Casas et al . 1988: 60) and similar basic
word order , namely,SubjectVerb Object (SVO) (Ouhal la1994: 209; Costa
Casas et al . 1988: 269; Alvarezet al . 1986: 515ff . ) , as examples (1) and
(2) show:
(1) John bought the CAR2
(2) Xoan mercou o COCHE
John bought-3-pers.sing, 3 the CAR
The proposi t ional form (i .e . the semantic or t ruth-condi t ional content)
associated with (1) and (2) is ident ical . Both examples have the same truth-
condi t ions: they would be true only if John bought the (designated) car .
Pragmatical ly they are also ident ical : for example, both can be construed
as an answer to the same quest ion: namely,What did John buy? This point
wil l be expanded below.
However , Engl ish and Galician differ in the way they achieve presuppo-
si t ional effects . These effectsare the resul t of s tyl is t icvar ia t ionsin the way
the proposi t ional content of the ut terances is expressed. In English, pre-
supposi t ional effects may be achieved by means of stress-shif t ing,whereas
in Galician the same effectscan be obtained by changing the word order .
This is shown in the fol lowing two examples (3) and (4):
(3) JOHN bought the car
(4) O coche mercouno XOAN
The car bought-it JOHN
The proposi t ional form of the ut terances (3) and (4) is the same, and is
also ident ical to that of the ut terances (1) and (2) . They would be true
under the same condi t ions, namely, in a world in which John bought the
designated car . However , their pragmatic effects are sl ight lydifferent from
those of (1) and (2) . For example, (3) and (4) would be appropriate an-
swers to the question: Who bought the carf
To be sure, examples (3) and (4) differ from each other in the way these
effects are achieved. The only difference that the Englishexample (3) has
introduced in relat ion to (1) is s t ress-shif t f rom final to ini t ia l posi t ion. In
the case of (4) , the difference issyntact ic : the subject moves from ini t ia lto
f inal posi t ion and the object spl i ts into two parts : a cl i t ic par t which re-
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mains obl igator i ly at tached to the verb in object posi t ion (i .e . no) and an
optional nominal object which is fronted (i.e. O coche).4
The contrast ing effects of the stress and word order strategies in English
and Galician are clear ly exposed if we try to switch them across languages.
The resul ts are clear ly different , as shown in (5) and (6):
(5) The car bought i t JOHN
(6) XOAN mercou o coche
JOHN bought the car
Sentence (5) is not acceptablebecause Englishdoes not al low subject move-
ment in the way Galiciandoes, and, fur thermore, (6) does not achieve the
same interpretat ion as (4) , because in Galician intonat ionalpat tern change
is disrupt ive. Or, as I wil l argue below, i t is very cost ly in cogni t ive terms
(more so than word-order shif t ) . (6) would be best understood as at t i tudi-
nal : for example, echoing a previous ut terance to express surprise , e tc . , in
clear contrast to what is intended in (4) , where no such at t i tude need be
communicated.
Thus, the effectsof s t ress change are markedly different in the two lan-
guages: in English i t can give r ise to ei ther presupposi t ionaleffects or at t i -
tudinal effects (e .g .contrast) , or both; whereas in Galician i t gives r ise to
at t i tudinal effectsonly. Hence, to obtain the same presupposi t ionaleffects
we need to use different s t ra tegies cross- l inguis t ical ly:s t ress in English,
word order in Galician.
But , crucial ly , how can we capture this difference in cogni t ive terms and
provide an explanatory account of presupposi t ionaleffectsacross the two
languages? I wil l devote the rest of this ar t ic leto answering this quest ion.
PRESUPPOSITIONAL EFFECTS IN ENGLISH AND GALICIAN
What I want to argue here is that Engl ish and Galician have different cog-
ni t ive costs associated with stress and syntax. Hence, given a basic word
order and stress pat tern, in English i t is more cost lyto al ter the word order
than the stress pat tern; in Galician the si tuat ion is reversed.This makes i t
possible to neutral ise the cross- l inguis t icdifferencesat pragmatic level ( i .e .
the levelat which contextual assumptions are taken into account) by inter-
changing the strategies across the languages. In which case the resul ts
achieved wil l be the same (as (3) and (4) show).
The equivalence between stress and word order cross- l inguis t ical lyis a
well-known phenomenon which contrasts languageswith a low and a high
degree of morphological elaboration (see, for example, D'Introno et al.
1988; Eirbas 1966) . D'Introno et al . (1988: 186) state this clear ly in the
case of English and Spanish:
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El orden de las palabras es un recurso que usan las lenguas como el
espanol , lenguas con una morfologi 'a muy elaborada, para marcar el
tema y el rema. Otras lenguas usan otros recursos, de t ipo fonologico.
En ingles ,e l tema y el rema se ident i f ican mas bien por medio de recur-
sos fonologicos: el rema tiene una entonacion mas al ta y, a menudo, un
volumen mas al to que el tema. Este recurso se usa tambien en espanol ,
aunque de manera menos usual que el orden de palabras , sobre todo
para marcar un rema contrastante , es decir , un rema que ademas de ser
informacion nueva contradice una informacion aceptada o presupuesta
por el inter locutor .
This can also be shown for Galician by comparing examples (1) and (2) to
(3) and(4) in more detai l . As we saw earl ier , in (1) and (2) there is no
pragmatic difference between English and Galician. In those ut terances
the stress and syntact ic pat tern is s tandard cross- l inguis t ical ly:unmarked
final s t ressand SVO syntact ic order . Both ut terances give r ise to the same
interpretat ion. We can thus say that , in these standard condi t ions, Engl ish
and Galician behave similar ly across l inguis t ic levels (except for the pho-
nological level) .
This equivalent pragmatic behaviour can be shown by appeal ing to the
propert ies commonly associated with the l inguis t iccontrastsvar iouslycal led
given-new information, theme-rheme, focus-presupposi t ion, topic-com-
ment , e tc . Contrasts which I wil l def ine here by simply saying that they
capture a strong intui t ive tendency to draw a dist inct ion between informa-
t ion which sets the scene (information general ly taken to be already avai l -
able to the hearer) and information which tel ls us something about i t
( information general lytaken to be new to him or her) . (For fur ther discus-
s ion of this see, for example, Chafe 1 976; Firbas 1 966; Hal l iday 1967;
and Reinhart 1981.) The propert ies in quest ion are spel t out in what fol-
lows (Sperber & Wilson 1 995: 202ff . ; see also Hall iday 1967) .
Firs t ly ,old information tends to come firs t and new information second,
which is what we saw happen in the standard examples (1) and (2) . In
example (3) this changed, giving rise to different presupposi t ional effects
(see below). Secondly, s t ress helps focus the at tent ion of the hearer on a
const i tuent of the ut terance: i t acts as a 'point ing ' device and indicates that
the const i tuent is to be enter ta ined as foreground information. Moreover ,
given the structured nature of language, placing stress on the smallest fo-
cal ly s tressed const i tuent ( i .e . the smallest phrase in which the focused
word is located) may be used to draw attent ion to any of the more inclu-
s ive const i tuents of the ut terance. These const i tuents may consequent ly
become the focus.In thisrespect ,examples (1) and (2) have (broadlyspeak-
ing) equivalent const i tuent s t ructure , as shown in (7):
(?) a . [ s [Np John ] [Vp [v bought ] [Np the car ] ] ]5
b. [ s [Np Xoan ] [Vp [v mercou ] [Np o coche ] ] ]
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This not only shows their syntact ic s imilar i ty but also lays the r ight s t ruc-
tural condi t ions for their ident ical focal scales ,as we wil l see below.
Thirdly, the focusof a declarat ive ut teranceis widelythought to provide
an answer to a quest ion. Furthermore, this quest ion is taken to be implici t
in the context . Not only this , but given the const i tuent st ructure of ut ter-
ances (see,for example, Ouhal la 1994) , a l l inclusive const i tuentscould be
potent ia l ly highl ighted too. These inclusive const i tuents are the analyt ic
implicat ions of the ut terance. Each of these analyt ic implicat ionscan func-
t ion as background to the immediately narrower inclusive const i tuent or
as foreground to the immediately wider inclusiveconst i tuent . Thus, on an
interpretat ion which takes the hearer to the ful l proposi t ional form (i .e . to
the complete thought expressed by the ut terance) ,the only analyt ic impli-
cat ion that should be exclusively foregrounded should coincide precisely
with the proposi t ional form in the examples from both languages. And
this can be shown to be the case by finding a quest ion which wil l take the
propositional form as an answer. Such a question could be: What did John
buy? The focal scale wil l be equivalent in both of them (ref lect ing their
semantic ident i ty) , as shown in (8) and (9) , corresponding to (1) and (2)
respect ively:
(8) a . Something is the case
What is the case?
b. John did something
What did John do?
c. John bought something
What did John buy ?
d. John bought the car6
(9) a . Algo ocorreu 7
iQue ocorreu f
b. Xoan fixo algo
iQue fixo Xoan?
c. Xoan mercou algo
iQue mercou Xoan?
d. Xoan mercou o coche
Following Sperber and Wilson 's Relevance Theory, whose Principle of
Relevance states that 'every ut terance (or other act of ostensive communi-
cat ion) creates an expectat ion of [opt imal] relevance ' (Wilson &cSperber
1993: 286) , and where an ut terance achievesopt imal relevanceif and only
if : [a] ' i t achievesenough contextual effects to be worth the hearer 's at ten-
t ion ' ; and [b] ' i t puts the hearer to no gratui tous processingeffor t in achiev-
ing those effects ' (Wilson &t Sperber 1993: 286) , a background analyt ic
implicat ion achieves relevance 'by giving access to a context in which fur-
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ther implicat ions wil l have contextual effects ' and a foreground analyt ic
implicat ion 'by yielding contextual effects in i ts own right ' (Sperber &c
Wilson 1995: 209) . Hence, in (8) and (9) the analyt ic implicat ions (a-c)
are backgrounded and the proposi t ional form (d) is the only implicat ion
which is exclusively foregrounded.
The fourth property commonly associated with the l inguis t ic contrasts
mentioned above is the hierarchical nature of the focal s t ructure (cf . Firbas
1966) . That is , the potent ia l foci are ordered according to their degree of
sal ience.The smallest focal lystressed const i tuent is the most prominent in
a ser ies of inclusively less prominent foci . The nested and gradient s t ruc-
ture , as shown in (8) and (9) , can be obtained by subst i tut ing the smallest
highl ighted const i tuent by a (semantic) var iable . The process is then re-
peated with the next smallest inclusive const i tuent , which becomes high-
l ighted as a resul t of the variable subst i tut ion.Thus, the respect ive gradi-
ent focal scales for (8d) and (9d) would be (10) and (11) respect ively:
(10) THE CAR
BOUGHT [S OMETHING]
JOHN [DID S OMETHING]
(11) OCOCHE
MERCOU [ALGO]
XOAN [FIXO ALGO]
From the last few points made, we can infer that the information dis t r ibu-
t ion in (1) and (2) is s imilar . That is to say, on the assumption that hearers
found i t opt imal ly relevant to derive al l the analyt ic implicat ions up to,
and including, the proposi t ional form, examples (1) and (2) would give
r ise to equivalent focal scalesand focal gradat ion, and thus would presup-
pose similar pragmatic condi t ions.
However , in (3) and (4) the similar i t iesacross l inguis t iclevels are fewer
than in the cases just discussed. Phonological ly and syntact ical ly(3) and
(4) are different from each other . In part icular , the syntact ics t ructure of
(3) remains the same as that of (1) , whereas (4) 's becomes (12):
(12) [ s [Np O coche, ] [s [Np t2 ] [Vp [Vp [v mercou ] [Np na t ] ] [Np Xoan 1 ] ] ] ]
where, as we saw earl ier , the nominal object has moved to the front of the
ut terance and adjoins the S node, a pronominal cl i t ic has taken i ts place
at tached to the verb and the noun has moved to the end of the ut terance
adjoining the VP node.
The only level where they clear ly achieve equivalence is pragmatic; that
is , they are relevant in the same context . This is i l lustratedby the fact that
(3) and (4) could be construed as answers to the same question: Who bought
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the car? Moreover , this quest ion is par t of a focalscale which is ident ical in
both cases , as shown in (13) and (14) respect ively:
(13) a.
b.
Someone bought the car
Who bought the car?
John bought the car
'JOHN bought the car '
[Proposi t ional Form]
[Surface Structure]
(14) a. Alguen mercou o coche
eQuen mercou o coche?
b. Xoan mercou o coche
'O coche mercouno XOAN'
[Proposi t ional Form]
[Surface Structure]
In this case the focal scales are shorter than, and different from, those of
(8) and (9) . This is due to the pragmatic effect of s t ress shif t ( in English)
and syntact ic movement ( in Galician) .The strategies are different but the
resul t is the same. The effect of the changes is a rearrangingof the analyt ic
implicat ions to the extent that most of them have disappeared from the
focal scale . In fact , the analyt ic implicat ions avai lable as a resul t of the
al terat ions differ from those derived in (8) and (9) . Note that these prag-
matic effects have not al tered the proposi t ional form of the ut terances as
at tes ted by (8d) and (9d) , on the one hand, and (13b) and (14b) , on the
other . In other words, despi te the focal scale al terat ion (caused by stress
shif t and syntact ic movement) , the semantic or t ruth-condi t ional content
remains the same across al l four examples .
Knowledge assumed to be shared by the speaker and the hearer in (1)
and (2) varies sl ight ly from that in (3) and (4) . In the former cases , no
information is necessar i lyshared by the speaker and the hearer (as regards
the proposi t ional content expressed) , whereas in the lat ter cases al l the
implicat ions analyt ical ly derivable from the ut terances (but not actual ly
deduced) are taken to be so strongly manifest to the hearer as to not re-
quire derivat ion. In relevance-theoret icterms, the derivat ion of those an-
alyt ic implicat ions wil l not yieldenough cogni t ive effects to offset the ef-
for t expended in their processing,as they are assumed to be already present
in the working memory of the hearer . And any effects that might be pro-
duced should, by that t ime, have been derived. Hence, the speaker should
have envisaged the fol lowing scenario in the hearer 's mind (both in the
English and Galician cases) ,as shown in (15) and (16):
(15) a. Something is the case
What is the case?
b. Someone did something
What did someone do ?
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c . Someone bought someth ing
What did someone buy f
Implications Not Deduced
d. Someone bought the car
Who bought the car?
e . John bought the car
Implications Deduced
Algo ocorreu
eQue ocorreu?
Alguen fixo algo
iQue fixo alguen?
Alguen inercou algo
iQue mercou alguen ?
Implications Not Deduced
Implications Deduced
d. Alguen mercou o coche
iQuen mercou o coche?
e. Xoan mercou o coche
The consequences of these focal s t ructures are important for communica-
t ion in both languages. Firs t ly ,no const i tuent other than the subject can be
internal ly focal ised, i .e . there cannot be other more inclusive foci which
may be considered to be opt imal ly relevant in the context of (3) or (4) .
Secondly, no quest ions other than the one in (15/16d) are relevant enough.
Thirdly, there is no gradient focal s t ructure , as the only possible focus is
' John/Xoan' . The resul ts of these predict ionswil l provide evidence for the
claim that there isa pragmaticequivalence between (3) and (4) or , in other
words, between stress and word order in English and Galician, and that
this is due to the processing cost associated with these strategies in each
language.
We can test these predict ionsby at tempting to el ic i t implicat ions which
are assumed not to have been deduced. This can be done by asking ' focal '
quest ions which in the context of (1) and (2) are re levant but not in the
context of (3) and (4) , and observe whether the ut terance would const i tute
an answer with the intended import (a similar s t ra tegy is also used by
Blakemore 1988) . The quest ions are drawn from (15) and (16) as shown
in (17) and (18):
(17) a. What is the case?
? JOHN bought the car
(16) a.
b.
c.
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b. What did someone do?
?? JOHN bought the car
c . What did someone buy ?
?? JOHN bought the car
(18) a. eQue ocorreu?
? O coche mercouno XOAN
b. eQue fixo alguen?
?? O coche mercouno XOAN
c. iQue mercou alguen?
?? O coche mercouno XOAN
It is clear that in cases (17/18a) , the answers emphasise John/Xoatt, i .e .
they invi te us to dig into our encyclopaedic knowledge about John/Xoan.
In the English example, this then leads to subsequent unstressed informa-
t ion, namely, that he bought the car. In the Galicianexample, the unstressed
information precedes the focus, i .e . the old information comes firs t . In
both answers the old information is presupposed to be highly accessible .
The si tuat ion implici t in these pairs ((17a) and (18a)) is in contrast to what
was intended in our original examples (3) and (4) . There, the fact that
somebody had bought the car was already implici t common knowledge
(which isn ' t manifest ly assumed in the quest ions under (17a) and (18a)) ,
and therefore the interpretat ion was different , for example, a correct ion
(i t was not Peter but John who bought the car) . In (17/18a) the si tuat ion
seems to be somewhat i l logicalas the quest ionsdon' t presupposeany knowl-
edge about the si tuat ion whereas the answers do (i .e . they presuppose (15/
16d)) .
Examples (17/18b—c)are dis t inct ly odd, as the quest ions (What...?/
iQue. . .?) point the hearer in one direct ion (events in (17/18b) , and ent i t ies
in (17/18c)) ,but the answers point in manifest lydifferent direct ions.8 There
is a subt le mismatch in the assumptions made about the cogni t ive environ-
ments assumed to be shared by the speaker and the hearer . This is clear ly
shown by the focal gradat ion discrepancy. In (17/18c) , for instance, the
quest ion makes i t obvious that an opt imal ly relevant answer should con-
tain a focus which highl ightsa const i tuent capable of instant ia t ingthe var-
iable What/Que. However , the answer provided does not l ive up to the
expectat ion because i ts smallestfocal ly stressedconst i tuent would only be
opt imal ly relevant as an answer to a quest ion containing a variable such as
Who/Quen, in clear contrast with the information which would be com-
pat ible with the implici t quest ion. Furthermore, given the syntact ics t ruc-
ture of the ut terances (see above) the only opt imal ly relevantconst i tuent
avai lable within them (i .e . bought the car/ tnercouno) has an ineffectual
degree of act ivat ion because of i ts low and distant locat ion in the r ight and
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lef t hand side of the two syntact ic s t ructures respect ively (see (7a) and
(12)) .
I f we compare the above resul ts to a similar tes t for (1) and (2) , where
the combinat ion of stress and syntact ic form does not necessar i lygive r ise
to assumptions about the speaker and hearer shar ing any of the informa-
t ion conveyed by the ut terance, we can see that , in clear contrast to (3) and
(4) , we can have al ternat ive internal foci , a l ternat ive focalquest ions and a
gradient focal s t ructure , a l l perfect ly compatible with the proposi t ional
form, as shown by the fol lowing pairs in (19) and (20):
(19) a. What is the case?
John bought the CAR
b. What did John do?
John bought the CAR
c. What did John buy?
John bought the CAR
(20) a. eQue ocorreu?
Xoan mercou o COCHE
b. eQue fixo Xoan?
Xoan mercou o COCHE
1 c. * Que mercou Xoan?
Xoan mercou o COCHE
The quest ions in (19/20) , unl ike those in (17/18) , show that there can be
other internal foci , namely, the whole sentence in (19/20a) , the Verb Phrase
in (19/20b) and the Noun Phrase the CARJo COCHE in (19/20c) . Similar-
ly , there can be a larger range of focal quest ions. This is shown by the fact
that al l the quest ions introduced in (19/20) are appropriately answered by
(1) and (2) , again in clear contrast to (17/18) . Final ly ,the focal gradat ion is
s imilar ly shown by (8) and (9) , as opposed to (13) and (14) . In the former
cases the gradient foci are ordered as in (10) and (11) , whereas in the lat ter
cases the only possible focus is Johti/Xoan.
Interest ingly, each of the possible foci in (8) and (9) are isolated by the
quest ions in the contexts of (19) and (20) without the focus being shif ted
from final posi t ion. This corroborates the fact that al l the analyt ical lyim-
pl ied foci specif ied in (10) and (11) can be deduced in the processingof (8)
and (9) , in clear contrast to (13) and (14) , where most of the analyt ic
implicat ions aren ' t deduced. In other words, most of the analyt ic implica-
t ions that can be logical ly derived from (13) and (14) are not relevant
enough to be actual ly deduced. They are assumed to be already manifest in
the context of the ut terances and their der ivat ion would involve unjust i f i -
able effor t , i .e . they would not t r igger enough contextual effects for the
processing cost incurred in inferr ing them. This contrasts with (8) and (9)
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where al l their analyt ic implicat ions can, in principle , be relevant , and
therefore be deduced.
CONCLUSION
In the previous discussion 1 have shown that (3) and (4) are relevant in the
same way at a pragmatic level . That is , they highl ight the same analyt ic
implicat ions. Animmediate consequence of this is that s t ress-shif tandword
order must be responsiblefor their s imilar i ty ,as nothing else haschangcd.9
In fact , the changes undergone by (3) and (4) in relat ion to (1) and (2)
must be styl is t ic ,given that their proposi t ionalcontent is ident ical . AsQuirk
and Greenbaum (1973: 406) put i t , ' judicious ordering and placing of
emphasis may be important for the proper understanding of the message
and i ts implicat ions ' .
Since the stress and syntact ic changes are not representat ional elements
of communicat ion (i .e . they do not carry conceptual content) , they must
t r igger natural cogni t ive processes . That is , they must affect the way we
understand the proposi t ional form expressed by the ut terances. This is in
l ine with a more general hypothesis about an explanatory theory of style
made by Sperber 8c Wilson (1995) . They argue that the key to account ing
for the differences between two utterances with the same truth-condi t ions
but different l inguis t ic form lies ' in their contextual effects and in the
processing effor t they require ' (Sperber &cWilson 1995: 202) . And the
conclusion I draw from this is that , a l l e lse beingequal , when these equiv-
alent s tyl is t ic effects are achieved across languages by means of different
s t ra tegies , the procedures they tr igger must incur the same relat ive cogni-
t ive cost .
In relevance-theoret ic terms this makes sense, as processing effor t re-
sul t ing from cognit ive processes has a privi leged place in the theory. An
optimally relevant interpretat ion wil l be one which is der ived without un-
just i f iableprocessingeffor t . This means that any phenomenon that helped
reduce processing costs would give r ise to a cogni t ive advantage, and this
seems to be the case with stress and word order in English and Galician
respect ively.Sperber &CWilson themselves (1995: 204) argue that ' for a
speaker aiming at opt imal relevance, eff ic ient exploi ta t ion of . . . [ the] tem-
poral sequencing is crucial'. Moreover, 'stress placement, like other stylis-
t ic features [e .g . word-order] , should be looked at in terms of processing
effor t ' (my emphasis) . Stress (and I would add other sub-proposi t ional
s tyl is t icdevices , such as the sequent ia l i tyinherent in word order) is viewed
here as 'a purely natural device for pinpoint ing some noteworthy aspect of
an ut terance ' (Sperber &cWilson 1995: 212) . In English,s t ress is a cogni-
t ively inexpensive way of al ter ing the sal ience of analyt ic implicat ions;
whereas in Galician i t is much more disrupt ive and the same cogni t ive role
is played by word order . As Sperber &cWilson (1995: 213) put i t 'greater
\ \
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disrupt ion impliesgreater processingeffor t and, other things being equal ,
lowered acceptabi l i ty ' .Hence, we would expect that the resul t ingcontex-
tual effectsof an ut terance which had undergone permissibleal terat ions of
word order in English, and stress in Galician, should parallel the disrup-
t ion descr ibed above in terms of analyt ic implicat ions.
To conclude I wil l say that these differences between languagesdo not ,
in principle , l imit the expression of the same richness of thought . What
they do do is ref lect the various natural s t ra tegies avai lable to communi-
cate thought (our private language) by means of natural language (our
publ ic language) .
NOTES
1. An ear l ie r vers ionof th i sa r t ic le wasde l ivered to the HI Pos tgradua teHispanis t s '
Conference a t Tr in i ty Hal l , Cambr idge , 5-6 January 1995, and I am gra te fu l
to the par t ic ipantsfor the i rcomments . I would par t icu la r lyl ike to thank Dei rdre
Wilson and John Ruther ford . Of course , the respons ib i l i ty for i t s shor tcomings
is en t i re ly mine .
2 . Throughout th i s paper capi ta l i sed words indica te s t ress , except in examples
(10) and (11) . S t ress here i s v iewed as the highl igh t ing of a grammat ica l
cons t i tuen t by means of both volume and pi tch (see Bol inger 19$%;and Chafe
1976 for fur ther d is t inc t ions) ,func t ion ingas a device for focus ingour a t ten t ion
on re levant informat ion .
3 To make mat te rs s impler I wi l l exc lude f rom subsequent t rans la t ions verba l
endings indica t ing person [pers . )and number ( s ing . ) ,as a l l examples used here
are in th i rd person s ingular .
4 Note tha t (as poin ted out to me by Benigno Fernandez Salgado) a poss ib le ,
and more res t r ic t ive lyused , equiva lence of (4) in Engl i sh would be the pass ive
The car was bought by John The use of th i s s t ruc ture complements , in some
contex ts , the in tona t iona l s t ra tegy .
5 . Note tha t I am using a very s imple cons t i tuen t s t ruc ture : S —>NP VP; VP —>V
NR
6 Note tha t I am assuming tha t the def in i te ar t ic le does not have any ef fec t on
the ana ly t ic impl ica t ions . I t se f fec t sa re of a d i f fe ren t k ind , not d iscussed here .
7 I take i t tha t Something is the case and Something happened serve the same
purpose here , as they both represen t the fac t tha t someth ing is mani fes t to the
hearer . I have chosen thesecond al te rna t ive in Gahcian for reasons to do wi th
t rans la t ion .
8 Note tha t the answers in (17/18b—c)could be made appropr ia te i f they were
broken up in to two in tona t iona l and process ing uni t s as opposed to jus t one
as in tended here . This a l te rna t ive scenar io would a l low each in tona t iona l and
process ing uni t to ins tan t ia te one of the two semant ic var iab lespresen t in the
ques t ions . The two uni t s would thus provide appropr ia te ind ica t ions and
enough informat ion to ins tan t ia te a l l the semant ic var iab les This i s , however ,
a top ic tha t ca l l s for fur ther research in to the t r ipar t i t e re la t ionsh ip be tween
in tona t ion , pragmat ics and cogni t ion .
mmm
\
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9. Except for the introduct ion of the cl i t ic in Galician,which is otherwise
compatible withthe front ingand backgroundingof the nominaldirectobject .
Pragmatical ly ,the introduct ion of this cl i t icemphasisesthe exis tenceof a
topical isedobject in the si tuat ion,preciselythe object that is being talked
about (see Givon 1987:177) .
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Interpretive use of language in Galician: the
case of disque and seica]
Xose Rosales Sequeiros, University of Leicester
Galician grammars 2 in general make two points regarding the lexical
i tems disque, ' apparent ly , i t is said that ' , and setca, ' apparent ly , i t seems
that ' . ' They state that (a) these i tems are adverbs, and (h) semantical ly ,
they express doubt . This ar t ic le is concerned mainly with the second of
these claims. In part icular , arguments are presented against the
classif icat ion of disque and seica as adverbs of doubt ; i t is argued that
this classif icat ion does not capture their semantic meaning. A number
of counter-examples are considered in this respect , including
etymological issues , subst i tut ion tests , and the semantic intui t ions of
nat ive speakers . An al ternat ive approach based on their cogni t ive funct ion
is then proposed, and i t is argued that the meaning of disque and seica is
best analysed from a cogni t ive point of view. From this s tand point ,
they can be character ised as special to interpret ive use of language: that
is , they are used to echo another person 's thought or ut terance and in
the process to dis tance oneself from the proposi t ion expressed. In this
respect , disque and seica al low us, as communicators , to carry out two
tasks simultaneously. They enable us not only to express proposi t ional
content , but also to indicate expl ic i t ly our own at t i tude towards that
content . Hence, in using these adverbs a speaker is carryingout a double
communicat ive act : an informative one and an at t i tudinal one. In what
fol lows, the tradi t ional analysis proposed by exis t ing grammars is f i rs t
introduced and, subsequent ly , some counter-arguments are discussed in
some detai l . An al ternat ive account is then presented, based on the
not ions made avai lable within the theoret ical framework of Relevance
Theory. 4
The tradi t ional analysis of disque and seica, as stated ear l ier , regards
these lexical items as adverbs of doubt. Alvarez et al. claim that 'seica
and disque indicate that the speaker is not cer ta in about the truth of the
ut terance produced, but that he accepts i t as l ikely. '5 The same claims are
made by Costas Casas et al . ,6 who also classifythese two words as adverbs
of doubt , together with other adverbs such as talvez , 'perhaps ' , and
quizais , 'perhaps ' . Let us see an example of each:
(1) Disque l ie roubaron o coche o Venancio.
'Apparently , Venancio 's car has been stolen. '
(2) O fi l lo do Carlos seica quere marchar para A Coruna a trabal lar .
'Carlos 's son apparently wants to go to A Coruna to work. '
2 Xose Rosales Sequeiros
The meaning of these sentences, fol lowing the tradi t ional analysis ,
conld be paraphrased as fol lows (where the equivalent paraphrase of the
adverbs in quest ion is i ta l ic ised):
( 1 ) Ep r o b a b l eq u el ie roubaran o coche o Venancio.
'It is probable that Venancio 's car has been stolen. '
(2 ' ) Noti sei se e certo que o fi l lo do Carlos quere marchar para A Coruria
a trabal lar .
'/ don't know if it is true that Carlos 's son wants to go to A Coruna
to work. '
In (1 ) what is s ta ted is that the si tuat ion descr ibed is probable , whereas
in (2 ' ) i t is s ta ted that there is no certainty about that s i tuat ion; this
uncertainty, according to the tradi t ional analysis , is the semantic core of
the two adverbs in quest ion. They would consequent ly fal l a longside
other adverbs, such as quizais , talvez or acaso, 'maybe ' . 8 Thus, again
according to the tradi t ional analysis , a semantic paral le l ism could be
establ ished between the examples (1) and (3) , on the one hand, and (2)
and (4) , on the other :
(3) Talvez l ie roubaron o coche o Venancio.
'Perhaps Venancio 's car has been stolen. '
(4) O fi l lo do Carlos quizais quere marchar para A Coruna a trabal lar .
'Perhaps Carlos 's son perhaps wants to go to A Coruna to work. '
In these new versions talvez and quizais are used instead of the
original adverbs, which by hypothesis should preserve the original
meaning, leaving aside for the moment any possible styl is t ic
differences. In fact , this purported equivalence raises the f i rs t problem
of the tradi t ional analysis . The firs t counter-argument , meanwhile ,
is precisely the joint classification of adverbs such as disque, seica,
quizais , talvez . , or acaso. I f a l l these adverbs were of the same type,
one would expect that , s tyl is t ic matters aside, there should be a certain
synonymity between them; this should, for instance, al low us to
interchange them. Thus, for example, one would expect that i f in
(5) the adverb quizais is subst i tuted for talvez , the resul t , in (6) , should
not substant ia l ly al ter the semantic interpretat ion nor should i t give
r ise to changes in our intui t ions of i ts grammatical ly:
(5) Quizais chova mana.
' I t may ra in tomorrow. '
(6) Talvez chova mana.
' I t may ra in tomorrow. '
s .
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Indeed, t l ie subst i tut ion effected in this example does not substant ia l ly
change ci ther the meaning of the sentence or intui t ions of i ts
grammatical ly: even the subjunct ive mood is maintained. I bis is exact ly
what would be expected if the tradi t ional classif icat ionwas correct .
I here is , however , a subt le but important difference in the case of the
adverbs in which we are interested here. For example, there isa difference
between (I) and (3) . In (3) the doubt is expressed expl ic i t lyby the adverb
talvez , which is par t of i ts semantic content . In (1) , by contrast , the
element of doubt found in the interpretat ion, i f i t exis ts at al l , is not
part of the semantic content, but is rather the result of the pragmatic
interpretat ion of the ut terance. To i l lustratethis , le t us take the fol lowing
example (where the quest ion mark indicates that there are reservat ions
about the ut terances 's contextual appropriateness , and the aster isk that
the ut terance is clear ly contextual ly inappropriate) :
(7) A: cQue pasou?
'What 's happened? '
Bl : Disquc houbo un accidente .
'Apparent ly there has been an accident . '
B2: ?* Talvez/acaso/quizaishoubo un accidente .
'Perhaps/maybe/perhaps there has been an accident . '
I t seems clear that in this example, in contrast with what happened in
examples (5) and (<•>)(where the subst i tut ion did not al ter the semantic
content of the ut terance) , the answer Bl does not have the same semantic
content as the answer B2. In B2, the speaker is quest ioning the veraci ty
of the fact descr ibed (perhaps,maybe) , which fal lsshort of A'sexpectat ions,
hence the lack of contextual appropriateness . 1lowever , in Bl the speaker
is interpretively attributing the content of the utterance (apparently),
and thus expl ic i t ly dis tancing himself from the proposi t ion expressed.
In other words, he is able to answer A's quest ion and avoid commit t ing
himself to what is being said, al l of which is contextual ly fel ic i tous. This
at t r ibut ion is , of course, what can subsequent ly give r ise to a pragmatic-
interpretat ion in which there is uncertainty about the truth of the content
of the ut terance. But the uncertainty is not an inherent ( i .e . semantic)
par t of i ts meaning: the doubt , i f i t is conveyed, isthe resul tof ident i fying
the strength of commitment that one is prepared to give to the truth of
the proposi t ion expressed. This is a pragmatic process which is par t of
the interpretat ion of al l ut terances and consis ts in establ ishing the degree
of guarantee that the speaker offers about the truth of the content
expressed in the ut terance. As Blakemore argues: ' ident i fyingthe strength
of this guarantee is par t of the [ut terance] interpretat ion process ' . ' ' I bus ,
in the case of disque and seua considerat ions of doubt may, when required,
fol low from the general processes of pragmatic interpretat ion, which are
$
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appl ied to al l ut terances. However , this also means that , contrary to
what t radi t ional analysis ts claim, there wil l be instances in which there
is no doubt about the si tuat ion descr ibed. An example of this , in which
the adverb seica is present , can be found when two inter locutors are
witnessing the same si tuat ion and one. A, descr ibes what they are seeing
to the other , B:
(8) (B is witnessing the work of the paramedics in an accident . At that
point A arr ives and addresses B:)
A: Seica houbo un accidente .
' I t looks l ike that there has been an accident . '
In this s i tuat ion, i t is obvious to both A and B that there has been an
accident . In other words, A cannot be doubt ing the exis tence of the state
of affairs described. In particular, seica could not be substituted by quizais
without changing the meaning of the sentence and thus without i ts
becoming contextual ly odd. Examples of this type contradict the claims
made within the tradi t ional analysis . The adverb seica in this case could
not be classif iedas an adverb of doubt . The proposi t ional at t i tudes that
A communicates (so as to establ ish an interpersonal relat ionship) ar ise
from the at t r ibut ion, as wil l be discussed later .
The at t r ibut ive nature of this type of adverb can be seen more clear ly if
we go back to example (7) .The answer B1, which could not be subst i tuted
by answer B2 (indicat ing doubt) , can be subst i tuted by answer B3
(indicat ing at t r ibut ion) , as shown in (9):
(9) A: <Que pasou?
'What happened? '
B3: Dinme que houbo un accidente .
7 am told that there has been an accident . '
This subst i tut ion is , of course, not surpr is ing, s ince the etymology of
the adverb disque originates in the verb dicir , ' to say ' (precisely a verb
which indicates at t r ibut ion of ut terances or even, indirect ly , thoughts) ,
plus the conjunct ion que, ' that ' . 10
Thus far i t has been argued that disque and seica cannot be
semantical ly equated with adverbs of doubt ; in this sect ion, their
at t r ibut ive nature is explored in more detai l . I t is argued that this is
precisely what dis t inguishes them from the other adverbs ol the group
mentioned above. The Dicciot iario Xerats da Lingua i l lust ra tes the
point clear ly:
(1 0) disque (dicir + que) , adv. Diseque; din que; comentase; oese; scica."
'd isque (to say + that) , adv. I t is said that ; people say that ; i t is
commented that ; i t is heard that ; apparent ly . '
iiipfDHjlilni
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I his entry provides severalsynonymous expressions which, s tyle aside,
can he used instead of disque; for example:
(1 1) A: <Que pasou?
'What happened? '
B4: Din que houbo un accidente .
'They are saying that there has been an accident . '
B5: Dise que houbo un accidente .
'It is being said that there has been an accident . '
B6: Comentase que houbo un accidente .
kIt is being commented that there has been an accident . '
B7: Oese que houbo un accidente .
'It is being heard that there has been an accident . '
B8: Seica houbo un accidente .
'Apparently there has been an accident . '
Al l these expressions, amongst others , have a basic meaning of
at t r ibut ion, in contrast with the other adverbs discussed above. The
adverbial (as opposed to verbal) nature ofdisque al lows i t to be integrated
and used flexibly within the syntact ic s t ructure of the sentence (e.g. at
the beginning, in the middle or at the end) , which would not be possible
with most of the other expressions in (1 0) unless they were used
parenthet ical ly . Thus, consider the fol lowing example:
(1 2) O marineiro disque viu unha serea mais eu coido que mente.12
'The sai lor has apparent ly seen a mermaid, but I think that he*is
lying. '
In this example, disque cannot be subst i tuted by another adverb
indicat ing doubt without substant ia l ly changing the meaning of the
ut terance; this is in fact a typical case in which disque is used to at t r ibute
ut terances. The speaker here at t r ibutes an ut terance to someone (unkown)
regarding the sai lor ( that he has seen a mermaid) . In other words, the
semantic funct ion of disque is not that of communicat ing doubt , as is
clear ly shown in the contrast with the fol lowing example:
(1 2 ' )0 marineiro talvez/quizais/acaso viu unha serea mais eu coido que
mente.
'Perhaps/maybe the sai lor has seen a mermaid, but I think that he is
lying. '
In (12) the contr ibut ion of disque is that of at t r ibut ing, whereas in
(12 ' ) the adverbial contr ibut ion is that of indicat ing doubt about the
veraci ty of the proposi t ion expressed. The two examples could be
paraphrased respect ively as fol lows:
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(1 2 ) a. I he sai lor has said that he has seen a mermaid, but I think that
he is lying.
b. I t may be true that the sai lor has seen a mermaid, but 1 think
that he is lying.
Note also that disque and seica are never used with the subjunct ive,
which is of ten used to indicate doubt . This contrasts with the fact that
genuine adverbs of doubt do take the subjunct ive, as shown in the
fol lowing examples:
(1 2 ") a . * O marineiro disque vise unha serea mais eu coido que mente.
'The sai lor has apparent ly seen (subj . ) a mermaid, but 1 think that
he is lying. '
b . O marineiro talvez/quizais/acaso vise unha serea mais eu coido
que mente.
'Perhaps/maybe the sai lor has seen (subj . ) a mermaid, but I think
that he is lying. '
The same can be said of seica. Consider the fol lowing example:
(13) . . . un relator io presentado no Congreso Internacional de Socioloxia
da Cidade de Mexico que seica non foi publ icado."
a paper del ivered to the Internat ional Conference on Sociology
in Mexico City which was apparent ly not publ ished. '
Here we cannot subst i tute for seica genuine adverbs of doubt without
al ter ing the meaning:
(1 3 ' ) . . . un relator io presentado no Congreso Internacional de Socioloxia
da Cidade de Mexico que talvez/quizais /acasonon foi publ icado.
' . . .a paper del ivered to the Internat ional Conference on Sociology
in Mexico City which perhaps/maybe was not publ ished. '
What is being communicated in (13) is not pr imari ly doubt , but rather
that the proposi t ion expressed by the ut terance is at t r ibuted to a person
(not mentioned) . This in i tself may raise doubts , but i t is already part of
the pragmatic , not semantic , interpretat ion of the ut terance. Note,
however , that as in the case of disque, seica can also be subst i tuted by
other at t r ibut ive expressions:
(1 4) . . . un relator io presentado no Congreso Internacional de Socioloxia
da Cidade de Mexico quese di/dtn/secomenta que non foi publ icado.
' . . .a paper del ivered to the Internat ional Conference on Sociology
in Mexico City which i t is said/people say/ i t is commented was not
publ ished. '
t
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In this sense, the defini t ion provided by the Diccionario Xerais da Lingua
is less accurate as far as seica is concerned:
(15) seica (sei + ca) . adv. Expresa dt ' ib ida:acaso, ta l vez, disque (eseica
che sabe o pastel?; iSeica estds tolo!). u
' se ica (I know + that) , adv. I t expresses doubt : maybe, perhaps, i t
seems that (Yon seem to l ike the cake?; You are crazy!) . '
The defini t ion provided here rel ies on the not ion of doubt , which
contrasts with the facts seen so far . In cer ta in contexts , those in which
we can express uncertainty with adverbs of doubt , we could not
express the same with adverbs such as seica. Compare the fol lowing
examples:
(16) Talvez xa chegaron.
'Perhaps they have already arr ived. '
(17) Seica xa chegaron.
'Apparent ly they have already arr ived. '
Clear ly in the f i rs t example the speaker communicates doubt about
their arr ival . By contrast , in the second example the speaker does not
communicate so much doubt as cer ta inty about the same fact . This again
indicates that semantical ly we are faced with two different ia ted types of
adverbs: on the one hand, the adverbs of doubt proper, such as talvez,
quizais, etc.; on the other, the adverbs of attribution, such as disqut,
seica, e tc . What role , then, from a theoret ical point of view, do these
at t r ibut ive adverbs play in communicat ion?
Within Relevance Theory there are two types of use of language: one
is the descr ipt ive use, the other the interpret ive use. Sperber and Wilson
state that 'Any representat ion [ . . . ] can represent some state of affairs in
vir tue of i ts proposi t ional form being true of that s ta te of affairs ; in this
case we wil l say that the representat ion is a descript ion, or that i t is used
descript ively . Or it can represent some other representat ion which also
has a proposi t ional form a thought , for instance - in vir tue of a
resemblance between the two proposi t ional forms; in this case we wil l
say that the f i rs t representat ion is an interpretat ion of the second one,
or that i t is used interpret ively ' . 1S To il lustrate this contrast , two
part ic ipants are wait ing for Xepe at the rai lway stat ion, in order to take
a train which is about to leave:
(18) Maruxa: t iQue dixo Xepe?
'What did Xepe say? '
Anxo: Non imos atopar ningun asento l ibre .
'We are not going to f ind any empty seats . '
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Anxo s ut terance can be interpreted in two different ways. On the one
hand, we can interpret i t as a paraphrase of what Xepe had said; in this
case, the ut terance is being used interpret ively with the intent ion of
resembling what Xepe had said or thought . On the other hand, we can
interpret i t as a genuine answer on the part of Anxo, in which case Anxo
would be describing a si tuat ion in the world.
The interpret ive use is based on the resemblance which exis ts between
two proposi t ional forms (where proposi t ional forms are those
representat ions which (a)can enter into logical relat ions,e .g . implicat ions,
and (b) can be true or false of a state of affairs by vir tue of their ful l
semantic content) . lh In this case a resemblance isestabl ished between the
proposi t ional forms of what Xepc had said and what Anxo says. The
degree of resemblance inferred wil l be as high as required in order to
derive an opt imally relevant interpretat ion. 17 For example, any of the
fol lowing ut terances produced by Xepe would be compatible with Anxo's
paraphrase:
(19) Xepe:
a . Non imos atopar ningun asento l ibre .
'We are not going to f ind any empty seats . '
b . Quedan poucos asentos l ibres .
'There are few empty seats lef t . '
c . O tren vai cheo.
'The train is ful l . '
d . Hoxe e venres .
'Today is Friday. '
In (19a) the resemblance between the paraphrase and the original is
ful l f rom the point of view of the l inguis t ic form (that is , excluding
accent , tone of voice, etc . ) . In (19b) the resemblance is near ly , but not
qui te , ful l . In this case we have to infer that i f there arc few empty seats
lef t , there wil l be fewer chances of f inding one. In (19c) and (19d) the
resemblances are st i l l more opaque: in (19c) we have to assume that i f
the train is ful l , the seats wil l be taken quickly, and that asa resul t i t wil l
not be easy to f ind empty seats ; in (19d) we have to know that on
Fridays more people use trains and that , as a consequence, they are ful ler ,
which means in turn that there are yet fewer chances of f inding empty
seats . In the last three cases the paraphrase is an implicature of the original
ut terance (where an implicature is an intended logical conclusion derived
from a number of contextual premises) .18
These examples show a decrease in the degree of resemblance with
Anxo's paraphrase. Each one of the successive original ut terances requires
access to more contextual information and more inferences in order to
establ ish the intended degree of resemblance. This means that there is a
gradient of cogni t ive effor t , where (19a) requires less cogni t ive effor t
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and (19d) requires more. From the point of view of Relevance Theory,
the 1ess cogni t ive effor t required to derive adequate cogni t ive effects , the
more relevant the ut terance wil l be. Thus in the minimal context we
have in (18) , we can hypothesise that Maruxa wil l infer a fair ly high
degree of resemblance between the paraphrase and the original , so as to
al low her to reduce the cogni t ivecost involved in processingthe ut terance.
In the l ight of what has been said so far , the exis tence of interpret ive/
at t r ibut ive adverbs is not surpr is ing in a system in which there are two
different types of language use. Languages often specify cer ta in words or
expressions for carrying out cer ta in tasks. The thesis proposed in this
essay is that interpret ive adverbs const i tute a group of l inguis t icexpressions
which are specif ic to the interpret ive use of language. These adverbs
faci l i ta te the unravel l ing of ambigui ty between descr ipt iveand interpret ive
uses of language in favour of the lat ter . By doing this , they al low us to
save cogni t ive effor t in deciding whether a given ut terance is being used
descr ipt ively or interpret ively.I t is important to note that this dis t inct ion
between descr ipt iveand interpret ive uses is an inherent feature of language
used in communicat ion. Therefore if the intended use is not encoded
l inguis t ical ly , we wil l a lways have to resolve the indeterminacy
pragmatical ly . In the case of interpret ive adverbs this is avoided, s ince
they specify the type of use involved.
The interpret ive namre of this type of adverb was captured by Alvarez
et al . , who comment: ' [This type of adverb] is used a lot to express
judgments which one has heard from others , but whose degree of cer ta inty
one is unable or unwil l ing to ascer ta in ' .19 Compare examples (1^ and
(20):
(1) Disque l ie roubaron o coche o Venancio.
'Apparent ly , Venancio 's car has been stolen. '
(20) Roubaronl le o coche o Venancio.
'Venancio 's car has been stolen. '
In this minimal context , the difference between the two is precisely
between interpret ive use (1) and descr ipt ive use (20) . This , of course,
does not mean that the second example is not ambiguous: in a context ,
say, in which the speaker is relat ing the content of a report , example (20)
wil l not be interpreted as a descr ipt ion to which the speaker iscommit t ing
himself . Rather , i t wil l be processed as an ut terance at t r ibuted to the
author of the report . The funct ion of the adverb disque in (1) is thus to
remove ambigui ty , so as to avoid any doubts regarding the speaker 's
intent ions.
The same can be seen to occur with example (2) :
(2) O fi l lo do Carlos seica quere marchar para A Coruna a trabal lar .
'Carlos 's son apparent ly wants to go to A Coruha to work. '
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(21 ) O fi l lo do Carlos quere marchar para A Coruna a trabal lar .
'Carlos 's son wants to go to A Coruna to work. '
The si tuat ion here is the same as in the previous one. Example (21)
could he interpreted, in an appropriate contcxt , e i ther descr ipt ively or
interpret ively. However , in example (2) the interpretat ion is resolved in
favour of interpretive use due to the use of seica.
1 liese last two examples show the role played by both disque and seica
in the disambiguat ion of descr ipt ive/ interpret ive use of language in
ut terance interpretat ion. In this sense Galician is different from other
languages (e .g . Spanish, or even English) in that i t has lexical i tems (in
this case, adverbs) evolved and special ised for interpret ive use. In other
languages (e .g . Occi tan, personal communicat ion of Pierre Bee) , adverbs
equivalent to the Galicianones examined here have changed l inguis t ical ly ,
evolving from being specif ic to interpret ive use to indicat ing doubt . This
shif t could also happen in Galician with disque and seica in the furure .
But that would be another evolut ionary step.
Thus far disque and seica have been classif ied together as interpret ive
adverbs, while i t was argued that interpret ive use of language is based
on a resemblance between two representat ions, each with a
proposi t ional form. These representat ions can be ei ther ut terances or
thoughts , s ince both ut terances and thoughts can have proposi t ional
forms. The proposi t ional forms are what enable us to establ ish the
degree of interpret ive resemblance between the two representat ions.
The dis t inct ion between ut terances and thoughts is , the present essay
suggests , precisely what underl ies the difference between disque and
seica. A cursory look at their etymology ref lects this dis t inct ion too:
disque has i ts or igins in the verb dicir, ' to say ' , whereas setca comes
from the verb saber, ' to know' . This provides us with a clue to the
nature of their l inguis t ic meaning: i .e . they are not only interpret ive,
but also special ised in the type of interpret ive use they encode. Thus,
disque is special ised in interpret ive use between ut terances and
thoughts , and seica exclusively between thoughts . Consider once more
example (8) to i l lustrate the dis t inct ion:
(8) (B is witnessing the work of the paramedics in an accident . At that
point A arr ives and addresses B)
A: Seica houbo un accidente .
' I t looks l ike that there has been an accident . '
In this example there is no reason to assume that what A is saying is a
report of an ut terance produced by someone else , s ince the inter locutors
are strangers meet ing for the f i rs t t ime with no manifest knowledge of
other speakers ' having commented on the si tuat ion descr ibed. Even if A's
s ta tement was original ly based on a report by someone else , by using
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seica A is clear ly drawing at tent ion to his knowledge, not to someone
else 's ut terance. This is in keeping with the context , in which both
inter locutors are witnessing the event as i t unfolds .
I t is important to note that the interpersonal effects which arise from
the use of the ut terance can he explained by reference to knowledge: i t is
obvious to both A and B that an accident has occurred; saying so wil l
not have adequate contextual effects , s ince any effects wil l by then have
been derived from the mental representat ion of the event . One way in
which the ut terance can have effects , however , is by showing that the
mental representat ion of the event enter ta ined by both A and B is ident ical ,
and that they both share a similar cogni t ive environment ( i .e . set of
contextual assumptions) . This creates a degree of int imacy between the
inter locutors in the si tuat ion and helps any subsequent communicat ion
between the two.
If we subst imte disque for seica in (8) , the effects are subt ly different :
(8 ) (B is witnessing the work of the paramedics in an accident . At that
point A arr ives and addresses B):
A: Disque houbo un accidente .
'Apparent ly there has been an accident . '
In this case A is drawing at tent ion not so much to his knowledge but
rather to what someone else has told him. Here the resemblance is not
between the thought he communicates and that of someone else , but
rather between the thought communicated by his ut terance and the '
ut terance of someone else . In this case the source of the at t r ibut ion, on
the basis of the l inguis t ic form of the ut terance, is less direct that in the
previous case: in (8) the resemblance was with a representat ion internal
to A, with one of his thoughts ; whereas in (8 ) the resemblance is with a
representat ion external to him, with someone else 's ut terance. This also
explains why disque is not as contextual ly appropriate in the si tuat ion
descr ibed as seica, s ince there is no shared knowledge between A and B
about potent ia l speakers of the original ut terance.
Let us consider another example, this t ime one which original ly
included disque:
(1 2) O marineiro disque viu unha serea mais eu coido que mente.
'The sai lor has apparent ly seen a mermaid, but I think that he is
lying. '
In this example the ut terance is presented as a report of what the
sai lor had said; for example:
(22) O Marineiro: Vin unha serea
' The sai lor : I have seen a mermaid. '
\
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The degree of resemblance between the speaker 's ut terance and the
original one (the sai lor ' s ) wil l be as high as is opt imal ly relevant , but no
higher . In the current example, s ince the speaker is ta lking about l ies ,one
would assume that the degree of resemblance is fair ly high, as otherwise
the speaker might be taken to be misleading the audience. Let us replace
<Usque with seica:
(23) O marineiro seica viu unha serea mais eu coido que mente.
'The sai lor has apparent ly seen a mermaid, but I think that he is
lying. '
In this case the resemblance is not so much with the sai lor ' s ut terance,
but with the knowledge of what the sai lor has said. This knowledge may
be the resul t of someone else 's having told the speaker of (23) about the
incident , or of the speaker 's having himself inferred from the evidence
provided by the sai lor , e tc . What is crucial here is that al though the
speaker is using the ut terance interpret ively ( i .e . not descr ipt ively) , he is
establ ishing a relat ionship of resemblance with a thought , not an
ut terance. I lence, he is drawing at tent ion to the processes involved in
thinking (inferences, concepts) , not in ut ter ing (words) .
In this ar t ic le i t has been argued that the tradi t ional classif icat ion of
the adverbs disque and seica as adverbs of doubt does not explain their
semantic funct ion in language. I t has been shown using various tests
that their meaning is not one of doubt but of interpret ive at t r ibut ion.
The connotat ions of doubt that some authors seem to perceive are
derivat ive, not pr imary. These traces of doubt ar ise from the lack of
manifest speaker commitment towards the proposi t ion expressed and
the dis tancing factor involved in the at t r ibut ion process . Hearers wil l
understandably be reluctant to put too much fai th in the proposi t ion
expressed and may consequent ly enter ta in some doubt over the si tuat ion
descr ibed. The process by which this reasoningis carr ied out is pragmatic ,
and thus the degree of commitment derived wil l be variable .
The semantic special isat ion in interpret ive use of these adverbs is
explained adopt ing the theoret ical framework provided by Relevance
Theory. In this theoret ical approach there is a dis t inct ion between
descr ipt ive and interpret ive uses of language: the f i rs t is concerned with
those uses in which the ut terances descr ibe a state of affairs in the world,
whils t the second is concerned with those ut terances which interpret
ei ther another ut terance already produced at another t ime or a thought
at t r ibuted to another person. Interpret ive adverbs encode the interpret ive
use of the ut terances in which they are inser ted, thus faci l i ta t ing the
interpretat ion process by reducing the cogni t ive effor t required in
processing those ut terances.
I t has also been argued that the difference betweendisque and seica l ies
in their fur ther special isat ion in the type of interpret ive use encoded. In
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the former case, the interpret ive resemblance sought by the speaker is
between his own utterance and someone else 's ut terance (or his own at a
different t ime) . In the lat ter case, the resemblanceis between the speaker 's
thought and someone else 's thought (which could conceivably be one of
the speaker 's own at a different t ime) .
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NON-DECLARATIVESENTENCES IN SPANISH:
THE CASE OF THE INFINITIVE
Xo.seRosales Sequeiros. University of (Ireenwich. L'K
1. INTRODUCTION
I his article is concerned with the imperative use of the infinitive in Spanish In particular, an
analysis is presented of lis semantics and pragmatics, and an account is provided which brings
together these two aspects of the infinitive and its imperative use.
Wilson and Sperber (1988) provide a survey of semantic accounts of non-declarative
sentences and argue that the infinitive and the imperative differsemantically According to them,
Ihe latter encodes that the state of affairs described is both potentialand desirable, whilst the
former encodes that the state of affairs is only possible They also argue that this does not
preclude the use of the infinitive as an imperative when assumptions about achievability (i.e
potentiality) and desirability are available in the context However, their analysis does not take
account of a number of issues: (a) what is the theoretical status of Ihe imperative interpretation
of the infinitive?, (b) what pragmatic processes, if any, are involved in this type of imperative
use7, and (c) why is the imperative use of the infinitive possible in Spanish (and other languages,
both Romance (e g French) and non-Romance (e g German)) and not in languages such as
English''
It will be argued that whilst the semantics of the infinitive may be restricted to possibility, in
an imperative use its contribution is to the exphcatures of the utterance, and not to the
implicatures This means that its contribution is to the explicitcontent of the utterance and not to
the implicit content, contrary to what Wilson and Sperber seem to suggest Hence, any pragmatic
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processing involved will contribute to the explicit rather than the implicit part of the
interpretation,which provides an answer to the second question posed above. Equally, this also
seems to suggest an answer to the third question raisedearlier, namely, that the contribution of
the imperative use to the explicit content of the utteranceand the repeated use of the infinitive as
imperative in Spanish (and other Romance and non-Romance languages) has made it possible
for this use to be more accessible and become semi lexicalised In English the same (politeness
and referential)elfects are achieved by other means and, as a result, the infinitive is not normally
used as an imperative
The article is organised as follows Firstly, a brief survey is provided of the role of
illocutionary force and mood 111the interpretationof non declarative sentences Secondly, there
follows a discussion of Sperber and Wilson's model, which is applied to Spanish data (involving
both the imperative and the imperatival infinitive), as well as (briefly) to data from other
languages Thirdly, some problems are discussed in relation to Sperber and Wilson's analysis,
and then an alternative account is developed. Finally, some conclusions are provided, which
suggest a number of areas for further research
2. MOODANDILLOCUTIONARYFORCEINUTTERANCEINTERPRETATION
Speech-act accounts of non declarative (as well as declarative) sentences have relied on
illocutionary force to explain differences between different types of sentence Illocutionary force
has been seen as a semantic category, where the meaning of a sentence was associated with its
general potential for illocutionary force In particular,the semantic meaning of a sentence would
be the range of illocutionary forces it could be used to perform So, for example, non-declarative
interrogative sentences have been seen as performing directive speech acts, which involve the
speaker making a request for information Non declarative imperative sentences were also seen
as performing a directive speech act, but this time involving a request for action, not
information From this perspective, the role of pragmatic interpretationwas to identify the actual
speech act performed from the range of possible ones (i.e the ones allowed by the specific
sentence type). Hence, for instance, an imperative may be used to perform a request for action,
which covers a number of possibilities including a request interpreted as a plea, entreatment,
order, etc Pragmatic considerations would help us determine which one of these possible, more
specific, requests for action would have been performed in any particular instance
One of the main problems with a speech-act based account of non declarative sentences are
cases in which sentence meaning and lllocutionaryforce potential do not correspond Thus, for
example, many uses of imperatives do not involve a request for action, as predicted by its
illocutionary-based semantics Cases in point are, for example, good wishes, advice, threats, and
permission, amongst others Let us consider good wishes and advice as an illustration of this
point
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(1) Good Wishes:
(John bidding Mary farewell at the airport)
John Have a sate (light back
(2) Advice:
Mary Is there a petrol station around here?
John Yes l ake the third turn on the left and continue 200 meters
In both these cases, speech act theory would predict that some action was being requested from
the hearei Ihus, for example, in (1) John would be predicted to be requesting Mary to perform
the action described, namely, making sure she has a safe flight However, John is clearly not
doing any such thing In particular, he is not intending to communicate, for example, that Mary
must carry out checks to make sure that the aircraft is in flying condition IIns action is beyond
Mary's control and, probably, ability John is merely expressing a good wish towards Mary's
safe arrival at her destination and, thus, no action needs to be performed to understand
successfully the force of the sentence In (2) Mary is not intending to get John to perform the
actions she is describing She is merely indicating what he could do to get to a petrol station
John may or may not choose to follow her advice His understanding of the sentence does not
depend on his performing the actions described
In these types of case, the imperative cannot be said to change its meaning in any special
uay, which might prevent it from fulfilling its predicted illocutionary potential In the light of
the above examples, it is difficult to see how illocutionary force, as understood by speech act
theorists, could be a semantic property, rather a pragmatic one, since the precise force with
which a sentence is uttered is dependent on pragmatic interpretation (see below for further
discussion on this point) In this respect, illocutionary force is a property of utterances
(pragmatics), rather than sentences (semantics)
However, if illocutionary force is not what distinguishes the meaning of different types of
non declarative (as well as declarative) sentences, then something else must be responsible
Many theorists have resorted to the notion of mood to explain these differences
3. MOOD BASF.DANALYSISOF IMPK.RATIVKFORCK
Mood has been defined as referring to the semantic and logical properties that make one
sentence type (eg imperatives) different from another (eg interrogatives) Io make a mood
based account work, we need to know (a) how these moods arc characterised (ie their
semantics) and (b) how they relate to force (i e their pragmatics)
Using mood, as opposed to force, as the main distinguishing feature for (non (declarative
sentences involves establishing the range of speech acts a given mood is conventionally used to
perform As Hare (1970, quoted in Wilson and Sperber 1988:79) states "When we say that I he
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cat is on the mat is a typical indicative (when we mention its mood, that is), we identify the type
ol speech act which it is standardly used to perform.Thus mood signs classify sentences
according to the speech acts to which they are assigned by the conventions which give meanings
to those signs" (My italics)
Ihe standard speech acts a given mood is used to perform must be identified by pragmatics.
As far as the imperative mood is concerned, it is generally acccpted that it is standardly used to
perform directive speech acts, which involve an attempt to get the hearer to perform the action
described by the proposition expressed This is, in effect, a parallel characterisation to that ol
illocutionary force and as such is subject to the same counterexamples. The only difference
between the two characterisations is that illocutionary force is seen as a more pragmatically
oriented notion (i.e it emphasises the impact of the sentence on the hearer, its force), whereas
mood is seen as a more semantically oriented one (i.e. it emphasises the semantic and logical
content of the various sentence types, their mood) However, in a mood-based approach,
pragmatics plays a crucial role in determining which speech acts a given mood is used to
perform
As was briefly illustrated above, there are many uses of the imperative which do not involve
getting the hearer to perform any kind of action, thereby providing evidence against a mood-
based analysis of the imperative Let us consider some counterexamples to this type of analysis
(3) Threats:
(John and Mary are fighting)
John Yeah, go on Punch me
(4) Permission
Mary: Can I use your computer 9 •
John Go ahead Use it for as long as you need to
In these cases the imperative is being used to convey threats and permission However, in neither
of them is there an attempt to get the hearer to perform the action described by the proposition
expressed In the case of threats, the use of the imperative is not an attempt to get the hearer to
perform the action described by the proposition expressed, rather it is an attempt to stop her
doing it In the case of permissions, the speaker is merely showing his approval towards the
action described, but not his intention to get the hearer to carry out the action In addition to
threats and permissions, the earlier cases of good wishes and advice are also counterexamples to
the mood based analysis In the case of good wishes, the speaker is merely expressing his
goodwill towards the hearer The action described is largely out of the hearer's control, so she
could not be taken to understand the sentence as an attempt to get her to perform the action in
question In the case of advice, the speaker is giving the hearer helpful directions, but in no way
can he be seen as trying to get her to perform the action described by the proposition expressed
Some scholars have discussed this type of example, putting forward alternative analyses
However, none of them provides an account which covers the full range of cases Schmerling
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(1982), tor example, argues tor an account based on the imperative communicating that the
speaker is trying to bring about the state ol aftairs described by the proposition expressed, as
opposed to getting the hearer to do it Ihis analysis could be said to account lor good wishes, in
'hat the speaker could be seen as wanting to bring about the good wish; but not lor advice,
threats, or permission cases, where the speaker does not necessarilywant to bring about the state
ot affairs described McGinn (1977) departs from speech-act analyses and proposes an
alternative using the notion of truth conditions. He argues in favour of the imperatives having
not truth conditions as such, but rather fulfillment conditions, which are satisfied when the state
of affairs described by the imperative is materialised The fulfillment of this state of affairs can
be achieved by linking mood with desire, which also provides the connection between mood and
force. That is to say, the speaker of the imperative (which is the carrier of mood) would be seen
as conveying a desire (which is the carrier of force) regarding the realisation of the state of
affairs, thereby contributing to the connection between the semantic and pragmatic stages of
interpretation However, this analysis would only account for cases such as good wishes, where
a desire may be seen to be involved In the other cases (threats, advice, and permission), no
desire on the part of the speaker is necessarily present
The real breakthrough in accounting for the range of imperatival uses comes when force is
taken out of the equation altogether Huntley (1984) followed this line of analysis when he
proposed that the difference between declaratives and imperatives (and other non-declaratives)
lies in whether they make mdexical reference to the actual world (declaratives) or to some other
possible world (imperatives) In this respect, he argues (ibid 122), "(imperatives, and other non-
declaratives] can represent a situation as being merely envisaged as a possibility with no
commitment as to whether it obtains, in past, present or future, in this world" However, two
problems arise in relation to this proposal Firstly, it is not clear what the link is between
envisaging a slate of affairs as a mere possibility, and wishing, advising, threatening, permitting,
etc , to bring about that state of affairs. In other words, it is not clear what the relationship is
between the semantics and pragmatics of non-declaratives from this point of view However,
Huntley did make an important connection, for the purposes of this article, between imperatives
and infinitives. He argued that both involve the notion of possibility in their semantics, with the
difference that infinitives do not necessarily represent the state of affairs they describe as either
achievable or desirable (which imperatives may do) This allows for the possibility of infinitives
being interpreted without imperative force, though it does not preclude it altogether This latter
option is the one explored in this article
The second problem with Huntley's analysis is that it predicts that imperatives can be used
without imperative force (i e by encoding only possibility) However, this seems to be incorrect,
as imperatives must somehow be linked to imperative force as part of their meaning (however
this force may ultimately be characterised) Otherwise, this would entail that imperatives and
infinitives would be semanticallyequivalent, which seems to be counterintuitive
In order to solve these problems, Sperber and Wilson (1988:84) argue that imperatives are
necessarily linked to notions of desirability and achievability, whereas the infinitive is only
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linked to the notion of possibility Thus, they distinguish semantically between imperatives and
infinitives, thereby retaining their potential for different pragmatic forces, whilst at the same
time allowing for the possibility of similarities in their interpretation Moreover, as will be
shown below, they do this by dispensing with the notion of semantic mood altogether
4. SPERBERANDWILSON'S APPROACH
Traditionally, the imperative is seen as a mood in its own right However, Sperber and Wilson
argue that they "see no reason to assume that semantic moods exist" (1988:99). They argue
further that the characteristic linguistic features associated with declarative and non-declarative
sentences only encode an abstract property of the intended interpretation "the direction in which
the relevance of the utterance is to be sought" (ibid:101). In the case of infinitives the direction is
one of envisaging possibilities. In the case of imperatives the direction is one of entertaining
states of affairs as potential (achievable) and desirable To exemplify this, consider the following
examples in Spanish, Galician, and English
(5) a Me encantaria vivir en el campo (Spanish)
me would-love to-live in the countryside
"I would love to live in the countryside."
b Quero falar con ela (Galician)
I-want to-speak with her.
"I want to speak to her "
c To be in England in April! (English)
In these three sentences there are three infinitives:vivir, falar, and to be, respectively In each
case, the claim is that the speaker is only committing himself to the possibility of the events
described He is envisaging the events as possible and commenting on them at the same time
The semantic meaning of (5a), for example, could be paraphrasedas follows:
(5') a Me encantaria tener la posibihdad de vivir en el campo
me would-hke to-have the possibility of to-live in the countryside
"I would love to have the possibility of living in the countryside."
However, in the case of imperatives the speaker is encoding more than this. Consider the
following Spanish examples (where SUBJ denotes subjunctive)
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(6) Order
- ( Que quieres que haga?
what you-want that I-do-SUBJ
"What do you want me to do?"
- Abre la puerta.
you open-IMP the door
"Open the door."
(7) Permission
- iPuedo abrtr la puerta ?
can-I to-open the door
"Can I open the door?"
- Abrela
you-open-IMP-it
"Open it."
In both examples the speaker is encoding that the events are potential (achievable) and desirable
The difference between the two is that whilst in (6) the state of affairsis desirable from the point
of view of the speaker, in (7) it is desirable from the point of view of the hearer Determining
from whose point of view the event is desirable is one of the semantic indeterminacies in the
interpretation of imperatives that must be resolved pragmatically Following Sperber and
Wilson, the meaning of example (6), for instance, could be paraphrased as follows
(6') a It is feasible for you to open the door
b It is quite desirable, from my point of view, that you open the door
In fact, Sperber and Wilson's analysis involves three pragmatic indeterminacies regarding the
interpretation of imperatives Firstly, one must determine how potential the state of affairs
described is This may have a bearing on how some utterances are interpreted For example, it
may help us distinguish between requests and challenges
(8) Request
(At home)
Ana to Pablo Hazme un cafe.
Ana to Pablo: Make-IMP-me a coffee
"Ana to Pablo Make me a coffee "
(9) Challenge
(At home)
Ana to Pablo (who's manifestly incapable of making exotic drinks) Hazme un cocktail
Ana to Pablo (who's manifestly incapable of making exotic drinks): Make-IMP-me a
cocktail
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Ana to Pablo (who s manifestly incapable of making exotic drinks) Make me a
cocktail "
In (8), the imperative can be interpreted as being a request, as the state of affairs described is
easily achievable However, in (9) the state of affairs is manifestly less achievable, because of
(the shared knowledge regarding) Pablo's incompetence at making exotic drinks Thus, the
imperative in this case can be interpreted as a challenge more readily than (8)
Secondly, one must determine how desirable the state of affairs is The degree of desirability
may also have a bearing on how we interpret some utterances For example, it may help us
distinguish between pleas and requests:
(10) Request
(Pablo is going to the shop)
Ana to Pablo Trdeme tabaco
Ana to Pablo: Bnng-IMP-me tobacco
"Ana to Pablo Bring me tobacco "
(11) Plea
(Pablo is going to the shop)
Ana. who is suffering from withdrawal symptoms, to Pablo Trdeme tabaco
Ana, who is suffering from withdrawal symptoms, to Pablo Bnng-IMP-me tobacco
"Ana, who is suffering from withdrawal symptoms, to Pablo Bring me tobacco "
In (10), in the absence of other contextual assumptions, the imperative is used to make an
ordinary request. In particular, there is no reason to believe that a specially high degree of
desirability is involved, which means that Pablo is unlikely to give the utterance an interpretation
beyond that of a request However, in (11), where there are relevant manifest assumptions
available, the imperative is used with extra force In particular, due to these available
assumptions, Pablo will establish a high degree of desirability as part of the interpretation of the
utterance, which will lead him to interpret it as a plea
The third indeterminacy to be resolved pragmatically is the one already mentioned above,
namely, the answer to the question from whose point of view is the state of affairs desirable
speaker, hearer, or someone else As shown above in (6) and (7), the resolution of this
indeterminacy may lead us, for example, to interpret utterances as orders or permissions, or in
other cases as favors or advice This resolution is dependent on whether the state of affairs is
desirable from Ihe speaker's point of view (orders, favors), or the hearer's (permissions,advice)
Hence, to sum up, three elements play a part in Sperber and Wilson's analysis of imperatives
degree of achievability, degree of desirability, and point of view of desirability. Using these
parameters, we can account for examples (l)-(4) discussed earlier
Example (1) was a good wish because it involved desirability from the point of view of the
speaker (with benefits to the hearer), and lack of achievability (as neither the speaker nor the
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hearer can bring about the state of affairs). Examples (2)-(4) involved desirability from the point
of view of the hearer In particular, example (2) was a piece of advice because the information
was desirable from the hearer's point of view in order to fulfil her goal, and was easily
achievable. Example (3) was a threat because, although it was potentially achievable, it was not
desirable, particularly from the hearer's point of view, since carrying out the state of affairs
described would bring negative consequences to her (which would consequently make it noi
desirable from her point of view). Finally, example (4) was a permission because the state of
affairs was desirable from the hearer's point of view, and its potentiality depended on the.
speaker's acquiescence (which in this case is given) Let us now turn to the imperative use of the
infinitive
5. IMPERATIVEUSEOF INFINITIVE
It is a well known fact that in Spanish (as well as in many Romance and non-Romance
languages, see below) the infinitive can be used as an imperative (see e.g. Butt and Benjamin
1988:277ff)- Consider the following examples:
(12) a In a hospital:
No fumar
not to-smoke
"Do not smoke "
b In a recipe book:
Trocear las patcitas
to-cut the potatoes
"Cut the potatoes "
c. In an instructions Booklet:
Enchufar la impresora
to-plug the printer
"Plug the printer"
d. In a cashpoint:
Introducir la tarjeta
to-introduce the card
"Introduce the card "
It seems clear that in none of these examples the infinitive is used simply as a possibility For
instance, in (12a) the hospital personnel do not just want visitors or patients to consider the
utterance as communicating the mere possibility of not smoking In fact, that interpretation
would be useless as far as they arc concerned, since what they really want is to avoid health risks
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to their patients. In other words, they want people positively not to smoke Moreover, if any
visitor to the hospital was found smoking, it seems clear that, on the basis of the sign, they
would be entitled to require the person to stop smoking or leave the building This suggests,
therefore, that what is being communicated is much more than just a mere possibility In other
words, there are issues of achievability, desirability,and point of view involved in this type of
case In particular, the state of affairs described is easily achievable and highly desirable (from
the point of view of the patients and public at large) The same is the case for the other
examples, whose force is also that of an imperative. In (12b), the recipe book is not just
envisaging the action described as a possibility, but rather if the reader wants to follow the
particular recipe, then they must carry out the action described to bnng about the overall goal
successfully In (12c) and (12d), the situation is similar In (12c), the booklet is describing an
action which must be followed, if the reader wants to use the printer successfully In (12d), the
cashpoint machine is describing an action which must be followed in order to carry out a
transaction In all these cases, the state of affairs described is achievable and, in the right
circumstances, highly desirable from the addressee's point of view In more general terms,
example (12a) can be interpreted as an order, given the social assumptions about the power
which hospitals authorities have within their premises On the other hand, examples (12b-d) can
be interpreted as instructions, given their goal-orientedcontext
In all the above examples, the infinitives could be replaced by imperatives without a change
in their interpretation (as far as their directive import is concerned),as shown below
(12') a In a hospital
No fumen
not you-smoke-IMP
"Do not smoke "
b In a recipe book
Troceen las patatas
you cut-IMP the potatoes
"Cut the potatoes "
c In an instructions booklet:
Enchufen la impresora
you-plug-IMP the printer
"Plug the printer."
d In a cashpoint
hitroduzcan la tarjeta
you -introduce-IMP the card
"Introduce the card "
For instance, imperatival example (12'a) carries the same pragmatic force as the infinitival
(12a) Both involve a request not to smoke. Similarly, imperatival example (12'b) carries the
\
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force of an instruction, as does infinitival example (12b) Both instruct the addressee to follow
(he action described in order to complete the recipe successfully The same type of explanation
applies to the other examples, where the imperative and infinitival versions share the same
pragmatic force
Hence, these paraphrases seem to show that the infinitival versions do, in fact, convey the
same direction of relevance sought as the imperatives (in the type of contexts considered) From
Sperber and Wilson s point of view, they convey potentiality (i.e. they are achievable state of
affairs) and desirability (i.e. they are desired outcomes either from the point of view of the
addresser, e g at the hospital, on behalf of patients; or from the point of view of the addressee,
e g in the case of the recipe book). In their framework, Sperber and Wilson allow for the
possibility of imperatives and infinitives having equivalent pragmatic interpretations "The
semantic analysis of imperatives must make reference to these notions [i.e. potentiality and
desirability]; the semantic analysis of infinitival clauses does not. This is not to say that
infinitival clauses can never be used with imperatival force When can they be so used7 When it
is clear in the context that the state of affairs "envisaged as a possibility" is both achievable and
desirable." (Wilson and Sperber, 1988 84)
If the account provided so far is correct and the infinitivalconstructions convey thesame
import as the imperative (as far as the direction of relevance sought is concerned), then the
question arises as to whether this equivalence is semantic or pragmatic In other words, are
infinitives semantically ambiguous between possibility, on the one hand, and potentiality and
desirability, on the other? Or, do they, semantically, only encode possibility and then become
pragmatically interpreted as imperatives? At a first glance, the first option would seem to be
counterintuitive, as the infinitive is not normally seen as encodingimperative mood in traditional
grammars From Sperber and Wilson's point of view, the solution would be closer to the second
option, i.e. that infinitives encode possibility, and imperatives potentiality and desirability, so
that at a linguistic semantic level they are different However, as stated above, from their point
of view, infinitives could be interpreted as carrying imperative force at a pragmatic level,
provided assumptions of potentiality and desirability were available in the context (Sperber and
Wilson ibid ) This means that infinitives and imperatives could have equivalent pragmatic
force.
This second analysis would appear to be confirmed when we consider the type of context in
which the imperatival infinitive is found As seen in the above examples in (12), imperatival
infinitives are used in contexts in which instructional assumptions are common (e g hospitals,
recipe books, instructions manuals, etc ) Given their accessibility in these contexts, it would
seem natural that assumptions about potentiality and desirability could be used in the
interpretation process, with the resulting imperatival upgrade. This would seem to be
corroborated by the fact that in other types of context the imperatival interpretation does not
seem to be equally available Thus, consider the following examples where the infinitive is used,
but no imperatival interpretation is available (please note that, for ease of presentation, in these
and the remaining non-English examples only idiomatic translations are provided, with extra
106 From Words lo Discourse
information given when required)
(13) a. On a travel brochure:
/Ver la isla desde el avion 1 Esa es una experiencia unica.
To see the island from the plane! That is a unique experience."
b At the beginning of a novel:
Reflexionar, charlar, observar. Eso era lo que liaciamos diariamente.
"Reflect, talk, observe. That was what we did daily."
c In questions:
( Marchar ahora? No me parece una bi:ena idea
"Go now? It doesn't seem to me a good idea "
d Intensifier in Repetitions:
Comer comimos Pero la comida era mala
"Eat we did. But the food was bad "
e In descriptions:
- tQue hicisteis
"What did you do?"
- Pnmero. ducharnos Despues, llamar por telefono a Juan Litego. vernos con el
"First, we showered Then, we telephoned Juan Then, we met him."
In all these cases only the narrow infinitival interpretationis available For example, in (13a) no
indication is conveyed about the need for the addresser or addressee to carry out the action
described, only the possibility is being envisaged (which may subsequently lead to desiring its
actualisation) Similarly, in (1 3b) no desire is necessarilycommunicated for the writer or reader
to reflect, talk or observe, rather those states of affairs are merely being described (in the past)
The same goes for examples (13c-d) Furthermore, general unavailability of imperatival
interpretation is not only due to the type of situational context In certain common grammatical
structures, the imperatival interpretation is not available either, e.g.:
(14) a Embedded Clauses
Quiero ir al cine
"I want to go to the cinema "
b Exclamative Sentences:
/Visitor Islandia' Me encantaria
"To visit Iceland! I would love it."
In (14a), the embedded infinitive cannot be interpreted imperatively It can only be entertained
as a possibility This seems to be the result of the fact that the infinitive is embedded into a
higher level explicature verb (quiero), which determines the type of attitude by which it is
governed In this case, the attitude is of wants, and therefore the infinitive cannot be subjected to
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standard imperatival force The unavailability of imperatival force is further evidenced by the
fact that it would be ungrammatical to construct a sentence with this higher-level exphcature
type ol verb in the imperative, as shown below (where * denotes ungrammatically, and "formal"
polite verbal ending):
(14'a) * Quierair al cine
"Want-IMP(formal) to go to the cinema"
rhis suggests that not only is imperatival force unavailable in relation to the embedded verb, but
also imperative mood is incompatible with the type of higher-level explicature verb used This
seems to suggest further that, in this type of construction with querer-iype verbs, imperatival
force is excluded from the whole utterance, not just the embedded verb Equally, in (14b) the
infinitive within the exclamative sentence does not make an imperatival interpretation available
As in the previous case, the state of affairs described can only be envisaged as a possibility This
seems to be for the same type of reason The cxclamative mood under which the infinitive falls
determines the attitude which directs the interpretation of the infinitive This attitude is not one
of imperatival force, but rather one of exclamative degree Therefore, the infinitive cannot give
rise to an imperatival interpretation in this type of context Unlike in the previous example, the
attitude in this case was not encoded explicitly by a verb, but rather it was communicated
implicitly by the use of exclamative force
In the light of the preceding discussion, it can be concluded that imperatival interpretations
of the infinitive can be blocked either pragmatically(by inaccessibilityof appropriate contextual
assumptions) or grammatically (by insertion in certain grammatical structures). So far we have
considered imperatival infinitives in Spanish However, are they also available in other
languages9
5 . 1 . I m p e r a t i v a l U s e s o f t h e I n f i n i t i v e i n O t h e r L a n g u a g e s
As was suggested above, the imperatival use of the infinitive is indeed not limited to Spanish
Other Romance and non-Romance languages allow it. Here some Galician and German
examples will be discussed to illustrate this phenomenon further In Galician the infinitive is
used imperatively as widely as in Spanish (see Alvarez et al , 1986: 387) Let us consider some
examples (where INF denotes infinitive):
(15) a Phone Speaking Instructions
Falar a modo
"Speak (INF) slowly "
\
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b At Doctor's Practice:
Non Fumar.
"Do not Smoke. (INF)"
c. Shopping Message:
Truer Ovos do Supermercado
"Bring (INF) Eggs from the Supermarket"
d Notice in Park
Manter Limpo.
"Keep (INF) Tidy."
As in Spanish, the interpretation ot all these infinitivalsentences carries imperative force, i.e. not
just the force ol mere possibility For instance, (15a) instructs people to speak slowly. In
particular, it docs not just ask them to consider the mere possibility of doing so. Equally in (15b),
the sign is at the very least requesting people not to smoke, if not ordering them to do so. It is
certainly not just asking people merely to entertain the possibilityof not smoking. The same type
of explanation applies to the other examples Moreover, as in Spanish, these sentences could be
reproduced using the imperative without changing their directive import. Thus, consider the
following imperatival versions
(15') a Phone Speaking Instructions:
Falen a modo
"Speak (IMP) slowly "
b At Doctor's Practice:
Non Fumen
"Do not Smoke (IMP)"
c Shopping Messgage:
Trunin Ovos do Supermercado
"Bring (IMP) Eggs from the Supermarket "
d Notice in Park
Mantenan Limpo (o Parque)
"Keep (IMP) Tidy "
The directive import of these imperative sentences is equivalent to the ones above Both the
imperative and infinitive sentences involve not just possibility, but rather achievability and
desirability Both involve interpretations of (non-)actions being instructed, requested, reminded,
etc , which are typical of imperatival interpretations The same is the case for German, where the
infinitive is one of the various ways in which imperative force can be expressed (see Drosdowski
et a! , 1984:293) To illustrate, consider the following infinitivalexamples:
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(16) a On a Grass Lawn
Nicht auf den Rasen Treten
"Do not Step (INF) on Grass."
h Pedestrian Traffic Lights:
Rot - Stehen / Grim Gehen
"Red - Stay (INF) / Green - Go (INF)"
c On a Door Bell
liter Khngeln
"Ring (INF) here"
d On Film Instructions
Kameraanleitung Beachten.
"Follow (INF) Camera Instructions
In these examples the infinitive has been used, and again the intended interpretation goes beyond
entertaining the mere possibility of the state of affairs being described Some kind of imperatival
interpretation is intended in each of them For example, in (16a) the sign does not |ust ask
pedestrians not to step onto the grass, rather it requires them not to do so (or a reprimand might
follow) Equally, in (16b) pedestrians are not just invited to envisage the scenarios presented to
them by the sign Rather they are again required to follow the state of affairs described The
same type of imperatival interpretation is available in relation to the other examples As in
Spanish and Galician. the German infinitival sentences can be reproduced using the imperative
without affecting the directive import of their pragmatic interpretation Thus, consider the
following imperatival versions of the above examples
(16') a On a Grass Lawn
Treten Ste Nicht auf den Rasen
"Do not Step (IMP) on Grass "
b Pedestrian Traffic Lights
Stehen Ste bet Rot / Gehen Ste hei Grun
"Stay (IMP) on Red / Go (IMP) on Green "
c On a Door Bell
Khngeln Ste liter
"Ring (IMP) here "
d On Film Instructions:
Beachten Ste die Kameraanleitung
"Follow (IMP) the Camera Instructions"
As in earlier cases, these imperatival versions convey the same import as the original infinitival
examples For instance, imperatival example (16'a) conveys the same directive import as
infinitival example (16a). where in both cases pedestrians are required to stay outside the lawn
)
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From Sperber and Wilson's point of view, the difference between the two is that, as far as the
imperative case is concerned, the addressee is directed to an interpretation involving a state of
affairs which is both achievable and desirable from the addresser's point of view Thus, the use
of the imperative here counts as a requirement, in that the sign is in a park under the control of
the park authorities, who are empowered to set and enforce the rules On the other hand, in the
infinitive case, the addressee is only directed towards envisaging the state of affairs as a
possibility. This is then interpreted further, in the light of available contextual assumptions about
park regulations, resulting in a pragmatic upgrade of the possibility interpretation into an
imperatival one The same type of explanation obtains in the case of the other examples.
Although no further languages will be discussed here, suffice it to say that the imperatival
use of the infinitive is fairly widespread within European languages Just to illustrate this point,
consider the following examples in a number of languages taken from the instructions attached
to an Afgachrome photographic Film
(17) a. French:
Faire developper immediatemenl le film expose
"Develop (INF) immediately the exposed film."
b Dutch:
Belichtingsmeterop ISO 1000/21inslellen
"Set (INF) your exposure meter to ISO 100/21 "
c Italian:
Osser\>arele istruziom allegate all apparecchio. ,
"Follow (INF) the instructions provided with your camera."
In each of these examples an infinitive has been used faire, instellen, and osservare,
respectively. As in earlier cases, the interpretation of each of these infinitives goes beyond
merely entertaining the possibility of the state of affairs described and involves some kind of
imperatival interpretation, where assumptions about achievability and desirability are present
Although the line of explanation developed by Sperber and Wilson seems to account for the
differences and similarities encountered here between imperatives and imperatival infinitives As
will be seen below, there seem to be some problems with their account
5 . 2 . P r o b l e m s w i t h S p e r b e r a n d W i l s o n ' s A c c o u n t
So far we have observed that Sperber and Wilson's claims are that assumptions of potentiality
and desirability constitute the basis for an imperatival interpretation of the infinitive However,
as anticipated above, there are indeed a number of problems with their account The first is one
that Sperber and Wilson leveled at Huntley themselves regarding possibility (Wilson and
Sperber 1988:84). Namely, often imperatives are associated with some kind of (non-)action, and
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the gap between potentiality/desirability and action is often too wide to bndge pragmatically
and, as a consequence, to explain the resulting directive interpretation.So, for example, simply
to say that it is desirable not to smoke in a hospital is not necessarily going to persuade people
not to do it, which is the intended (non-)action the hospital authorities wish to bring about Thus,
there must be more than just potentiality and desirability for the desired (non-)action to be
brought about In the case of the hospital, for example, the addressee must recover further
assumptions about the desirability of not smoking, so as to encourage the adherence to the rules:
(18) a If you smoke, the hospital will throw you out
b If you smoke, patients will suffer the negative effectsof smoking
c If you smoke, you behave antisocially, etc.
In (18) there are some of the assumptions that might be available to the addressee All of them
lead to negative consequences, which might in turn persuade him not to smoke It is these
negative consequences that will make adherence to the rules desirable, and may ultimately carry
the force of a warning This type of example suggests that imperatival directive force requires
more pragmatic interpretation for its derivation than seems envisaged by Sperber and Wilson,
and may also play an important role in establishing degrees of desirability in the interpretation
Another problem with Sperber and Wilson's account relates to the universality of their
claims. Thus, if it is the case that infinitive imperatival interpretations are dependant on the
availability of contextual assumptions about potentiality and desirability, then why is it that
English infinitives cannot be used imperatively even when those assumptions are available in the
context 9 Consider the following English versions of the examples in (12):
(19) a. In a hospital Not to smoke
b In a recipe book To cut up the potatoes.
c. In an instructions booklet To plug in the printer
d In a cashpoint To introduce the card
These English infinitival versions are not pragmatically acceptable and, as they stand, also
ungrammatical Therefore, the imperatival interpretations cannot be available. However,
contextual assumptions about the potentiality and desirability of the state of affairs described in
the English scenarios should be as easily available in the various contexts considered as they are
in the Spanish cases After all, instructions are as easily found in Englishhospitals, recipe books,
and instructions manuals as they are in Spanish ones This means that, from a contextual point of
view, there should not be any differences between the English and Spanish cases (i.e. regarding
accessibility of assumptions about potentiality and desirability, and hence interpretation of
infinitives with imperatival force) This means further that at some level there must be
differences between the two languages which must ultimately stem from linguistic factors, rather
than purely contextual ones If this is correct, Sperber and Wilson's predictions would not be
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borne out
The question now becomes whether English and Spanish (and other similarly behaved
languages) are different at semantic or pragmatic level. Let us consider the first of these two
possibilities: that Spanish infinitives are different at semantic level from their English
counterparts This possibility would mean that Spanish infinitives are ambiguous between
infinitivalmeaning and imperatival meaning. As stated above, this possibility does not seem to
be an optimal solution, since it creates a number of problems Firstly, it (louts the Occam razor
principle in that it multiplies meanings unnecessarily. Secondly, as a direct consequence of
ambiguity, semantic processing would be doubled, as every time an infinite was used, an
addressee would have to disambiguate its meaning Thirdly, it would make the infinitive
equivalent to the imperative at the semantic level, which seems counterintuitive (since their
morphology and their meaning are different)
If we agree that it is unlikely that in Spanish (and other languages) the infinitive encodes
imperative force semantically, then the difference must be pragmatic Furthermore, if the
difference is pragmatic, then crucially it cannot just be availability of contextual assumptions,
since they are equally available in both English and Spanish contexts. For us to be able to
interpret the Spanish infinitives imperatively, there must be further directions specified
pragmatically, in addition to semantic ones, which enable us to find the relevance sought and
intended Moreover, the result must contribute to the explicit meaning of the utterance (as will
be seen below) But so far, within the relevance theoretic paradigm, this has not been allowed
for Encoding is only supposed to impinge on either the linguistic semantic level or pragmatic
level, but not both However, to accommodate the examples in Spanish (and other Romance and
non-Romance languages), it has to be conceded that infinitives, in addition to encoding
possibility semantically, must also encode pragmatic constraints regarding the type of contextual
assumptions that are required in order to arrive at the intended interpretation
6. A REVISEDAPPROACH
From a theoretical point of view, the possibility of encoding pragmatic constraints(in addition to
semantic ones) is not surprising, as the retrieval of appropriate contextual assumptions may
require more than just pragmatic principles The sheer number of potential assumptions available
to an addressee makes utterance interpretation even more dependent on any possible linguistic
instructions which may help select the appropriate assumptions This aids pragmatic principles
in the process of deriving the intended interpretation The encoding of instructions to select
appropriate assumptions is a common phenomenon in linguistic communication, such as 111the
case of conjunctions (see e g Blakemore 1992, chs 7-8).
From a relevance-theoretic point of view, conjunctions are normally analysed as encoding
instructions regarding the direction in which relevance is to be sought, e g
Non-Declarative Sentences in Spanish 113
(20) Juan no fue al cine ya que llovia.
"Juan didn't go to the cinema because it rained."
In the interpretationof this utterance the conjunction ya que ("because") encodes instructions to
the addressee to retrieve one crucial contextual assumption which is necessary to understand the
utterance, i.e.:
( 2 1 ) S i l l o v i a .J u a nn o f u ea l c i n e
"If it rained, Juan didn't go to the cinema."
The interpretation of (20) depends on us being able to retrieve the causal connection between the
two events described as shown in (21), where if the premise (llovia) holds, then the consequent
(no fue al cine) follows. The conjunction ya que allows us to retrieve this causal assumption, by
encoding instructions to that effect, and thus enable us successfully to interpret the utterance
In a similar way the infinitive in Spanish encodes instructions about the type of assumptions
which the addressee must look for in order to arrive at the intended interpretation The difference
between conjunctions and infinitives is that in the former case linguistic meaning only impinges
on the pragmatic processing stage, whereas in the latter it impinges on both the semantic and
pragmatic processing stages This presents us with a new type of linguistic meaning not
explicitly argued for so far in the literature. That is, linguistic expressions which encode both
semantic and pragmatic meaning Semantically, the infinitives encode possibility, pragmatically
they can constrain further the types of contextual assumption sought
The next question is whether this meaning contributes to the exphcatures or the implicatures
of the utterance One might expect that if the constraints are pragmatic they do not make a truth
conditional contribution One accepted test of explicit content contribution (see e g Kempson,
1977) is the use of conditionals Let us take the hospital example as in (12a) Which of the
following two situations do we regard as capturing what is being said in the example?:
(22) a. If people are required not to smoke, then the hospital will evict anybody who smokes
b If people are suggested not to smoke, then the hospital will evict anybody who
smokes
If we regard (22b) as representing the situation envisaged by our example (12a), then the
imperative force will not necessarily be part of the explicit content of the utterance If, on the
other hand, we regard (22a) as representing the situation envisaged, then the imperative force
will be part of the explicit content of the utterance It seems clear that the situation that best
represents (12a) is (22a) and not (22b) If this is correct, then the imperative content of the
interpretation of the utterance must contribute to the explicatures, rather than the implicatures
This would explain why in the interpretation we take the addresser (i.e the hospital) to be
conveying the force of an imperative not just as an implication, but rather as the explication ot
\
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their message, i.e.:
(23) The hospital requires people not to smoke
However, this interpretation is available in Spanish but not in English, which means that the
recovery of the explicature has not been purely inferential The Spanish infinitive must direct
addressees, in the appropriate contexts, to look for potential and desirable assumptions which
then become part of the (higher-level) explicatures of the utterance This procedural content is
not part of the meaning of the English infinitive, which does not allow imperatival
interpretations in the same contexts This means further that words can encode more than one
type of meaning and thus, when considered cross-linguistically, the differences between the
same grammatical categories may be due to pragmatic, not semantic factors However, one
question remains to be answered: why should an infinitive develop an imperatival use?
7. COMMUNICATIVE ADVANTAGES IN THE USE OF IMPERATIVAL
INFINITIVES
The imperatival use of the infinitive offers a number of advantages to the communicator Firstly,
it allows him to leave reference to addressees implicit (cf. ponga usied , explicit, vs. poner PRO,
implicit) In Spanish, standard imperatives require the speaker to choose either the formal or the
informal ending (e g coma, formal vs come, informal) The infinitive allows- referential
neutrality and detachment, which is particularly suitable in the institutional settings in which it is
found There is referential neutrality because no individual is being referred to overtly The
subject in this case would be a big, un-indexed, PRO, rather than a small pro There is
detachment because the imperative force is derived pragmatically, not semantically, and
suggests less personal involvement in the desirability of the state of affairs encoded This is also
suitable in an institutional context where assumptions about shared knowledge between the
interlocutors (e g hospital-patients, manufacturer-user, bank-client) are generally weaker than in
more personal contexts (e g between fnends, parents-children, teacher-pupil, etc.), and thus it
becomes more difficult to determine the origin and degree of desirability experienced in the
situation In other words, we rely on our general knowledge of those situations in order to derive
the appropriate level of desirability
The second advantage associated with the imperatival use of the infinitive is that it is less
direct than the imperatives proper. That is to say, it leaves assumptions about desirability
implicit for the addressee to access and use in the interpretation process. This, paradoxically,
increases the mutual understanding between addresser and addressee, as there is an increase in
the knowledge that has to be shared between the two interlocutors for the imperatival
interpretation to go through That is, there is a greater implicit appeal to, and increased
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accessibility of, appropriate contextual assumptions, particularly those which relate to rules
governing the types of social environment envisaged here (e.g. rules in hospitals, unspoken
agreements between friends, etc ).
There is a third advantage with the use of the infinitives as imperatives, whose significance
vanes across languages, namely, processing cost. The imperative infinitive involves less
processing cost than the imperative in a number of ways. Firstly, the infinitive is generally not
used in conjugated form, unlike the imperative which is in most languages, including Spanish.
This adds processing costs to the semantic decoding of the sentence, as the addressee must
decode the type of subject being used (e g formal vs. informal, singular vs. plural) In the case
of the infinitive, a general empty category PRO is readily supplied without having to decode any
politeness or number features. Secondly, the infinitive is more amenable to having objects left
out in the predicate Take, for instance, the following example in Spanish:
(24) At a Park:
a. Manlener Limpio
"Keep (INF) Tidy."
b Mantengan Limpio el Parque
"Keep (IMP) the Park Tidy
In Spanish, the infinitival version in (24a) is amenable to having the direct object (el parque)
omitted and to recover it from the context However, the imperative version is less amenable to
the same omission process and needs the direct object to be explicit This means that imperatives
again require further processing costs in the semantic decoding stage of the interpretation, as
predicate objects must be explicit and, therefore, decoded In the infinitival version, this is not
necessary, as it is supplied as a readily available contextual assumption
A third advantage of the imperative infinitives in terms of processing cost is more language
specific In German, unlike Spanish and Galiciar., the syntax of some verbs is more complex
when they are conjugated than when they are not This is particularly so in the case of trennbar
verbs (i e. splittable verbs). In this type of verb, verb meaning (and in turn sentence meaning)
can only be fixed, when the split part of the verb at the end of the sentence is processed in
conjunction with the verb root which appears towards the beginning of the sentence To
illustrate, let us consider an example:
(25) On the Front Door of a House:
a. Ketne Reklame Etnwerfert.
"Do not Leave (INF) any Publicity."
b Werfen Sie Keine Reklame Em.
"Do not Leave (IMP) any Publicity."
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Example (25a) uses the infinitive and the verb appears un-split at the end of the sentence
(emwerfen) However, in example (25b) the imperative form of the verb is used and, therefore,
the verb must be conjugated. As a result, the splittable verb einwerfen must have its prefix ein-
moved to the end of the sentence with the root remaining at the beginning This syntactic
complication adds further processing costs to the imperative sentence in relation to the infinitival
one Moreover, this is corroborated by the fact that in German children learn to communicate
imperative (and non-imperative) force by using the infinitive, which is easier to acquire and use
(native informant)
All these arguments in favor of lower processing costs for the infinitive (as opposed to the
imperative) predict that preference of the imperative infinitive over the imperative is particularly
sensitive to considerations of relative processing cost That is to say, its use is expected in
situations in which low processing costs are crucial to communicative success. Indeed, this
seems to be the case Imperative uses of the infinitive are found in contexts where low
processing costs are cntical, for example: at pedestrian traffic lights, where simple messages for
quick reactions and decisions are highly desirable and at times life saving, product instructions,
where space is of the essence and often a large amount of information has to be packed in a very
small space (e.g. photographic films, printer cartridges, etc.), at points of service, where a quick,
easily readable message is required (e.g. cashpoint machines, telephone booths, etc.); reading
instructionalmaterial, where simple, clear, direct, instructions allow faster and easier processing
(e.g. recipes, manuals, etc ) The possibility of packing equivalent amount of information by
providing short, easily readable messages is an obvious advantage, particularly in societies in
which speed and efficiency are of paramount importance to information processing
The various advantages and pressures described here may ultimately contribute to the
conventionalisation of the imperative use of the infinitive. Moreover, this may be one of the
routes available in some languages for associating pragmatic imperative force with the infinitive
and making it more accessible during utterance interpretation The fact that some of these
advantages and the resulting pressures arc not applicable to other languages may explain, to
some extent, why they do not allow the imperatival use of the infinitive. For example, in English
there is no distinction between formal and informal verbal endings, nor is the presence of
imperative subjects normally required or even allowed Similarly, the English imperative, unlike
the Spanish one, is more amenable to having predicate objects omitted, which further reduces the
need for an imperatival infinitive use. In general, all these factors would seem to count against
the availability of this infinitival use in languages like English, since the imperative itself
exhibits all (or most of) the advantages discussed in this section
Ji,
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8. CONCLUSION
In this article it has been argued that Spanish infinitives can be used with imperative force in
addition to their more common infinitival use. The imperative use sets them apart from English
infinitives, in that the latter do not give rise to imperative interpretations,even when the contexts
are the same as in the Spanish examples. It has also been shown that imperative interpretation of
Spanish infinitives is only possible when they are used in contexts which make instructional
assumptions, and their attendant notions of potentiality and desirability, very accessible (e g at
cashpoints, in manuals, hospitals, etc.) This suggests that the imperative import is not semantic
in nature, but rather pragmatic. It suggests further that the meaning of the infinitive in Spanish is
complex, including semantic meaning proper and pragmatic constraints. The latter arise from the
inclusion of assumptions of potentiality and desirability in context, which the infinitive
procedurally encodes. The inclusion of these assumptions in the explicit content of the utterance
means that this side of the infinitive's meaning contributes to the explicatures of the utterance.
From a cross-linguistic point of view, the difference between the Spanish and the English
infinitive is that in the Spanish case there are procedural instructions encoded for the addressee
to seek assumptions of potentiality and desirability in the context, whereas in the English case
such procedures are not part of the meaning of the infinitive This means that, in English,
without the linguistic help needed to direct addressees towards specific assumptions in the
context, those addressees face a gap between possibility, on the one hand, and potentiality,
desirability, and imperative force, on the other, which is too wide to bridge, and which will
ultimately make the imperative interpretation in the English case not available to him
From a theoretical point of view, Spanish infinitives (as well as infinitives in other Romance
and non-Romance languages) unveil a new two-dimensional category of linguistic meaning
From a semantic point of view, they encode conceptual and truth-conditionalmeaning From a
pragmatic point of view, they encode procedural and truth-conditionalmeaning The procedural
pragmatic stage may or may not be acted upon depending on whether it does in fact contribute to
relevance Thus, Spanish infinitives encode two types of meaning, one that impinges on the
semantic representation of the sentence (semantic dimension), and another that impinges on the
pragmatic interpretation of the utterance (pragmatic dimension) Both ultimately play a part in
the explicatures of the utterance
One interesting area for further research is to establish how common and wide the Spanish
and English behaviors are respectively. As seen above, many European languages seem to allow
the imperative use of the infinitive. English, in this respect, seems to stand out in its behavior
However, it would be surprising if English were to be unique in this respect. One possibility may
be that this phenomenon is found more regularly in non-European languages. The answer to this
question though would require further research, which is outside the scope of this article
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TRANSLATION DISCREPANCIES IN GALICIAN: HAMLET
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1. Introduction
Pragmatic interpretation affects how we understand a
text, to the extent that often what a reader takes to have
been communicated differs from what is linguistically
encoded in the original text. In translation, this can have
important consequences, since the translator produces a
target text on the basis of, not just the linguistic content,
but also his interpretation of the original.
The discrepancies that arise as a result of this
mismatch between what is linguistically encoded and
what is pragmatically communicated are seen in the
Galician version of Shakespeare's Hamlet. To some
extent, they reflect the two roles played by the
translator in the process of translation, namely, that
of interpreter and that of communicator.
I will be analysing examples of pragmatic processes
that give rise to discrepancies between the original and
the target texts. In particular, I will analyse two types
of interpretive use of language, namely, loose use and
instances of narrowed down meaning.
When discrepancies are of a pragmatic nature,
the re is a shift in the style of the two texts, e.g. from
literal to figurative use of language, from implicitness
to explicitness, etc., though not necessarily in what
is communicated. In literary translation, these sty-
listic changes can elicit varying degrees of accepta-
bility in readers, depending on the relevance sought
for, and expected from, the translation. These issues
will be considered in relation to examples taken
from the first scene of the Galician Hamlet.
2. Interpretive use
Wilson & Sperber (1995:228-29) argue that there
are two different uses of language: descriptive use
and interpretive use. They state that:
Any representation., can represent some state of affairs
in virtue of its propositional form being true of that state
of affairs; in this case we will say that the representation
is a description ; or that it is used descriptively (...) It
can represent some other representation which also has
a propositional form — a thought, for instance — in
virtue of a resemblance between the two propositional
forms; in this case we will say that the first represen-
tation is an interpretation of the second one, or that it
is used interpretively." •
Let's consider an intralinguistic exchange to
exemplify this distinction, where the two participants
are waiting at the Station for Martin to turn up to
catch a train which is about to leave:
( 1) M ar y .What did Martin say' ?
Peter. We're not going to find any empty seats.
Peter's answer can be interpreted in two ways. It can
be seen as a report on what Martin had said, in
which case the utterance is used interpretively to
resemble what Martin had uttered or thought. It can
also be seen as a genuine answer on Peter's side, in
which case he is describing a state of affairs in the
world.
The interpretive use of language is based on the
resemblance between the two propositional
representations. However, there is another even more
basic interpretive use. That is, all utterances are
interpretive expressions of the thoughts of the speakers
(ibid.: 230), and what mediates between them is
pragmatic processing. This is a first-order interpretive
use (between an utterance and a thought), whilst the one
discussed in relation to (1) is a second-order interpretive
use (between two propositional representations formed
at different times). In this paper I will be concentrating
on the pragmatic effects on translation of the first-order
interpretive use, namely, interpretive resemblances
between utterances and thoughts and, more specifically,
between words and concepts.
There are two such types of interpretive re-
semblance: loose use (e.g. metaphor) and narrowed-
down uses of language (e.g. prototypicality effects).
I will be dealing with these in relation to Hamlet
in its Galician version.
3. Loose use of language
I will start with loose uses of language, by first
considering an intralinguistic example (taken from
Lakoff and Johnson 1980):
(2) Argument is war.
This utterance doesn't communicate that arguing
involves machine guns, bullets, cannons, shells,
launchers or missiles, or even injuries or deaths. In
other words, the utterance doesn't communicate
everything that is encoded by the word "war". Instead,
it communicates an impression composing a series of
weak implicatures reflecting the resemblances between
the encoded concept and the intended concept. Thus,
(2) can be said to communicate:
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(3)
a. Argument involves two opponents.
b. Argument involves attacking your opponent's positions.
c. Arguments can be violent.
d. In arguments, one loses or wins ground.
f. Argument requires planning and using strategies...
This means that what is encoded is not necessarily
communicated. To arrive to the latter from the former,
we need to undergo an inferential process in order to
derive what we take the addresser to have communicated
by what he had encoded. And all this on the basis of
the interpretive resemblances between the two.
From a translation point of view, this mismatch
between what is encoded and what is communicated
can give rise to discrepancies between the source and
the target texts. This may be due to the fact that
certain cultures may not explore the same re-
semblances between what is encoded and what is
communicated, or to the translator deciding on a
change of style from a less-than-literal to a more
literal use of language in the targef text. Let's consider
these two cases in turn (where back-translations from
Galician to English are in brackets).
(4) FRANCISCO
For this relief much thanks. 'Tis bitter cold,
And I am sick at heart.
FRANCISCO
Moitas gracias polo relevo. Vai unha friaxe de
morte que me traspasa a alma.
(Much thanks for the relief. It is cold as death,
it is piercing my soul.)
(Hamlet , pp. 20-21)
The segment in question is printed in italics. Here,
there is a change in the metaphor used to describe
how cold Francisco is. In other words, the re-
semblance sought between what is encoded and what
is communicated differs in the translated Gahcian in
relation to the English original. Some possible
implicatures communicated in each case might be the
following:
(5) I am sick at heart.
a. The cold reaches some of the deepest parts of
my body.
b. The cold is so intense that makes me ill.
c. The cold doesn't allow me to feel...
(6) Me traspasa a alma.
a. A friaxe chega ata as partes non corporais do
meu ser.
(The cold gets to the non-bodily parts of my being.)
b. A friaxe e tan intensa que vai mais ala da mina
alma.
(The cold is so intense that it goes beyond my
soul.)
c. A friaxe vulnera e dana a mina alma...
(The cold violates and damages my soul.)
The translator has interpreted the original metaphor
as communicating an array of weak implicatures which
would be best conveyed in Galician by the metaphor in
(6). The choice of metaphor has been influenced by the
specific set of implicatures taken as intended by him.
If this set of weak implicatures matches that of the
metaphor used in the target text, the translator would
have been justified from a communicative point of view.
However, though undeniably the two metaphors
involved here share implicatures, the impressions
invoked by the two texts are slightly different. Both of
them communicate the intensity of the cold and
discomfort felt by Francisco and, in this respect, they
resemble each other. However, the allusions to a
corporal part and a non-corporal part of the body,
together with the verbs used, send the readers of both
texts in somewhat diverging directions. To be sure, there
is a discrepancy in the interpretation derived by the
English and Galician readers. Although, the basic style
remains the same, namely, a less-than-literal use of
language, the readers in either case are experiencing two
slightly different impressions.
The translator has chosen a metaphor which
resembled the original in key aspects, i.e. one which
allowed for the inference on the degree of intensity of
the cold felt by Francisco. This degree of resemblance
may be sufficient in this context, although, of course,
that will depend on the expectations of the particular
readership of the translation. For a critic, this degree of re-
semblance may not be as acceptable as for a lay person.
Let's now consider the second type of discrepancy
regarding loose use, namely, a change from less-than-
literal to literal use of language, as shown in the
following example:
(7a) FRANCISCO
You come must carefully upon your hour.
FRANCISCO
Chegas puntualmente a tua hora.
(You arrive punctually at your time. (Ibid.)
In this case, the segment in the original printed in
italics amounts to a less-than-literal use of language,
since what is being communicated is not that
Francisco's interlocutor, Barnardo, is coming in a
careful manner. What is meant in the original is
precisely what the target text spells out, namely, that
Barnardo is punctual. Perhaps what was intended
with the original loose use was to convey an
additional poetic effect, so as to make the audience
feel that Francisco was no simple guard. He was,
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William Shakespeare, Hamlet, translated into Galician by Miguel Perez Romero (translation revised by Antonio R. de Toro),
Vigo: Servicio Central de Publicacions da Xunta de Galicia e Editorial Galaxia, 1993, pp. 46-47
1.2
HAMLET
O that this too too sullied flesh would melt,
Thaw, and resolve itself into a dew;
Or that the Everlasting had not fixed
His canon 'gainst self-slaughter O God! God!
How weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable
Seem to me all the uses of this world!
Fie on't, ah, fie, 'tis an unweeded garden
That grows to seed Things rank and gross in nature
Possess it merely. That it should come to this!
But two months dead, nay, not so much, not two!
So excellent a king, that was to this
Hyperion to a satyr; so loving to my mother
That he minght not beteem the winds of heaven
Visit her face too roughly. Heaven and earth,
Must 1 remember? Why, she would hang on him
As if increase of appetite had grown
By what it fed on. And yet within a month —
Let me not think on't. Frailty, thy name is woman.
A little month, or e'er those shoes were old
With which she followed my poor father's body
Like Niobe, all tears, why she, even she —
O God, a beast that wants discourse of reason
Would have mourned longer — married with my uncle.
My father's brother, but no more like my father
Than I to Hercules. Within a month.
Ere yet the salt of most unrighteous tears
Had left the flushing in her galled eyes.
She married O, most wicked speed, to post
1.2
HAMLET
Oxala esta en exceso contaminada came se fundise,"
disolvese e convertese en orballo.
Oxal5 a lei do Eterno
non prohibise o suicidio. jOuh Deus, Deus!
jQue fatigosos, caducos. insulsos e vans
me parecen os asuntos deste mundo!
Maldito sexa, 6 un xardin de herbas daniftas
que medra vizoso. Esta invadido
de cousas inmundas e ruins. j6 que chegamos!
S6 leva dous meses morto, non, nin sequera dous.
Un rei tan excelente que, 6 lado deste,
era como Hiperi6n 6 lado dun sAnro; tan agarimoso con mina nai
que nin os ventos do ceo permitia
que lie rozasen con rudeza o rostro. jCeos e terra!
j,teno que lembralo? AbrazAbao
como se o desexo medrase
co que o alimentaba. E nun mes...
Non quero pensalo. Fraxilidade, es muller.
Nun mes escaso, incluso antes de gasta-los A'ipatos
cos que segufa o corpo de meu pobre pai,
como Niobe, desfeita en bSgoas, ouh, ela, ela ...
ouh Deus, unha besta carente de raciocinio
chorarfa mais tempo... casa co meu ti'o,
o irman de meu pai, tan semellante a meu pai
como eu a Hercules. Nun mes,
antes de que o sal desas p^rfidas bagoas
lie proese os irritados olios,
casou. jOuh perversa ansiedade, correr
after all, a King's guard. Such a poetic use would
help emphasise his association with the high class of
his master, the King. It is interesting to note that the
Galician translation could have preserved the original
loose use and its attendant poetic elfect:
(7b) FRANCISCO
Chegas moi coidadosamente a tua hora.
Obviously, the stylistic shift in the Galician version
in (7) may not be totally acceptable. Such a shift
belies the vagueness of the original. It also reduces
the role of the reader in deriving the interpretation,
since, faced with a literal use of language, a reader
has less uncertainty about deriving the intended
thought and consequently requires less cognitive
effort. For a reader, a literal use of language can be
(although it need not be) less engaging.
Another example of stylistic change from less-
than-literal to literal use of language is the following:
(8) HORATIO
In what particular thought to work I know not.
HORACIO
Non sei que pensar disto.
(I don't know what to think about this.)
(ibid.: 28-29)
The original uses the metaphor of work to express
the activity of thinking, whereas the Galician
translation is rendered with a literal verb, namely,
"pensar". Again, although the core implicatures are
captured in the Galician, other implicatures associated
with the original concept WORK are lost, such as,
work, being a strenuous, physical activity; being an
activity carried out during a number of hours; being
done to achieve some end result, etc. Some of these
implicatures are not necessarily communicated by the
Galician version, thereby losing some of the potential
content communicated by the original.
Of course, the opposite case to what we have just seen
is also possible. There tire instances in which a literal use
of language is loosened into a more metaphorical use.
This is the case with the following example:
(9) HORATIO
Most like. It (the ghost] harrows me with fear
and wonder.
HORACIO
Talmente. O terror e o espanto me traspasan.
(Exactly. The terror and the fright are piercing me.)
(ibid.: 24-25)
In this example, I want to concentrate on the segment
printed in italics. In Shakespeare's time, the use of the
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verb "to harrow" here may have been intended in a
metaphorical sense, its basic meaning being "to apply
an agricultural implement over the land". What seems
to be clear from today's use is that the verb "to harrow"
in (9) is no longer used metaphorically, as it has, in
modem times, lexicalised the other meaning, namely,
"to distress, to vex" (see e.g. Collins Concise
Dictionary). So, at least for a modern reader, the use of
"harrows" in (9) does not amount to a loose use of
language. However, the Galician translation does
constitute a less-than-literal use of language. The verb
"traspasar" literally means "to go through from one
place to another". As this literal meaning would render
(9) absurd, the verb "traspasan" is obviously interpreted
as a metaphor by modern readers. Hence, the
interpretations of the two texts will differ accordingly.
In particular, the Galician text will be, for a modern
reader, vaguer as a result of its wide range of weak
implicatures. It crucially does not communicate (he
proposition expressed, whereas the English text does.
The two texts resemble each other in that both
communicate the acuteness of the feeling of fear.
As we have seen throughout this discussion, loose
use of language achieves relevance by allowing us to
communicate a number of imphcatures using just one
utterance, without the need to spell out each of the
implicatures communicated, which would be both
much more expensive cognitively and stylistically
infelicitous. This, however, means that the precise set
of implicatures intended will have to be derived
inferentially by the reader. And this is the result of a
pragmatic process whose outcome may vary depending
on the context the translator, as reader, brings to bear
on the interpretation. A degree of discrepancy between
the set of implicatures intended by the author and those
retrieved by the reader may invariably arise. If this
mismatch is then encoded in the target language, the
communicative discrepancy will have been perpetuated
as far as the L2 readers are concerned.
4. Narrowing down of concepts
So far, we have covered the first of the first-order
interpretive use types mentioned earlier. I will now
turn to the second one, namely, the narrowing down
of concepts. This narrowing down results from the
prototypicality effects associated with concepts. Let's
consider first an intralingual example of this type ol
interpretive use:
(10) Mary. I'm worried about how lonely Susan is
Ann\ She needs to meet a bachelor.
In this exchange the concept communicated by the
word "bachelor" is not its simple meaning of
"unmarried man". This interpretation would allow in
unsuitable bachelors, e.g. (taken (rom Wilson 1994):
(11) a. Susan needs to meet the Pope.
b. Susan needs to meet Edward Heath.
Both the Pope and Edward Heath are strictly
speaking bachelors, and yet they do not match the
bachelor type intended by the speaker. Hence, the
communicated import of Ann's statement in (10) is
not just any bachelor. She, obviously, has in mind a
specific prototype of bachelor, e.g.:
(12) SUITABLE BACHELOR PROTOTYPE:
youngish
emotionally uncommitted
free to marry
eligible to marry
childless
This suitable prototypical picture of the type of
bachelor Ann had in mind can be contrasted with the
following alternative bachelor prototype:
(13) UNSUITABLE BACHELOR PROTOTYPE:
oldish
solitary
fussy
uninterested in commitment
Often when we mention a concept, we are making
manifest a large amount of information stored in the
concept's mental address. All this information is made
manifest too weakly for all of it to have been intended.
We, therefore, need to narrow down this array of
information to a manageable size to allow us to infer
those implicatures which are truly relevant in the
context at hand. The pragmatic process of narrowing
down conceptual content does just that. It is an efficient
way of communicating the appropriate prototype we
have in mind without having to spell it out.
This mismatch between the concept encoded and
the concept communicated as a result of pragmatic
narrowing down also produces discrepancies in
translation. In this case the translator chooses to
render, in the target text, the narrowed down concept
rather than the original encoded concept. A case in
point is the following passage:
(14) MARCELLUS
Why such impress of shipwrights, whose sore task
Does not divide Sunday from the week.
MARCELO
... por que esa leva de calafatcs, que no duro labor
non diferencian o domingo do resto da semana.
(why such a levy of ship-carpenters, who in
their hard work
don't distinguish Sunday from the rest of the
week.) (ibid.: 28-29)
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Since biblical times (at least) the week has seven
days. However, that doesn't mean that societies don't
sub-group days together for their own puiposes. Thus,
we have for instance the working week and the
weekend. We make these distinctions because it is
relevant for us to do so. In the passage in (10), the
original text makes a reference to "week" which is
obviously not intended to comprise the seven days of
the week. That is, it is not intended in its literal meaning.
Otherwise it would give rise to a contradiction:
(15) The task does not divide Sunday from Monday,
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday,
Saturday and Sunday.
Clearly, what Shakespeare meant by writing
"week" in (14) was the working week or, as was
rendered by the translator in Galician in this context,
the rest of the week. The translator interpreted the
meaning of the original encoded concept by
narrowing it down during pragmatic processing to a
concept which could be reasonably ascribed to the
author. The choice was made between at least two
prototypes of the concept WEEK:
(16) SUITABLE WEEK PROTOTYPE:
people work during the week
they have less entertainment
the working week has five or, for some, six days
the working week excludes Sundays
the week is more stressful
people have less free time...
(17) UNSUITABLE WEEK PROTOTYPE:
a week has seven days
the days of the week are: Monday, Tuesday,
Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Saturday and Sunday,
a week is a division of the month
52 weeks make up a year...
Of these two prototypes, the one Shakespeare had in
mind must have been along the lines of (16), which
is precisely the one referred to in the Galician
translation.
Another example of narrowing down of concepts
can be found in the next passage:
(18) HORATIO
Such was the very armour he had on
When he the ambitious Norway combated.
HORACIO
Tal era a annadura que levaba
cando o noruego cobizoso combateu.
(Such was the armour which he had on
when the ambitious Norwegian combated )
(ibid.: 26-27)
Here the original refers to Norway, whereas the
translation mentions noruego / Norwegian. Clearly,
the intended interpretation doesn't span all the
information that the reader may have about Norway,
for example, none of the following would be
normally intended in this context:
(19) UNSUITABLE NORWAY PROTOTYPE:
it is a mountainous country
there are many fjords
it is a beautiful place
it is a long strip of land in Scandinavia
it is wider in the south than in the north
its neighbour to the east is Sweden...
None of these assumptions are relevant in the
context of (18). However, the following alternative
prototype would be more appropnate:
(20) SUITABLE NORWAY PROTOTYPE:
its inhabitants are the Norwegians
the Norwegians are descendants of the Vikings
the Vikings set off from there to conquer other
countries
it was the origin of numerous violent
invasions...
It seems clear that the author didn't intend to
communicate the natural beauty of Norway
described in prototype (19), but rather he was
referring to its inhabitants, more precisely, its
conquering and powerful ai*my as mentioned in
prototype (20). This is what the translator
interpreted and encoded in the Galician text. Note
that the Galician text is also subject to a narrowing
down process, whereby "o noruego" is interpreted
not as any type of Norwegian but, more specifically,
as the warrior Norwegian.
This is not the only synecdoche dealt with in this
way even in the first scene. Consider the following
text:
(21) HORATIO
... In which the majesty of buried Denmark
Did sometimes march?...
HORACIO
... coa que a maxestade do rei danes enterrado
desfilaba polo tempo?...
(with which the majesty of the buried Danish king
marched through time.) (ibid.)
Again in this case the original reference is to a
country, i.e. Denmark. However, the intended
reference interpretation is not to the country as such,
but to its King, as the Galician translation spells out.
Thus, the translator narrowed down the content of
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the concept encoded and look the author to have
communicated the more restricted concept, which is
subsequently encoded in Galician. This is another
example of stylistic shift from the vaguer original to
the more precise translation. Obviously, ihe
associations that the author may have wanted to
communicate with the concept Denmark will have
been lost in the Galician, such as, for example,
identifying the whole country with its King and ihe
powerful idea associated with it that the King is its
unifying symbol and essence.
It is also important to note that even il in
Shakespearean times, it was more common to name the
country to refer to its king, some pragmatic processing
would be required to derive that interpretation II
nothing else, because people at that time could also
name the country to refer only to the country, rather
than its king. One could argue that in those times this
prototype associated with the concept COUNTRY
(in relation to its king) was more accessible than at
present time.
5. Conclusion
My main argument has been that many translation
discrepancies can be explained by examining the
pragmatic processes performed by a translator during
the interpretation of the original text, and the
subsequent encoding of that interpretation m the
target language. Translators often choose to encode
their derived pragmatic interpretation in detriment of
what was encoded in the original
Here 1 have concentrated on one of the two basic
uses of language, namely, interpretive use. This use,
as we have seen, clearly shows the potential
mismatch between encoding and communication I
have attempted to explore the consequences of this
mismatch by analysing instances of the two subtypes
of first-order interpretive use, i.e. loose use and
narrowing down of concepts.
These two subtypes of interpretive use allow us to
understand and explain how translators arrive at their
target version, and constitute the basis of our
judgments as to whether the degree of interpretive
resemblance established in a particular case is
adequate and acceptable, given the relevance sought
for, and expected from, the translation.
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ABSTRACT
This articles explores one of the types of interpretive resemblance found in
translation, namely, resemblance between concepts. These are cases where the
concept encoded involves a resemblance relation between its literal import and
the meaning it communicates, i.e. cases in which words do not literally
communicate the concepts they encode. It is argued that translations are often
carried out not on the basis of the concept encoded in the original text but on the
basis of the actual concept communicated. This constitutes one of the sources
of discrepancy found between original and target texts. In these cases, the
translation encodes not what was encoded originally but (the translator's
interpretation of what) the source concept was intendedto communicate. There
are three ways in which what is communicated by a concept may depart from
what it encodes: concept narrowing, concept loosening, and echoic uses of
concepts. In addition to discussing these processes in relation to translation,
arguments are put forward for the existence of a further resemblance possibility:
concept widening
1. Introduction
In this article it is argued that discrepancies in translation are often due to the effects of
interpretive resemblance between what is encoded and what is communicated. Interpretive
resemblance arises when two propositional representations share their analytic and
contextual implications in a given context (Wilson & Sperber, 1988: 138). One of the main
types of interpretive resemblance found in translation are resemblances between concepts,
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in particular, between the concept encoded and the concept communicated. This variety of
interpretive resemblance manifests itseJf when the concept encoded and the meaning
communicated differ in their content, and when there is a relation between the two which
helps determine, via pragmatic interpretation, the concept communicated 1.
The gap between what is encoded and what is communicated has significant
consequences for translation. Indeed, target texts are often carried out not on the basis of
die concept encoded in the original text, but rather on the basis of the related concept it
communicates. As Wilson (1993a,7: 11) argues, "a word which linguistically encodes a
certain concept doesn't necessarily communicate diat concept". This constitutes one of the
sources of discrepancy found between original and target texts. In these cases, the translator
chooses to encode not what was encoded originally but (his interpretation of what) the
source concept was intended to communicate.
The particular type of discrepancy diat may arise in the process of translation depends
on the various ways in which an encoded concept may be used to communicate a related,
but different concept. It has been argued (Wilson, 1993a) that there are three ways in which
what is communicated by a concept may depart from what it encodes: concept narrowing,
concept loosening, and echoic uses of concepts. In what follows, each of these pragmatic
processes is discussed first monolingually and then applied to translauon. In addition, it is
argued that there seems to be a further possibility of resemblance: concept widening , which
appears to complement concept narrowing. Let us start by looking at concept narrowing.
2. Concept Narrowing
The pragmatic process of concept narrowing (Wilson, 1993: 7) consists in applying a
concept which is true of a set of entities to a more restricted subset of those entities. Thus,
the use of a concept picks out only those entities to which it is relevant to apply it. In other
words, it narrows it down to a more confined number of identifiable entities, out of all the
possible entities denoted by the concept. Let us illustrate this with an intralingual example:
the term 'professional'. A 'professional' is someone who takes special training in the liberal
arts or sciences. On the face of it, (music) teachers meet this criterion, since both their
background is in a liberal art (e.g. music) and they require special training after university
(e.g. in England, the PGCE: Postgraduate Certificate in Education). However, a (music)
teacher is not the prototypical professional. Thus, on hearing utterance (1), die kinds of
professions we envisage are, e.g. lawyers, doctors, accountants, etc.
(1) There are too many professionals in this country.
What is happening in the interpretation of this utterance is that the entities of which it is
relevant to say "professional" do not include all the entities of which it is true to predicate
it. As it is shown below the implications of concept narrowing for translation are important,
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as translations may be produced not on the basis of the concept encoded, but rather the
concept communicated.
This difference between the concept encoded and the concept communicated may also
have consequences for the truth-conditions of an utterance, i.e. for its descriptive content,
as opposed to, for instance, its attitudinal content (for background on the notion of truth-
conditions, seeCann, 1993, ch. 1). As Wilson (1993,7:4) points out, "there are some clear
cases where this sort of narrowing affects the truth conditions of the utterance, and must
therefore be dealt with at the level of the proposition expressed". Thus, example (2), uttered
whilst looking out into the open countryside, may have various referents:
(2) I like it here.
The referent of 'here' may be this spot, the countryside, this region, this country, etc. The
particular choice made in a given context will depend on what the hearer takes the speaker
to have intended. Each of those referents affects the truth-conditions of the utterance and
hence they must be included in the proposition expressed, which specifies the descriptive
content of the utterance (see Gutt, 1991: 24-33; Blakemore, 1992, ch.5).
In translation, the narrowing down of concepts is one of the results of the processes
involved in interpreting a text. As Baker states:
[a translator] must attempt to perceive the meanings of words and utterances very precisely in
order to render them into another language. This forces us as translators to go far beyond what
the average reader has to do in order to reach an adequate understanding of the text (Baker,
1992: 17, my italics).
Part of an adequate understanding of a text is deriving the intended propositional forms of
the utterances it contains. To do this the translator often has to go beyond the linguistically
encoded content of the text and draw information from the context to derive a fuller
propositional form. The translation will then be carried out on the basis of this complete
propositional form. This means that the translator has a choice between rendering, in the
target language, just the linguistic content of the source text (i.e. the words encoded in the
original language) or the proposition it expressed (i.e. the full thought it was intended to
communicate).
One of the sources of discrepancy between source and target texts lies precisely in the
decision by a translator to encode not the linguistic content of the source text, but the
proposition it expresses. Concept narrowing is often responsible for the discrepancy that
arises between the encoded utterance and its propositional form. The following translation
from Spanish, taken from a short story (from Lawaetz, 1972: 180-1), shows this narrowing
down process, where the example involves a hotel room which is beuig described:
(3) El agua salia hirviendo, y eso compensaba la falta de sol y de aire.
The water from the tap was boiling hot, and this compensated for the lack of sunlight
and fresh air.
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The word at issue in the Spanish original is aire, which literally means air. It seems
clear that the author did not intend this word to be understood as communicating literally
air. If he had intended that interpretation, the text could hardly be taken as a true description
of a possible world, as it would entail that there was no air at all in the hotel room (and
therefore no possibility of life). This is surely an unwanted implication. The author,
therefore, must have intended to mean something else, such as a more specific type of air.
There are many types of air: polluted air, stuffy air, clean air, fresh air, etc. In this case,
where the text is about a hotel, it seems reasonable to take the author to have had in mind
a stuffy room and to have intended the interpretation fresh air , thus contributing a narrowed
down concept to the proposition expressed. This is precisely what the translator rendered
in English, i.e. the truth-conditional contribution of the concept air in this context, rather
than just the concept it encodes literally. This is one of the discrepancies between the
original and the target texts found in (3), which as we can see stems from translating not the
literal linguistic content of the original text but what it was used to communicate.
Concept narrowing is, of course, not restricted to any particular type of translation and
is a special case of the more general relevance-theoretic notion of enrichment 2, which goes
beyond the simple narrowing down of a literally encoded concept. The following technical
example shows an original English text with its attendant Spanish translation (taken from
a FUJICHROME Instructions Leaflet, in which I am assuming the English text is the
original language, as it comes first and there is no Japanese version of the text):
(4) FUJICHROME 100 Film is a Daylight Type for use with light sources mentioned
below.
FUJICHROME 100 es una pelicula equilibrada parafotografiar con luz diurna y debe
usarse solamence con los siguientes tipos de luz.
The concept at issue here is the Spanish solamente, which literally means only. This concept
is not present in the English original. In fact, the translator of this text seems to have
narrowed down the scope of the light sources intended, resulting in an enrichment of the
original. This enrichment can be seen more clearly, if we look more closely at the English
original.
The original text could be interpreted in any number of ways. For example, it could be
construed as being qualified by "at least", "preferably", "mainly", "only", etc., as (5)
shows:
(5) a. FUJICHROME 100 Film is a Daylight Type for use at least with light sources
mentioned below.
b. FUJICHROME 100 Film is a Daylight Type for use preferably with light sources
mentioned below.
c. FUJICHROME 100 Film is a Daylight Type for use mainly with light sources
mentioned below.
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d. FUJICHROME 100 Film is a Daylight Type for use only with light sources
mentioned below.
This means that there are many ways in which the scope of the light sources referred to in
the text could be narrowed down. It seems probable though that, in this context, the
intended propositional form is that corresponding to (5d), namely, the one that restricts the
light sources to just those which are, in the original leaflet, listed immediately after the
current example. It is precisely this narrowed down scope that the translator conveys
linguistically in Spanish. It is important to note that there is no grammatical reason why the
translator could not have been faithful to the style of the original by leaving the scope
implicit, whilst still intending to communicate the same propositional form. To illustrate this
point further, consider the following amended version (where there is no linguistic mention
of solamente/only):
(6) FUJICHROME 100 Film is a Daylight Type for use with light sources mentioned
below.
FUJICHROME 100 es una pelicula equilibrada para fotogra fiar con luz diur na y deb e
usars e con los siguie ntes tipos de luz.
In this cas e, alth ough the re is no men tion of solam ente , we can st ill inte rp ret it in the
res tri ctive sense . Th is provi des furth er evidence that in (4) the translato r has de cid ed to
encode lingui st ical ly not just the original tex t, but the propo sition al form he deriv ed from
it. It is inte resti ng to note that the German vers ion of this text ha s bee n faithful to the sty le
of the orig ina l, whils t also giving rise to the same restri cted sco pe as in the Spanis h:
(7) FUJIC H ROM E 100 Film is a Da ylig ht Typ e for use with light sources me nt ion ed
below.
De r FUJI CHROME lOO istein Tag esl ichtfi lni, de r au ffolgen de Lic htquellen abge sti mmt
ist.
In thi s German example there is no refere nce to the scope of the light sour ces: it is left for
the rea der to infer and include in the propositi oua l form expres sed by the utterance. These
exam ple s suggest that translators adopt dif feren t styl es in com municat ing the sa me
pro pos itio na l form As a resu lt, the targ et text s may vary in linguistic terms , but not
necessar ily in comm unicative terms (i.e. in terms of the overal l con tent conv eyed). Let us
now turn to the nex t typ e of interpr etive res em blan ce rel atio n, namely, loose uses of
con cepts.
3. Loose Uses of Concepts
Concept loosening, which covers metaphor, is another case where the communicated
concept differs from the encoded concept. In this case, what is communicated shares some
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of its implications with the original, but not all. For example, the following utterance does
not communicate every implication derivable from the literally encoded concept:
(8) An idea not to be sniffed at.
(taken from The Times Higher Education Supplement, 2/2/1996)
It does not, for instance, communicate die following implication (although, had it been a
literal use of sniff, it would) :
(9) The idea must not be smelled.
Ideas cannot be smelled. The utterance can, however, be taken to communicate the
following implications:
(10) a. The idea must not be derided.
b. The idea must not be made fun of.
c. The idea must be respected...
The use of sniffed at in (8) is less-than-literal or loose. Adopting a relevance-theoretic
approach in the analysis of this type of pragmatic process, the use of sniffed at would be
consistent with the communicative principle proposed within relevance theory (cf. Wilson
and Sperber, 1993: 287), which stipulates that processing costs and contextual effects must
be balanced. In the interpretation of (8), this balance is achieved because, if the implicadons
derived in (10) were literally spelt out, it would involve greater processing costs for the
hearer than is required in interpreting (8). Examples such as (8) are said to communicate an
impression, i.e. a series of weak implicatures, which could not be straightforwardly
paraphrased without loss of content. Moreover, expressing them linguistically would
change the style of communication from a vague and weak type to a more precise and
stronger type, which may not always be desirable (e.g. in tides such as (8)) 3. To see the
overall effect of a stronger and more precise ude, compare the original, loose, tide in (8)
to the following, more literal, utle in (8'):
(8') An idea not to be ridiculed.
Although this new version communicates a determinate, specific, and literal proposition,
it does not attract our attention as much as the original, looser, title in (8), which left it more
open to us to pursue our own line of interpretation and thus was more appealing (as a title).
In the case of interlinguistic communication, the differences between what is encoded
and what is communicated, as a result of loose use of concepts, is another source of
discrepancies found in translation. For example, the following tide of a short story in
Spanish is not a literal use of language (taken from Lawaetz, 1972: 180):
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(11) La puerta condenada
The condetmed door (literal translation)
The term in question here is condenada (condemned). In Spanish, this term literally means
to pass sentence on a person by a judge. However, what the author had in mind here was not
any legal sentence passed on the door, instead he wanted to communicate some of the
implications derivable from the literal concept condemned.
(12) a. The door is to be avoided.
b. The door has been left without use.
c. The door is a symbol of evil.
d. The door where horrible things have happened. ..
It would be much more costly, cognitively speaking, to encode every single one of these
intended implications than to communicate a less-than literal interpretation of the concept
and weakly suggest all of them at the same time (by means of a single utterance).
Considerations of relevance led the writer to use condenada. The translator, however, did
not render the original literally in English. Instead, s/he derived the interpretation first and
then, on the basis of what she took the author to have communicated, produced the
following English version (Lawaetz, 1972: 181):
(13) The disused door.
This version is one of the implications of the original. In Spanish when an entity is
condemned, it can be interpreted as being left without use, following the parallelism of a
prisoner who is deprived of normal life. However, this implication is not necessarily the
only one communicated by the author in uttering the sentence in (11). The translator has
offered an English text based on the concept communicated, not on the concept encoded,
by the original. By doing this, s/he has altered the style. In particular, s/he has produced a
literal use of language, as opposed to a less-than-literal one. In other words, his/her
utterance is a literal interpretation of the thought he wanted to communicate. It does,
therefore, explicate its own propositional form, unlike (11) which does not. As a result,
there is also less involvement on the part of the reader in the process of interpretation,
because s/he would not take as much responsibility in deriving the intended implications.
In other words, there is not as much indication on the part of the translator, as there is on
the part of the author, regarding the direction he foresees the interpretation to go. That is,
the original author, in using a metaphor, invites readers to create their own impression of
the story by the title; whereas the translator, in using a literal expression, at most can only
hope to have encouraged readers to pose questions regarding the content encoded in the
translated title (e.g. why is it in disuse, etc.). Moreover, the translation could be even
entertained as having no implicatures at all (see Blakemore, 1992: 128), in clear contrast
with the original text 4.
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Another discrepancy associated with loose uses of concepts in translation arises when
the interpretive resemblance found in the target text is different from that found in the
source text. The following extract from the same short story discussed above exemplifies
this point:
(14) De no estar alii la puerta condenada, el llanto no hubiera vencido las fuertes espaldas
de la pared.
Had the door not been there, the wailing would never have overcome the strong
bastion of the wall. (ibid.: 186)
The expression in question here is espaldas , which literally means (human) backs:
(15) Las fuertes espaldas de la pared.
The strong backs of the wall. (Literal translation)
The Spanish original obviously involves a loose use of the concept espalda (de la pared).
In particular, it does not communicate any of the following:
(16) a. The back of die wall lias a spinal cord.
b. The back of the wall is covered with skin.
c. The back of die wall is behind the chest...
What it may communicate in the current context, where die text refers to die walls of a
hotel, are diese odier implications:
(17) a. The backs of die wall isolate guests from one another.
b. The backs of the wall protect the guests.
c. The backs of the wall resemble two humans turning their backs on each odier...
In contrast to the previous example, the target English text in this case has not become more
literal than the source text. Instead the translator chose to be faithful to the original loose use
of language (i.e. die communicative style), but changed die metaphor (i.e. die suggested
impression). The interpretive resemblance in the target text provided by the translator is not
between the back of a wall and the back of a human as in the original, but radier between
the bastion of a (fortification) wall and the wall itself. Thus, the type of implication die
reader is encouraged to derive will be, at least, slighdy different in the original and target
texts. In die Spanish text the implications are about the similarities between walls and
people, in particular, their backs. In the English text the similarities are between
fortifications and walls, in particular, the defensive and protective role which both play.
Thus, as stated above, although some of these implications will be similar, and in some
cases they may even overlap, other implications will certainly differ.
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To sum up, loose uses of concepts can give rise to discrepancies between source and
target texts. This is due to the fact that the concepts encoded (in these cases) do not match
precisely the concepts they communicate. The gap between the two is the result of an
interpretive process carried out in the search for relevance (Gutt, 1991, ch.2; Sperber &
Wilson, 1986/1995).
4. Echoic Uses of Concepts
A third type of discrepancy between what is encoded and what is communicated involves
echoic use of language. When we use a concept echoically, we are not using it to describe
some state of affairs in the world. Rather, we are attributing its use to someone else (or
ourselves in the past). Hence, there is a potential gap between literal and attributed
concepts, which may, as a consequence, give rise to discrepancies in communication (and,
m turn, translation). To illustrate, let us look first at an intralingual example of echoic use:
(18) Peter: What did Mary say?
John: You've dropped your wallet.
John's answer can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, it can be used descriptively,
in which case John is alerting Peter that he, at that moment in time, has dropped his wallet.
In this case, John is simply describing some state of affairs before him On the other hand,
it can be used echoically, in which case John is reporting what Mary had said. In this case,
John is not describing a state of affairs, or committing himself to the truth of what he has
reported, but rather he is simply committing himself to the faithfulness of the report. His
statement interpretively resembles what Mary had said to a relevant enough degree.
Let us consider now interlingual cases of echoic use, some of which often go unnoticed.
As Hervey et al. say in relation to cultural transpLantion of whole pieces of work:
Cultural transplantation! s].. , uhose extreme forms arehardly to be recognised as translations
at all (my italics], . ..are more like adaptations -the wholesale transplanting of the entire setting
of the ST, resulting in the text being completely reinvented in an indigenous target culture
setting (Hervey et al., 1995:23).
Although Hervey et al. refer here to complete pieces of work, the same general process is
found at word and sentential level. These are the levels on which the discussion below is
focused.
The following example is an instance of echoic use taken from die instructions of a hair
conditioning product and its back-translation from Arabic (from Baker, 1992: 35), where
back-translation is the translation of the target text back into the original language:
(19) Original
For maximum effect, cover the hair with a plastic cap or towel.
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Back-translation from Arabic
For obtaining maximum effectiveness, the hair is covered by means of a "cap", that
is a plastic hat which covers the hair, or by means of a towel.
The expression at issue here is the term cap and the way it has been rendered in Arabic
shown in bold in the back-translation. The English term in the original is used descriptively,
but in the Arabic version it is used echoically (i.e. what the English/writer call/s cap). This
echoic use is spelt out by providing a definition of what is meant. Hence, the translator is
using a term echoically and at die same time explaining the content of the attributed concept.
Obviously, he realised that the readers would lack enough knowledge to interpret die
concept, i.e. it would not give rise to cognitive effects, and decided to provide background
information to achieve successful communication.
Let us consider another example. Take the following English text about a private motor
museum and pan of its German translation (quoted in Baker, 1992: 34):
(20) The Patrick Collection has restaurant facilities to suit every taste -from die discerning
gourmet, to the Cream Tea expert.
... votn anspruchsvollen Feinschmecker bis zum "Cream-Tea "Experten.
Rack translation from German
. from demanding gourmets to "Cream Tea " experts.
The translator here has decided to keep the original Cream-Tea, which in German is,
arguably, an echoic use given that it mentions the English expression. That is, the
interpretation in this case would be: what the English call Cream Tea. This is done overtly
by virtue not only of its being a foreign word in German, but also of its being presented in
inverted commas. Note that the difference between this case and the previous one is that
here no spelling out of the concept is provided. It is assumed that the German readers will
have the relevant information accessible to interpret the expression. In other words, they
are assumed to have enough knowledge about this English institution, so as to render any
explanation of its meaning unnecessary.
This type of change from descriptive use to echoic use is not always the chosen padi to
translating a source text. The Italian version of text (20) chooses to respect the descriptive
use of language of die original, as the following extract shows (quoted in Baker, 1992: 33):
(21) . .di soddisfare tutti I gusti: da quelli del gastronomo esigente a quelli dell'esperto di
pasticceria.
Back-translation from Italian
...to satisfy all tastes: from those of die demanding gastronomist to those of the expert
in pastry
\ 0
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The word in question here is pasticceria , which as the back-translation shows means pastry.
This is not an echoic use of language as in the German example, but a descriptive one.
Hence, the translator has been faithful to the original as far as the descriptive use is
concerned. Of course, the result of this decision is that the Italian text communicates
something different from what the original text intended. That is, a Cream Tea expert is not
the same as a pastry expert. Content has thus been sacrificed. This may also reveal the
attimdes of the respective translators about die original text, where the German translator
opted for a foreignisation of the target text and the Italian for a domestication (for a critique
of these terms see Robinson, 1997, part 3).
In some cases, a term used echoically in one language may be used descriptively in
another. This happens, particularly, when the source text includes a term which is a loan
word from die target language. A case in point is the following English text, taken from the
information leaflet on The Patrick Collection already mentioned:
(22) You can even dine "alfresco" in the summer on our open air terrace.
The word in question here is alfresco. This is an Italian expression which means "in the
open air". However, in the English text it is used echoically, as shown by the quotation
marks. The Italian translation of this text would not include an echoic use of the word, since
in this language it is used descriptively.
(23) D'estate potrete anche pransare alfresco sulle nostre terraze.
In Italian, the word alfresco is used colloquially (native informant), in clear contrast widi
its echoic use in English, where it is used in more educated contexts and it has connotations
of sophistication (which are absent in the Italian original). In more standard Italian, the
expression used would be all'aperto , i.e. in the open (native informant). However, in either
case the Italian text would include a descriptive use of language, as opposed to the English
text which resorts to an echoic use of language.
The descriptive strategy was also used by the German translator of the text, as the
following German version shows:
(24) Im Sommer konnen Sie auch auf der Terrasse im Freien sitzen und essen.
Back-translation from German
In the summer you can sit and eat in the open on the terrace.
As we see, the style of the German text has changed from interpretive to descriptive use of
language by using in the open/im Freien. This means, amongst other things, that the
attitudes diat could have been communicated by the echoic use (e. g. -Italian- sophistication,
etc.) are lost in the target text. Let us now turn to the last type of interpretive resemblance
relation to be considered.
\
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5. Concept Widening
In addition to the three types of resemblance relation (between concepts) mentioned so far,
there seems to be a further resemblance possibility: concept widening. This is the opposite
case to concept narrowing and it may be possible to analyse it as a sub-case of loosening in
that it applies to some objects that do not fall under the concept (see above).
Concept widening involves die communication of a concept whose meaning, in a
particular context, is more general than that of the concept linguistically encoded. That is,
what is communicated incliules what is encoded. In translation, concept widening involves
encoding a target concept whose set includes the set encoded by the source concept. It is
first illustrated intralinguisucally with an example, taken from the contemporary novel
Sophie's World:
(25) But when diese basic needs have been satisfied -will there still be something that
everybody needs? Philosophers think so. They believe that man cannot live by bread
alone. (Gaarder, 1991; English Translation, 1995: 12, my emphasis).
The word in question here is bread. The concept it communicates in this context seems to
go beyond what it encodes. It is not communicating that philosophers believe that man
cannot live by eating bread only. The issue here is not bread in particular, but food or basic
needs more generally. In each of these interpretations the content of the concept bread
would be included in the concept communicated (bread is food which in turn is a basic
need). In this case it would be misleading to take the author to have communicated just
bread. The subset reladon at hand is shown in the following diagram:
(26)
S f t A c , c,
Set A = > Set of entities of which it is relevant to say that they are bread.
Set B=> Set of entiues of which it is true to say that they are bread.
This analysis, in fact, seems to be corroborated by the text that follows the extract in (25)
in the novel:
(27) Of course everyone needs food, (ibid., my emphasis).
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As (27) shows, what the author had in mind was not just bread, but food (or even basic
needs), in which bread itself is included.
An interlinguistic example of concept widening can be seen in the following translation
from Spanish (taken from a short story in Lawaetz, 1972: 196-7):
(28) La mujer no habia mentido.
The woman had deceived no one.
The original Spanish text includes the wordmentido, which literally means lied. However,
the translation provided here contains deceived. There is no grammatical reason why the
translator could not have rendered the original text literally,as the following version shows:
(29) The woman had not lied.
The translator (as a reader) has arguably taken the author to have communicated not that the
female character in the short story had lied but, more generally, that she had deceived. This
interpretation is possible because lying is a sub-case of deceiving and hence there is an
interpretive resemblance between the two concepts: they share some of their logical and
contextual implications. It is also possible because in the story what is relevant is whether
the woman is morally apt, and not so much wliat the moral flaw is. The widening of the
concept encoded in (28) causes the discrepancy in the target version.
Another example of concept widening is the following translation of the instructipns of
a Hewlett-Packard print cartridge:
(30) Have highest quality output every time with this HP print cartridge.
Consiga siempre la maxima calidad de impresidn con este cartucho de impresion HP.
(Hewlett-Packard Co.)
The Spanish expression at hand here is siempre , which literally means always. The
translator has interpreted the English expression every time in this context as meaning
always , which in itself includes the meaning of every time. That is, he has widened the
temporal scope of the source text in the target version (which could have included a more
literal rendering of the English original in Spanish, i.e. cada vez , every time).
Thus, the widenings of concepts effected in these translations have resulted in
discrepancies between source and target texts. The translator rendered the target texts on
the basis not of the encoded but the communicated concepts, thereby giving rise to the
differences between the two texts.
6. Conclusion
Interpretive resemblance between concepts underpins the gap that exists between what is
encoded and what is communicated. Four possible types of interpretive resemblance have
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been considered. They explain some of the discrepancies that arise in the process of
translation between the source and target texts as a result of pragmatic processing.
All these four types of discrepancy between encoding and communication are reflected
firstly in the (interpretive) mediation of die translator in rendering a source text in a target
language, and secondly in die resulting discrepancies between these two texts. In general,
these processes may give rise to a change in the style of the text from source to target
language, e.g. from inference to encoding or from interpretive use to descriptive use of
language.
These cross-linguistic textual changes may have implications for judgements of
acceptability in translation (for the notion of translation acceptability from a pragmatic point
of view, see e.g. Rosales Sequeiros, 1998b). Acceptability judgments will be affected
because what is deemed to be acceptable in one context may not be so in another. For
example, a widening such as the one carried out in the translation of (28) above may be
acceptable in a commercial translation of the short story in question. However, it may not
be so acceptable in other situations (e.g. as part of an exam). Ultimately, acceptability
judgements will be dependent on die degree to which expectations raised in the audience by
the translation are met during the interpretation of the resulting target text.
Notes
1. The researchdiscussedherebelongswithinamoregeneralprogramof establishingthetypes
and degreesof interpretiveresemblancefoundin translationand the roleinterpretiveresemblance
plays in (a) clarifying and explainingthe varietiesof discrepancybetween sourceand target texts
and (b) thedegrees of acceptabilityinvolvedin translation.
2. Enrichment is one of severalpragmatic processesrequired to develop the bare semantic
representationof an utteranceinto a full,truth-evaluable,propositionalform (cf. Gutt, 1991:24-
25; Blakemore, 1992: 77ff ).
3. For a discussion of strong and weak communicationsee Sperber & Wilson 1995, and
Blakemore1992.
4. It is interestingto notehere thatsome Englishdictionaries(e.g. CollinsConciseDictionary
Plus) quotethe meaningof disusedas one of the sensesof condemned.This shows to whatextent
lexicographerslist meaningswhich are, in fact, interpretationsof the literalsense of theconcepts
being defined. They often providelong lists of less-than-literalinterpretationsof (the original)
concepts, which may in time becomeliteralmeaningsin their own right.
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This article discusses the notion of pragmatic enrichment in relation to translation.
Enrichment is viewed as a pragmatic process whose function is to develop the vagueness found
in many natural language utterances in order to arrive at fully determinate thoughts. The
notion of enrichment, applied to translation, is defined here as interlingual pragmatic enrich-
ment. This process involves, firstly, the development of a source text into its fully determinate
conceptual representation by carrying out an enrichment and, secondly, the translation of this
fully enriched thought into another language. The claim is made that interlingual enrichment
is carried out on two grounds. First, it may be required for reasons to do with the input, e.g.
grammatical incompatibilities. Second, it may be done for reasons to do with the context, e.g.
cultural variation. These two types of enrichment correspond to the two information sources
involved in the interpretation process and, furthermore, they shed light on the changes
undergone by a text during translation. © 2002 Elsevier Science B V, All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This article discusses pragmatic enrichment in translation. In doing this, it places
translation within the sphere of communication. As Gutt (1991: 22) has stated,
"translation is indeed best handled as a matter of communication" (see also Gutt,
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2000: 202-8). In particular, translation is a form of linguistic communication and it
is here that enrichment and translation meet.
When we use language we encode semantic representations which are partial
representations of the thoughts we intend to communicate. These semantic repre-
sentations (or logical forms) constitute the blueprint for the thoughts which addres-
sees must recover to achieve successful communication.
As the word 'blueprint' suggests, semantic representations are not complete. This
means that before addressees recover fully determinate thoughts, they must engage
in a process of development of the logical form. The result of this development is the
propositional form of the utterance which is sometimes described as the proposition
expressed. As Wilson and Sperber (1993b: 6) comment:
"although the logical form of an utterance is recovered by decoding, its fully prepositional form is
obtained by inferential enrichment of the linguisticallyencoded logicalform It is the propositional form
of an utterance, not its logical form, that determines the proposition expressed"
Enrichment, therefore, involves a process of completion of the logical form (i.e.
the semantic representation encoded by the utterance) whose aim is to arrive at the
proposition expressed, which may or may not be one of the set of thoughts explicitly
communicated by the utterance. Following Wilson and Sperber in their presentation
of this notion, the conditions under which enrichment is carried out can be stated as
follows: "If the linguistically encoded information is too vague, or too incomplete,
to yield an adequately relevant interpretation, it will be enriched using immediately
accessible contextual assumptions, to the point where it is relevant enough" (ibid.,
1993a: 293).
This means that not all that is said is linguistically encoded. Standardly, there is
a gap between what is linguistically encoded and what is said. This is a fact that
has sometimes been overlooked in the study of linguistic communication, as Sper-
ber and Wilson (1986: 180) themselves have pointed out, "the fact that logical
forms must often be enriched is generally ignored". As it turns out, pragmatic
enrichment will prove to be an important and powerful device that translators, as
addressees and communicators, can use in the process of discourse interpretation
and translation.
Furthermore, what is crucial to translation as regards enrichment is that lan-
guages differ in the strategies used to make meaning explicit. Thus, one language
may be equipped to encode very subtle nuances by means of unequivocal linguistic
devices, while a different language may commonly express the same or equivalent
nuances by linguistic devices which encode very vague semantic constraints on the
interpretation. This forces translators to resort to pragmatic enrichment of the logi-
cal form in order to derive the intended, fully determinate, propositional form (when
there is one). Here is where translators themselves act as addressees of the original
text, before they become communicators in their own right (cf Gutt, 2000: 213 5).
In cases like this, where an equivalent communicative effect has been achieved by
two different communicative routes, there is a difference in style between the two
texts (and perhaps more fundamentally between the two languages), as far as the
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be argued that the two underlying cultures "perceive" the world in slightly different
ways, whilst at the same time enabling the linguistic communication of the same or
equivalent content.
In what follows, the role played by enrichment in translation (in particular, lit-
erary translation) will be illustrated by looking at a range of linguistic phenomena
which require or invite the application of enrichment at the level of the proposition
expressed to achieve successful translation.
2. Pragmatic enrichment
In order to illustrate the process of enrichment, consider the following intralingual
examples:
(1) a. He handed her the scalpel. She made the incision.
b. John dropped the glass. It broke.
c. The car is too expensive.
d. I have had lunch.
Example (la) is discussed by Carston (1993: 29). She argues that "the proposition
is enriched along the lines of [(2a) below]", where there is both a temporal and
an instrumental enrichment. Wilson and Sperber (1993a: 281) follow this type
of analysis by taking "the temporal and causal connotations of .. . [(lb)] as
inferentially determined aspects of what is said", thus contributing, as shown in
(2b), to the truth-conditions of the utterance (i.e. to what the hearer takes'as having
been said).
Wilson and Sperber (ibid.) discuss examples similar to (Ic) and (Id), where com-
parative adjectives imply that there is an implicit comparison between the explicit
entity mentioned in the utterance and a set of implicit entities assumed by the
speaker. This set is inferred pragmatically and contributes to the truth-conditions of
the utterance (that is, to what is said). The use of the present perfect implies that the
event described is located within a period of time stretching back from the time of
the utterance, and the particular period must be pragmatically selected. This period
contributes to the truth-conditions of the utterance. Thus, the role of the addressee
is to find, by pragmatic means, a unit narrow enough for the utterance to be worth
his attention. This would be a case of strengthening of the logical form. In the case
of (lc), if we assume a situation where the participants are considering the purchase
of a car, the enrichment could go along the lines of (2c), which would be a case of
completion. In the case of (Id) the most common enrichment would go along the
lines of (2d):
(2) a. HE HANDED HER THE SCAEPEL. [A SECOND OR TWO LATER]
SHE MADE THE INCISION [WITH THAT SCALPEL].
b. JOHN DROPPED THE GLASS [SOME MILLISECONDS LATER]
IT BROKE [/EV A RESULT OE JOHN DROPPING IT\.
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c. THE CAR IS TOO EXPENSIVE [FOR ME TO Bin'] .
d. I HAVE HAD LUNCH [TODAY].
Enrichment, therefore, involves [a] having knowledge of the logically ordered
sets of intended elements or the conceptual constituents, as the case may be, [b]
inferring the intended set or conceptual constituent, and finally [c] entering that
information into the proposition expressed. The proposition expressed is what
the addressee will take the addresser to have intended to say or, in the words of
the philosopher Grice (e.g. 1975), what is said , as opposed to what is implicated.
Together what is said and what is implicated then make up what is meant. The
content entered into the proposition expressed as a result of enrichment is
implicit in the context and it is sufficiently manifest to the addressee for it to be
easily recovered. If it was not so, communication would fail to some extent at
least.
The underlying hypothesis in the comparative and temporal examples is that our
mental structure is such that we tend to organise information logically on the basis
of our knowledge of the world (which includes social and cultural conventions). Our
logical capabilities are largely innate, whilst our world knowledge is largely based on
our experience, in which social and cultural conventions play a central role (since
they help impose a structure on our perceptions). Indeed, these two factors are
enshrined in pragmatic principles. As Sperber and Wilson (1995: 270) state, an
addressee will expect that "the ostensive stimulus fused in a communicative event] is
the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities [logical cap-
abilities] and preferences [personal, social and cultural conventions]" (my italics).
Eor example, a mental structure of social relationships could include the following
logically ordered sets: partner, family, friends, acquaintances, neighbours, strangers;
temporal units: now, this afternoon, today, yesterday, this week, last week, etc. We
structure these sets on the basis of cultural information, reflected on the language,
and the cognitive structures available to store it (which tend to be logical, as it is a
cognitively efficient way of organising and accessing information). However, not
everybody will have access to the same logically ordered sets and not all of those sets
will be equally accessible to an individual every time. This is because, on the one
hand, not everybody has the same knowledge of the world (including social and
cultural conventions): e.g. a social or personality psychologist will have a larger
range of logically ordered sets of possible social relationships between people than a
non-expert On the other hand, not all situations give equal access to all those sets:
e.g. at a dinner party a physicist is unlikely to be thinking and interpreting utter-
ances in terms of nanoseconds. However, those very small temporal sets will be in
the foreground of his mind during an experiment on particle physics. In other
words, the contextual effects of a particular set will vary depending on the situation
at hand: a nanosecond frame of mind at a dinner parly would be disconcerting, most
of the actions will not be recognised or understood as dinner party actions; equal ly a
second frame of mind at a particle physics experiment will be ineffectual, no inter-
esting facts would ever be detected. The task of the addressee is to select the inten-
ded logical set on pragmatic grounds.
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3. Context selection, relevance and pragmatic interpretation
As we have seen in examples (2), enrichment draws information from the context
to go from semantic representations to fully developed propositions. Gutt (1991: 25)
has stated this very clearly:
"verbal communication involves two distinct kinds of mental representations: semantic representations
that are the output of the language module of the mind, and thoughts with propositional forms that are
derived from semantic representations by further processing.The way in which audiences get from
semantic representations to propositional forms crucially involves the use of context."
Thus, to understand how linguistic communication is achieved we must under-
stand how context interacts with language. Enrichment is one of the processes whose
role is to bridge the two. This bridging is not always the same. Suppose, for instance,
that example (lc) above is uttered in a context where a university is considering the
purchase of a limousine for its Vice-chancellor In this context the likely enrichment
will be as in (3):
(3) THE CAR IS TOO EXPENSIVE [FOR THE UNIVERSITY TO BUY].
The enrichment carried out in (3) is much more likely in the context just described
than that in (2c). In other words, the contextual assumptions drawn upon in the
process of enrichment will be the most accessible ones in that context, they will be
the least costly to access cognitively. However, cognitive cost is not the 6nly con-
sideration used in the selection of an appropriate enrichment. Consider the enrich-
ment of (la) in (4):
(4) HE HANDED HER THE SCALPEL [A SECOND OR TWO LATER]
S HE MADE THE INCISION [HAVING REMINDED HERSELF OF
THE SHOPPING LIST FOR DINNER}.
The fact that the surgeon had thought about what she had to buy for dinner is
perfectly plausible but, in the situation described by (la), the enrichment that would
yield enough cognitive effects for no unjustifiable cognitive effort would be the one
shown in (2a). This enrichment coincides with the smallest and most accessible
context As Wilson and Sperber (1993a: 288) argue, "all the hearer is entitled to
impute as part of the intended interpretation is the minimal (i.e. smallest, most
accessible) context and contextual effects that would be enough to make the utter-
ance worth his attention". One of the smallest, most accessible, contexts that would
yield enough cognitive effects in the situation described by (la) is that represented by
the following question:
(5) What did she made the incision with?
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The answer to this question is precisely the enrichment made in (2a). By contrast,
the kind of context that would make the enrichment in (4) yield cognitive effects
would be:
(6) What did she remind herself of before she made the incision?
The context represented in (6) is certainly not the smallest context in which to
interpret (la), nor is it the most accessible. This seems to reflect the role of schemas
or scenarios in utterance interpretation, namely, to provide easily accessible infor-
mation. Although the effects derived from context (6) could in principle be worth the
addressee's attention, in the minimum context we are envisaging it is cognitively
much more expensive to construct (6) than it is to construct (5). In other words, (5)
would be the most accessible context and therefore an answer that instantiated its
variable what with and produced adequate cognitive effects would be the best and
most economical The enrichment in (2a) provides such an answer, whereas the
enrichment in (4) does not. In general, cognitive effort increases with the imagina-
tion and the psychological complexity required to construct the context, and cogni-
tive effects increase with the number of expectations or hypotheses confirmed
(Wilson and Sperber, 1993a).
Both cognitive effects and cognitive effort are the basis of the notion of optimal rele-
vance proposed by Spcrber and Wilson (1995). The definition of optimal relevance
states:
(7) Presumption of optimal relevance (revised)
(a) The ostensive stimulus [e.g. an utterance] is relevant enough
for it to be worth the addressees effort to process it.
(b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible
with the communicators abilities and preferences.
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 270)
This definition is the basis of a more general principle of ostensive-inferential
communication called the second principle of relevance:
(8) The second principle of relevance
The [second] Principle of Relevance is the principle that every utterance
(or other act of ostensive communication) creates an expectation of
[optimal] relevance
(Wilson & Sperber, 1993a: 286)
Wilson and Sperber (1993a: 287) note that for an utterance to be acceptable and
comprehensible it does not actually have to be optimally relevant Seeing how it
could reasonably have been expected to be optimally relevant to the addressee will
be enough They express this condition in the following terms:
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(9) Criterion of consistency with the [second] principle of relevance
An utterance, on a given interpretation, is consistent with the principle of
relevance if and only if the speaker might reasonably have expected it to be
optimally relevant to the hearer on that interpretation.
(ibid 287)
Hence, within this theoretical paradigm, enrichment can be described as an infer-
ential process whose input is, on the one hand, the utterance and, on the other, the
context (in which the utterance is processed); and whose output is a completed
semantic representation. The process of completion is constrained by considerations
of relevance, which means that only enrichments which are consistent with the
principle of (optimal) relevance are considered acceptable. This is what we saw
happen above. In relevance-theoretic terms, (4) was the result of an unacceptable
enrichment in the situation described, whereas (2a) was the result of an acceptable
one.
Note here that this theoretical paradigm, involving the second principle of rele-
vance, is intended to explain spontaneous linguistic communication, both in ordinary
and literary texts. In this respect, Sperber and Wilson (1995: 75) state:
"the lengthy and highlyself-consciousprocessesof textual interpretation that religiousand literary scho-
lars engage in are governed just as much by considerations of relevanceas is spontaneous utterance
interpretation Spontaneous inferenceplays a role even in scholarly interpretation".
Here a distinction is made between the highly self-conscious interpretive processes
involved in literary exegesis (i.e. non-spontaneous) and the largely unconscious pro-
cesses involved in ordinary utterance interpretation (i.e. spontaneous). This article is
concerned with the second case, i.e. ordinary, spontaneous, utterance interpretation.
Implicit in the above view, particularly as far as spontaneous interpretation is
concerned, is that literary texts (or any other types of text) do not constitute in and
by themselves a natural class (i.e. in a primary sense), and therefore are subject to the
same pragmatic principles as any other text. Another issue, of course, is whether we
classify some texts (e.g. literary ones) as belonging to a specific text type on the basis
of our world knowledge (e.g. literary knowledge). This is a secondary, derived sense
of text type (see Gutt, 2000: 211, for a parallel argument in relation to translations
as a text type). Moreover, our capacity to group texts of a literary nature together
(in a secondary, derived sense) does not mean that we use a different set of prag-
matic principles to interpret them spontaneously (though we may use our contextual
assumptions about any of these text types— i.e in a secondary, derived sense on
the process of interpretation, particularly at the non-spontaneous, cognitive stage,
see below). Furthermore, the examples analysed in this article are utterances (as
opposed to whole texts) and can therefore be seen as being more closely bound to
spontaneous pragmatic analysis. This type of analysis involves interpretation pro-
cesses fully shared by ordinary and literary uses of language (see Sperber and
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Wilson, 1991; Papafragou, 1995, for a discussion of pragmatic processes common to
these two traditional uses).
An additional issue is whether a (literary) author has intentions that go beyond
what is linguistically spontaneous, which may very well be the case in many (literary)
instances. However, this would be part of the non-spontaneous stage of interpreta-
tion, which falls outside the scope of this article (although it would also be subject to
considerations of relevance). In relevance-theoretic terms, the pragmatic interpreta-
tion with which we are specifically concerned here, as stated above, is the one cor-
responding to the second principle of relevance (the communicative principle), not
the first principle of relevance (the cognitive principle) (see Sperber and Wilson,
1995: 260-78, 1998: 192). In other words, this article is restricted to the interpreta-
tion that authors can be taken to have linguistically and spontaneously commu-
nicated by means of the sentences they encode, and not any further non-
spontaneous interpretation that may be additionally entertained (see Furlong, 1989,
1996, for a discussion of the notions of spontaneous interpretation and literary
interpretation; and Pilkington, 1994, for further discussion of the latter).
Another important point to make here is that natural language utterances nor-
mally (though not exclusively) express propositions (i.e. thoughts), and propositions
(in semantic terms) are generally considered to express truth-conditional content,
which represents the core meaning of the utterance (i.e. what the utterance tells us
about the real or a possible world) This is the case for any utterance, regardless of
whether they are found in a literary or a non-literary context. The only exception,
normally, are utterances which are loosely and metaphorically used (which would
not normally communicate their propositional form and corresponding truth-con-
ditions). Moreover, the derivation of the truth-conditional content of a given utter-
ance, as determined by the proposition it expresses, is governed by considerations of
relevance, as we saw in examples (1) (4). This means further that the proposition
expressed (by an utterance, i.e. its truth-conditions) is ultimately dependant on the
contextual assumptions available and thus may change from context to context, or
interpretation to interpretation (see Cann, 1992, chapter 1, for a discussion of the
notion of truth-conditional content; and Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 183 ff, for the
relationship between proposition expressed and truth-conditions).
Note also that the addressee of a given utterance will normally achieve some kind
of interpretation on processing it (if the presumption of relevance as well as the
communicative intention have been successful, cf. Gutt, 2000: 211). Whether the
interpretation derived by the addressee at a given moment in time is the one fully
intended by the original author (who, by virtue of producing the text, must have had
some kind of communicative as well as informative intention) is an ancillary ques-
tion All the hearer has to do in spontaneous interpretation is go ahead and derive
the first interpretation that is consistent with the principle of relevance on the basis
of the utterance produced and the assumptions accessible to him This interpretation
may, of course, be inconclusive at times or change at different readings of the origi-
nal text, in which case the text may be seen as having "more than one" interpreta-
tion The addressee will nevertheless strive to arrive at the interpretation which he
believes the original author had in mind, unless he chooses to suspend authorial
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intention for some given reason. The theoretical paradigm provided by relevance
theory covers both spontaneous interpretations and the process of arriving at the
interpretation which the addressee takes the author to have intended. Moreover, this
paradigm, as a direct result of the consistency criterion defined in (9), covers cases in
which the author or speaker may deliberately obscure his utterances to hide some
communicative intentions. In this respect, Sperber and Wilson (1998: 192) state,
"the effect [of an utterance] should be [.. J at least enough for it to have seemed to
the speaker that it would seem to the hearer to justify the effort -[...] this qualifi-
cation [.. .] plays a role only when the speaker deliberately or accidentally fails to
provide the hearer with sufficiently relevant information." (my italics). Thus, the
criteria of consistency with the principle of relevance allows for cases other than
those based purely on overt communication. Cases of covert or accidental commu-
nication, though, are not discussed in this article. So, how does the theoretical
paradigm discussed in this section help us with the notion of interlingual enrichment?
4. Interlingual enrichment
What transpires from the previous examples is that what we take to have been
said, that is, the fully determinate thought communicated may be only partially
encoded by linguistic means. Some meaning is linguistically explicit and some must
be inferred For translation this can have important consequences.
If two languages typically encode different degrees of explicitness for a particular
propositional form (thought) (because, say, L2 is capable of greater exphcitness than
LI in expressing it), the translator will have to enrich the original text befo&etransfer
can occur. The translator may also choose to enrich the original text on some other
grounds. The logical possibilities between the two languages seem to allow four dif-
ferent cases as regards explicitness/implicitness:
A Translation more explicit because of (enrichment):
i. Linguistic differences between two languages
li A choice of the translator on some other grounds
B Translation less explicit because of (impoverishment):
i Linguistic differences between two languages
n A choice of the translator on some other grounds
This article focusses on the A cases (for a discussion on the B cases, see Rosales
Sequeiros, 1998). The type of pragmatic enrichment across languages found in the A
cases will be called interlingual enrichment. Consequently, literary enrichment would
become a subtype of interlingual enrichment.
In all cases of enrichment, the adoption of a particular degree of explicitness by
either the original author or the translator may in itself be significant, as they may
choose to be more or less explicit in order to elicit a given pragmatic effect from their
audience (cf. "meaningful silence", Mey, 1997). However, this is an aspect which
falls outside the scope of this article.
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So far we have seen intralingual enrichments, that is, enrichments which arise
during the process of interpretation of an utterance and whose cognitive life ends
there. In interlingual enrichment, on the other hand, the cognitive life of the pro-
position expressed by an utterance goes beyond the interpretation itself to be reex-
pressed in a different language. Thus, a definition of interlingual enrichment is
proposed as in (10):
(10) Interl ingualenrichment:
An utterance is a case of interlingual enrichment if its semantic
representation is the intended enrichment of the semantic representation
of an utterance from another language.
Hence, for interlingual enrichment to occur there must be [a) an enriched semantic
representation derived from a given language and [b] an utterance from another
language which encodes that enriched semantic representation. As will be seen
below, interlingual enrichment carried out on linguistic grounds [type (Ai) above] is
necessary when the target language can only express the thought communicated in
the original language by means of a sentence which is made linguistically more
explicit. Hence, the justification for this type of enrichment is purely grammatical, as
it is the grammar of the target language that forces the translator to produce an
enriched translation. By contrast, interlingual enrichment carried out on other
grounds [type (Ah) above] is necessary when the contextual (e.g. cultural) assump-
tions required to interpret the original text successfully may not be easily accessible
to the target audience and as a result the full propositional form recovered by the
translator may not be communicable without the added contextual information.
This subtype of interlingual enrichment would also he justified when the guarantees
of communicative success, without the additional contextual information, are low.
Overall, the justification for this type of enrichment is dependent on the reasonable
judgment of the translator to foresee whether or not the target audience will be in a
position to access and use the appropriate contextual and cultural assumptions in
order to arrive at a relevant interpretation. The less guarantees he has in this respect,
the more he will be justified in enriching the original text, and vice versa.
In what follows, various types of enrichment in literary translation are discussed.
The examples examined will be translations between English and Spanish. They are
generally discussed in isolation for reasons of space and presentation, with reference
being made to their context whenever it is required. As will be seen below, in most (or
all of the) genuine cases, the origin of the interlingual enrichment effected is obser-
vable from the isolated text provided. Only in some cases, not genuine for the most
part, knowledge of the wider context is required to evaluate the enriched translations.
4.1. Temporal enrichment
The first type of enrichment to be examined is temporal As we saw earlier, this
enrichment is carried out in order to select, from the logically ordered sets of possi-
ble times, the unit taken to have been intended: e g. now, this afternoon, today, this
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week, this month, this year, etc. It was suggested above that logical ordering of sets
saves cognitive effort as it aids the search for the intended unit. To illustrate this
process of selection and enrichment at work in literary translation, consider the fol-
lowing Spanish examples and their published English versions taken from a literary
work (Lawaetz, 1972: 10 ft):
(11) Te he querido mucho.
I've always been very fond of you.
(12) El cafe estaba vacio a aquella hora.
The cafe »V<Mempty at that time of the day.
(13) Aplasto una brizna de tabaco entre las yemas de los dedos y de nuevo hablo,
mirando hacia el mar.
He rubbed a scrap of tobacco between his fingertips and spoke again,
still looking out to sea.
As far as (11) is concerned, the use of the present perfect tense is equivalent in
(Peninsular) Spanish and (British) English The event described is located within a
time period stretching back from the moment of utterance. This means that any unit
of time that fits that condition could have been intended. But clearly in (11) the unit
of time intended is not this afternoon nor today, nor this week. The natural inter-
pretation is the unit of time of a lifetime, that is, always, which itself requires some
narrowing down This temporal reading is implicit in the Spanish text, but it has
been made explicit in its English rendering. This is a case of interlingual temporal
enrichment
Similarly, in the English version of (12) we find that the time unit involved is
explicitly specified as being a day. However, the Spanish original does not include
any explicit reference to that unit, that is, it is left for the reader to infer [from hora
( hour)]. Thus, the translator has added the prepositional phrase of the day to the
English version It is quite likely that the decision to enrich the original was as a
result of the fact that the lexical item time in English is quite vague and could refer
to various units of time: e.g. at that time of the month, year, etc. By encoding the
unit of time to which it belongs, the translator is reducing the risk of mis-
understanding and compensating for the vagueness of the English term, albeit at the
cognitive cost of processing the added prepositional phrase.
Example (13) is more subtle in its enrichment. The temporal difference between
the original and the translation lies in the use of still in the English version. This
temporal adverb implies that the event in question was already happening before the
time of the utterance This interpretation is possible because earlier in the text there
had already been a reference to the character's looking out towards the sea, as
shown in (14)
(14) Miraba hacia mas alia de la arena, hacia la bahia.
He was gazing beyond the sands and out over the bay.
1080 X Rosales Sequeiros / Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 1069 1089
The Spanish text did not explicitly encode the connection between the two
descriptions. The English text, on the other hand, includes the temporal enrich-
ment overtly. Thus, here we have another change from inference to encoding
across languages. This change helps the English reader make the connection more
easily.
Interlingual temporal enrichment works in both directions. To illustrate, let us
consider the following example from English into Spanish (taken from Santoyo,
1989: 43), where the discussion is about France and its war conflicts with
England:
( 1 5 ) T e m p o r a le n r i c h m e n tE n g l i s hi n t oS j
Before that period she had to
struggle for her very existence
with the English, already
possessed of her fairest
provinces.
(Walter Scott, Quentm Durward)
ish
Mucho antes de esta epoca se
vela ya precisada a sostener
contra Inglaterra, duena de sus
mejores provincias, continua y
sungrienta lucha, tratandose
nada menos que de defender
su existencia politico.
In this example there are several types of enrichment (some of which are not gen-
uine interlingual enrichments as defined above), but let us concentrate here on the
temporal one, which is a genuine instance of the type of enrichment under discus-
sion. The difference in explicitness between the original and the translation as far as
temporal information is concerned lies in the inclusion of mucho (i.e. much) in the
Spanish version, which is absent in the English text In the original, the length of
time prior to the time in question is left for readers to infer by themselves. In the
translation, on the other hand, it is made explicit Why? One reason may be that
some readers of this text might lack the encyclopaedic knowledge to derive the
intended enrichment: that France had already fought against England a long time
before the time of the narrative. By making it explicit, the translator is reducing the
cognitive effort the reader might have to invest in the enrichment process and thus
help the reader in the comprehension process. If this enrichment had not been car-
ried out, those Spanish readers who lacked the appropriate historical knowledge
might derive a slightly different interpretation from the English readers. Let us now
turn to another case of enrichment, this time not of a temporal but of a thematic
nature.
4.2. Thematic enrichment
There are several types of thematic enrichment, all based on the thematic roles
adopted by the constituents in question. By way of definition, Frawley (1992: 197)
states that "thematic roles are semantic relations that connect entities to events".
They provide further information about the event described.
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4.2.1. Agent enrichment
One such role is that of the agent of the event described, that is, the entity that
carries out the action Consider the following text taken from Lawaetz (1972: 10 11):
(16) A cada impulso sonaha un dnmnuto crujido
With every push it crackled a little
If the context of this text was a situation in which two men were pushing a car
whose battery had run down in order to jump-start it, then (16) would very likely be
interpreted as in (17):
(17) A cada impulso [de los dos hombres] sonaba un diminuto crujido [en el coche]
With every push [by the two men/ /the car] crackled a little
The enrichment shown in the first set of square brackets spells out the agents of
the event: the two men This has not been encoded linguistically in the original text.
It has been derived by taking into account contextual assumptions about the situa-
tion, e.g.:
(18) The two men are pushing the car
The car must be a bit old
The resulting propositional form is the enriched semantic representation which
had been encoded linguistically. The enriched proposition is thus taken as one of the
thoughts the original writer intended to express. However, the enrichment will be
different if different contextual assumptions are brought to bear on the interpreta-
tion process. To illustrate, consider a situation where the back entrance of a house
which leads onto the beach consists of a reed curtain against which the wind is
crashing. In this situation, the enrichment will be as in (19):
(19) A cada impulso [del viento] sonaba un diminuto crujido [en la cortina]
With every push [hy the wind/ / the reed curtain] crackleda l i t t le
In fact, the translation published for the current example is as in (20):
(20) With every gust of wind it crackled a little.
The version in (20) specifies the type of impulse it is (i.e. a gust) as well as the
agent of the impulse (i.e. the wind), which in the original was left for the reader to
infer. The translator has, therefore, gone further than the original text and has
explicitly encoded what had been merely suggested Arguably, this amounts to a
change of style from the original to the translation, which in turn may cause some
differences in what is communicated. Indeed, one of the possible consequences of
linguistically encoding information which was only implicitly conveyed in the origi-
nal text is that the new linguistic items may have implications of their own, which
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now become guaranteed by the addresser (the translator) and sought by the
addressee (the reader), as a direct result of thein being encoded. This guarantee
would not have been present in the interpretation of the original text. Moreover, this
stylistic change may be unacceptable to some readers (particularly literary readers
and scholars) as it involves an unnecessary departure from the original and a change
in what may be regarded by them as a fundamental feature of the original text, i.e.
its style. This is particularly so, since if the original author of the literary work had
decided to encode the type of push and agent involved in (16), she could easily have
done so. In Spanish there is an expression which literally matches the English gust of
wind.
(21) English Gust of wind —*Spanish Racha de viento
This is a commonly used expression which, no doubt, the author knew. If she had
wanted to convey the same level of explicitness in the original she could have done
so without any problem, as (22) shows:
(22) A cada racha de viento sonaba un diminuto crujido
With every gust of wind it crackled a little
The fact is that she did not and, as a result, the degree of explicitness has been
changed. This is another case of interlingual enrichment based on information which
had not been linguistically encoded in the original but merely suggested, but which is
linguistically encoded in the translation The translator has interpreted and enriched
the original text, and then carried out the translation on the basis of that enriched
propositional form rather than the original text exclusively.
As stated above, readers for whom issues of full faithfulness are central to trans-
lation will judge this type of stylistic change unacceptable (particularly in the case of
literary translation), as they will expect full equivalence between original and trans-
lation, including both content and form In this case, readers would expect no
enrichment to be carried out at all In particular, they would be prepared to put into
the interpretation process the extra effort required to access any contextual
assumptions necessary in order to arrive at the intended interpretation From a
theoretical point of view, this difference in judgment will reflect the fact that faith-
fulness between two representations (e.g. an original text and its translation) is a
matter of degree of resemblance, where at one end of the scale there is absolute
resemblance (of form and content) and at the other no resemblance at all These
varying degrees of resemblance are covered by the notion of faithfulness, which is
defined in terms of the extent to which two representations (e.g. an original and its
translation) share analytic and synthetic implications (i.e. logical properties, see
Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 226 37)
However, in the translations examined here, published and sanctioned academi-
cally, the translators clearly considered the enrichments shown to be perfectly
acceptable. This reflects the fact that different translators have different expectations
regarding the appropriate degree of faithfulness to choose. In the less faithful
X Resales Sequeiras/ Journal of Pragmatics 14 (2002) 106V 10X9 108 i
versions discussed above, the translators seem to carry out enrichments so as to aid
the interpretation process and to make the communicated thoughts more transpar-
ent. This suggests that interlingual enrichment is more acceptable to readers that are
willing to trade some loss of faithfulness in the translation for ease of comprehen-
sion and interpretation Moreover, the degree to which translations can be inter-
lingually enriched can vary from no enrichment at all (in which case the translation
would be equivalent to the semantic representation of the original), to some enrich-
ment (in which case the translation would only be partially equivalent to the pro-
position expressed), to a full enrichment (in which case the translation would be
equivalent to the full proposition expressed in the original text). Since different
degrees of enrichment are acceptable to different readers, the translator should be
sensitive to the type of audience targeted (if he wishes to fulfil readers' expectations)
These various degrees of interlingual enrichment account for the different judgments
elicited by different types of translation as far as the explicit/implicit dimension is
concerned This dimension, together with other factors, may play a part in our eva-
luation of translation, but pragmatically they are treated like any other contextual
assumption As Ciutt (2000: 207) suggests:
The notion or notions of 'translation' favoured by a particular cultural group or sub-group, notions of
genre' that might determine which notion of translation is considered appropriate for certain kinds of
texts, conventions or ideas about what makes a text literary' and the like all enter into the relevance-
theoretic account of translation as contextual assumptions held by translator and audience (My italics )
4.2.2. Source enrichment
Another thematic enrichment is that of source, which conveys the point of origin
of an event or entity The implicit source, as well as any other implicit information,
can be drawn from various places, [a] from the encyclopaedic entry of a concept (as
we will see below), [b] from information carried over from the previous deductions
[as we saw above in (13)], or [c] from the perceptual environment (Sperber and
Wilson, 1986) Consider the following case of enrichment found in a situation where
the main character has checked into a hotel and goes into the room (taken from
Lawaetz, 1972: 180 1):
(23) El agua salia hirviendo, y eso compensaba la falta de sol y de aire
The water from the tup was boiling hot. and this compensated for the lack oj
sunlight and fresh air
The constituent at issue in (23) is the English prepositional phrase from the tap
which is not mentioned in the original This prepositional phrase denoting the
source of the water has been added to the translation as a result of a process of
enrichment This information has been made accessible in the original text by means
of the concept [HABITACION] ( [R()()M|), which is mentioned just before the
current excerpt ('le bastaba caminar unos metros para llegar a la habitat ion. El agua
.. ibid ). The stereotypical idea we have of a hotel room is that it might have a
bath and that the bath will typically have taps and that through the taps there will
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be hot and cold running water. It is from this stereotype that the translator is
drawing the information about the source.
What is revealing is that presumably in the room there was also a basin with a tap.
Given that in the original text there is no mention of the source, the tap from which
the boiling water runs could be either the bath tap or the basin tap. The translator,
however, does not specify which is the intended one. It is quite clear that if she had
decided to specify that information she would be committing herself to an enrich-
ment which could very well be unintended and therefore wrong. She is wise enough
to say just that the water comes out of a tap. This is the limit of the enrichment
process. If there is no firm communicative clue for a given enrichment, then the
translator should not take the author to have intended it, and should therefore
refrain from including it in the translation, or else do it at her own responsibility. If
the translator had not enriched the target text, it may be possible that the English
readers could derive a slightly different interpretation from the Spanish readers, as
they may both use different stereotypical scenarios for the interpretation of the
situation. This, in turn, may be due to cultural differences, where culture, in simple
terms, is viewed here as a set of assumptions shared by a given community and
which are widely expected to be easily accessible and retrievable by members across
that community, creating a shared cognitive environment (see Sperber and Wilson,
1995: 38 46; Scollon and Scollon, 1995, chapter 7).
Example (23) also includes other enrichments apart from the one discussed: i.e. sol
(literally sun) has been translated as sunlight , and aire (literally air) as fresh air. Both
examples can be interpreted as loose uses of the concepts encoded by sol and aire in
Spanish, as there is no expectation of there being no sun, or the room being in a
vacuum. What is meant in the Spanish examples is precisely that there is, respec-
tively, no sunlight or fresh air (coming into the room). The translator has decided'on
a more literal use of the Spanish concepts in English. Again there is, arguably, a
change in the underlying style of the texts: more suggestive in Spanish and more
explicit in English.
4.2.3. Possessor enrichment
Another thematic enrichment is that of possessor. This enrichment involves
building into the propositional form the possessor of an entity described in the
utterance To illustrate, let us consider example (24) [taken from Lawaetz (1972: 12
13)]:
(24) Ruti sonrio con melancolia. Ee puso una mano en el hombro.
Ruti smiled sadlyand put his hand on the old 'sman shoulder
The English version includes the possessor of the shoulder, namely, the old man,
and also the possessor of the hand, namely, Ruti. These two pieces of information
are merely suggested in the Spanish original by the pronoun le (to him/her) and the
first person verbal ending respectively. More generally, in Spanish the information
about the possessor in conditions like those in (25) is typically left for the addressee
to infer. The use of this type of pronoun such as le, generally called pronoun of
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interest, indicates that there is some kind of connection between the referent of the
pronoun and some other entity mentioned in the utterance, but it is for the addres-
see to decide, on pragmatic grounds, which kind of interest is intended. This inter-
lingual enrichment from Spanish into English, where the English version becomes
linguistically more explicit, is obligatory.
This example shows, as suggested above, that some interlingual enrichments are
required on grammatical grounds. This is due to the way languages typically express
some meanings. The consequence of not carrying out the enrichment in these con-
ditions gives rise to misunderstanding, or at worst, inappropriateness or ungram-
maticality. Thus, here the target language forces the translator to encode explicitly a
meaning which was only implicit in the (semantic representation of the) original text.
This is one of the most important grounds for interlingual enrichment, as it is
required in order to produce a grammatical and acceptable text in the target lan-
guage. By contrast, the other enrichments in this section were due to the addition of
contextual assumptions. In this case, the translator did not need to add them (from a
grammatical point of view), but he chose to do so in order to aid the comprehension
process, which is one of the other main reasons for this type of contextual enrich-
ment
4.3. Enrichment based on discourse relations
The next type to be discussed is enrichment based on discourse relations: that is,
enrichment which makes explicit the connections between two clauses or utterances
The discourse relation considered here is that of consequence, as shown in example
(25) taken from Lawaetz (1972: 14):
(25) El calor pegajoso le humedecia la cainisa, adhiriendosela al cuerpo.
The sticky heat made his shirt damp, so that it clung to his body
In (25) the Spanish text has two clauses, namely:
(26) a. El calor pegajoso le humedecia la camisa
b. adhiriendosela al cuerpo
Between these two clauses there is a discourse relation relationship of con-
sequence, that is, the second event described is a result of the first one. This con-
nection is left implicit in the original but in the translation it is encoded linguistically
by adding the connecting expression so that. The reasons for this extension might
have to do with cognitive effort. The translator may have opted for an explicit ren-
dering of the logical connection to decrease the amount of effort the readers would
have to invest in inferring it. Inferred information is more likely to be misconstrued
if there is a change in the contextual assumptions brought to bear on the inter-
pretation; explicit information, on the other hand, overtly directs the addressee to
the intended interpretation and commits the addresser to it.
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4.4. Enrichment based on implicatures
So far we have seen examples where the translations have been carried out on the
basis not of the encoded semantic representation but of the enriched prepositional
form of the original text. They were cases in which what was said was not all lin-
guistically encoded. The perceived difference between the original and the transla-
tion was the result of a change in degree of explicitness. The original author could be
held responsible for misleading the translator if he had not intended the enrichments
to be carried out.
The last example to be considered is a case in which the translation has gone
beyond the propositional form intended. This is a case where the translator has
included an implication of the original text in the target text, thereby translating not
only what was said but also what was implied. The example in question is from
English into Spanish, as shown in (27):
(27) Example of inclusion of iniplicc
Happily for the self-command
of both Heyward and Munro,
they knew not the meaning of
the wild sounds they heard.
ion: English into Spanish
Afortunadamente para Munro
y Heyward, no entendian el
significado de los salvajes
gritos que oian. pues de lo
contrario dificilmente
hubieran podido dominar su
renovado dolor
(Cooper, The Last Mohican)
In (27) the translator has added an implication of the first clause to the Spanish
text. The implication is the clause in (28), which was not present in the original
version.
(28) Pues de lo contrario dificilmente hubieran podido dominar su
renovado dolor
Since otherwise they would hardly have been able to control their
renewed suffering
This translation goes beyond a mere enrichment of the original. That is, we do not
take the author of (27) to have committed himself to (28) as part of what was said,
i.e. not part of the truth-conditions of the original. Rather, (28) is a possible impli-
cation of the original, and as such is not guaranteed to the same extent by the ori-
ginal text. The translator has interpreted the original by supplying a context, which
may not necessarily be identical to the intended one, and then by inferring an
implication and including it in the translation. The translator has increased the amount
of information encoded by the text and has also narrowed down the interpretation of
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the original to a specific reading. He is, therefore, at least partially responsible for
that interpretation and not the author. As a result, there is some loss in the faith-
fulness of the translation, which in this case goes well beyond just merely making the
proposition expressed fully linguistically explicit.
It is important to note here that in this type of example, unlike in the previous
ones, there is no equivalence at propositional level, since the translator has encoded,
in the translation, content which was not part of the proposition expressed in the
original text Instead, he has gone further and included content which was part not
of the development of the semantic representation into the proposition expressed
(i.e. what is said, in Gricean terms), hut of the implicatures/implications of the origi-
nal text (i.e. what is implicated). As a result, this may very well lead English and
Spanish readers to derive substantially different interpretations. This type of case
would fall outside the notion of interlingual enrichment as discussed in this article
and it would involve a major change in both content (incorporating implications)
and style (making the text more explicit than it would be warranted). These changes
would be unacceptable to a greater number of readers than earlier ones, which only
involved changes at propositional level, e.g. (20) These stronger unacceptability
judgments match the greater theoretical distance between original and target texts.
In this sense, this type of example shows the limits of acceptability in interlingual
enrichment as defined in this article.
Furthermore, this type of example shows the distinction between degrees of
explicitness (of the proposition expressed), on the one hand, and degrees of strength
(in what was implicated), on the other The case discussed here is an example of a
strong implication. The cases discussed in earlier sections are examples of different
degrees of explicitness in communicating the proposition expressed. This distiriction
further underpins the notion of interlingual enrichment, and in turn has con-
sequences for acceptability judgments, as seen above
5. Conclusion
In this article, it has been argued that pragmatic enrichment processes can have
effects on translation The translator, as a communicator, may translate not what
was linguistically encoded in the original hut rather what was propositionally com-
municated This will give rise to discrepancies in style between original and target
texts The acceptability of these discrepancies will be dependent on the degree of
translation faithfulness expected and judged to be relevant by the audience in the
context in question.
It has been argued further that interlingual enrichment is carried out on two
grounds. First, it may be required for reasons to do with the input, for example,
grammatical incompatibilities [e.g. (24)] Second, it may be done for reasons to do
with the context, for example, cultural variation [e.g. (15)J These two types of
enrichment correspond to the two information sources involved in the interpretation
process (input and contextual assumptions) and, furthermore, they shed light on the
changes undergone by a text during translation
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The first type of enrichment is generally obligatory because the reasons that
motivate it are grammatical. Thus, we would expect that translations involving this
type of enrichment showed some consistency across the board, as translators will try
to find the closest grammatical equivalent in the other language and show con-
sistency across contexts. The second, on the other hand, is optional. It depends to a
greater degree on the judgement of the translator: whether she thinks that the extra
contextual assumptions will contribute to relevance or that their absence will hinder
it. This judgement is subject to pragmatic considerations which, by their very nature,
will tend to vary from situation to situation. This second type of enrichment is more
controversial than the first one because it modifies the original to a greater extent
and its motivation is more subjective (in the sense that enrichment in this type of
case is not required from a grammatical point of view). In other words, it is only
justified on the translator's reasonable assumption that, without the interlingual
enrichment, the interpretation she has envisaged will not be successfully commu-
nicated. This is her own reasonable judgement, rather than a grammatical impera-
tive, and thus it would be an interlingual enrichment of a more subjective nature.
This type of enrichment will also be more likely to vary from context to context, and
version to version (of a translation), as it will depend on the distance between the
cultures involved, the knowledge that the target audience has of the original culture,
or the cultural/linguistic conventions of the target audience at a particular point in
time.
Enrichment cases that go beyond making linguistically explicit the propositional
form communicated by the original text, and that include content which belongs
within the imphcatures or implications of an utterance [e.g. example (27)], fall out-
side the notion of interlingual enrichment as defined in this article. The resulting
increased distance between original and translation gives rise to stronger unaccept-
ability judgements, mirroring the theoretical difference between genuine and non-
genuine cases of interlingual enrichment. In this respect, the notion of interlingual
enrichment attempts to provide a criterion for explaining the limits of acceptability
in cases where linguistic discrepancies are found in translation.
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Interlingual Impoverishment
in Translation 1
XOSE ROSALES SEQUEIROS
University of Oxford
1 Introduction
In this article it is argued that stylistic variation, 2 and more specifically
decisions regarding the degree of explicitness and implicitness, should be
seen as responsible for many of the changes undergone by original texts in
translation. In particular, the analysis will concentrate on the loss of
explicitness across languages with specific reference to English and
Spanish.
The claim made here is that, given a particular proposition (i.e.
thought) expressed by an LI (Language 1) utterance, the linguistic
rendering in L2 (Language 2) may encode less than the LI as a result of a
process which will be called interlingual impoverishment. This process
crucially involves a shift towards implicitness in L2, where (at least) part
of the content which had been linguistically encoded by the LI utterance
is now recovered pragmatically by the L2 addressee through a process of
enrichment. 3
It is argued further that interlingual impoverishment may be caused
by either grammatical considerations pertaining to how a certain
propositional form 4 is expressed in L2, or contextual assumptions which
1 This article is based on a paper delivered to the 5th International Pragmatics
Conference held at the Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mexico (UNAM), Mexico City,
4—9July 1996, and to the Romance Linguistics Seminar at the University of Oxford. I am
grateful to the participants of both events for their comments
2 See Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition
(Oxford: Blackwell, [2nd ed.] 1995), 202 ff.
3 Ibid.., 177-93; Ernst-August Gutt, Translation and Relevance: Cognition and
Context (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 21 ff.\ Robyn Carston, 'Implicature, Exphcature and
Truth-Conditional Semantics', in Mental Representations, ed. R. Kempson (Cambridge:
Cambridge U. P., 1988), 155-82; Robyn Carston, 'Conjunction, Explanation and Relevance',
Lingua, XC (1993), 28-33.
4 A propositional form is a well-formed formula which undergoes logical operations
(e.g. implications, etc.) and is capable of being true or false by virtue of its semantic
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the translator considers to be sufficiently manifest to the addressee to be
recoverable pragmatically. In both of these cases, L2 encodes less
linguistic information than LI.
In the first case, for a particular propositional form, L2 may be less
capable of explicitness than LI. 5 In the second case, for a particular
propositional form, L2 is capable of the same degree of exphcitness as LI,
but the translator chooses an L2 rendering which is less explicit than LI.
One of the consequences of lowering the degree of explicitness is that
the L2 utterance may have a greater range of possible interpretations
compared to those of the LI utterance. This may give rise to ambiguity or
a greater degree of indeterminacy in the interpretation of the L2 text, a
case which will be discussed below.
An analysis is provided which will account for the shift in explicitness
from source to receptor text in relevance theory terms as found in Sperber
and Wilson. From this theoretical point of view it is not surprising that
such shifts occur, given that the translator, acting as a communicator, will
make translation decisions in the light of the receptor language and
audience. His decisions will be based on the two sources of information
brought to bear on the interpretation process: the linguistic input and the
contextual assumptions. It will be shown that this constitutes the basis
for an explanation as to why receptor texts which have suffered a loss of
linguistic content (relative to the source text) can still be regarded as
successful translations.
Central to this analysis, therefore, is the following question: how is it
possible that two languages LI and L2, given the same propositional form
(see note 4), may differ in their encoding of it? The differences between LI
and L2, in their treatment of a particular propositional form, may be a
grammatical fact, and indeed this is often the case. However, this
grammatical difference does not explain how they can still express the
same propositional form.
The answer to the above question is that this is possible because of
pragmatic processing. Two languages can express a given propositional
form with varying degrees of possible linguistic encoding because the
addressee can, if necessary, draw the appropriate inferences and enrich
the semantic representation of the impoverished utterance in relevant
ways.
One of the advantages of looking at this phenomenon from a pragmatic
point of view is that this can account for the discrepancies that arise in
completeness (see Sperber and Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition, 72;
Carston, 'Imphcature, Explicature and Truth-Conditional Semantics', 178, n. 2)
5 The other case is also possible: see Xose Rosales Sequeiros, 'Interlingual
Pragmatic Enrichment in Literary Translation', paper delivered to The Linguistic
Foundations of Translation conference, University of Liverpool, 1995.
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the process of t rans la t ion be tween what i s l inguis t ica l ly encoded in the
or ig ina l and targe t tex ts .
In what fo l lows , severa l s t ruc tures which exempl i fy th i s poin t a re
examined toge ther wi th the i r e f fec t s on t rans la t ion be tween Engl i sh and
Spanish .
2 Impoverishment due to Grammar
2.1 Possession
The analysis first focuses on the encoding of possession in predicates.
Consider example (l): 6
(1) a. He put his hand in his pocket.
b. Se metio la rnano en el bolsillo. 7
In (lb) the possessive adjectives (i.e. his) are lost in the Spanish text.
These adjectives indicate a direct relationship between the referent of he
and the two entities hand and pocket in the original English text. Thus,
there is, as far as these direct relationships are concerned, a loss of
explicitness (i.e. an impoverishment) of the semantic content encoded by
the Spanish text. 8
Thus, in normal circumstances both (la) and (lb) communicate the
same proposition, i .e. roughly (2):
(2) Proposition communicated by (la) and (lb):
PETER PUT HIS HAND IN HIS POCKET
The capital letters indicate conceptual content as opposed to linguistic
content. To aid the exposition, the assumption is made that the person
referred to as he is Peter.
What is crucial in (1) is that in interpreting the Spanish text the
addressee has to infer the possessive interpretation, whereas in the
English text this is made more explicit by virtue of its being encoded
linguistically. Two observations are pertinent to this. First, the
6 Taken from Michael Swan, Basic English Usage (Oxford: Oxford U. P., 1984), 19.
7 A directly equivalent Spanish version with the possessive adjective su in (la)
would be possible (according to Leonardo Gomez Torrego, Valores gramaticales de 'se'
[Madrid Arco Libros, 1992), 15), namely, Metio su mano en su bolsillo But, as Gomez
Torrego himself states, 'hay diferencias semdntico-pragmaticas entre las construcciones de
SE y las de posesivo' (ibid ). That is to say, we would only use this construction in contexts
which gave rise to additional contextual effects. In particular, it would not normally be
used simply to communicate the possessive relation which is being discussed here.
8 By decreasing the amount of information encoded linguistically, an addresser is,
in effect, making it possible to derive a wider range of interpretations. This greater
contextual compatibility is a derivative effect of linguistic impoverishment, not a linguistic
gain.
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contribution of the possessive link to the interpretation of (1), in both the
English original and the Spanish translation, is truth-conditional. 9
Therefore, i t cannot be a Gricean conventional implicature. 10 Second, it is
true that English possessives themselves are indeterminate, thus
requiring some inferential interpretation. 11 So, for example, the
interpretation of the first possessive in (la) is about parts of the body (and
not about, say, personal belongings). However, this does not exclude the
possibili ty of having varying degrees of possible explicitness in different
languages to encode the semantic representations from which the same
propositional form is derived. Thus, English, in this case, is more explicit
than Spanish.
In the predicate of (lb) the most accessible context in which to
interpret, and make sense of, the entit ies described is one in which they
are directly related to the subject, i .e. Peter. Any other scenario would
require an extension of this minimal context, which would in turn
increase processing effort without its being offset by more contextual
effects (as far as the possessive interpretation is concerned). Hence,
interpretation (2) would be favoured by the principle of relevance 12 in the
absence of more relevant interpretations. The principle of relevance
directs us towards an interpretation which results in adequate cognitive
effects for no unjustifiable effort . Our interpretation in (2) has enough
contextual effects (the possessive links) for no unjustifiable effort (we do
not need to expand the context to find the possessor).
In the Spanish text the third person pronoun se 13 could be seen as
conventionally implicating (or even encoding) some kind of link between
the direct object (la mano/the hand) and the subject Peter, on the one
hand, and the place adjunct (en el bolsil lo/in the pocket) and Peter, on the
other, thereby resulting in an interpretation in which the hand and the
pocket are both Peter 's . But this is not necessarily so. This pronoun can,
for instance, be omitted without the utterance becoming unacceptable or
losing the possessive interpretation, as (3b) shows:
(3) a. He put his hand in his pocket.
b. Metio la m a no en el bolsillo.
The proposition communicated by (3b) in this minimal scenario is sti l l (2),
9 See Diane Blakemore, Understanding Utterances (Oxford Blackwell, 1992), 83;
Carston, 'Implicature, Explicature and Truth-Conditional Semantics', 172
10 Cf H Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, Mass : Harvard U P.,
1989), 361.
11 See Ruth Kempson, Semantic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge U P , 1977), 125
12 See Sperber and Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition, 132-42
13 Also called dativo simpatetico posesiuo, see Gomez Torrego, Valores gramaticales
de 'se' , 15
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which suggests that this pronoun is not necessary for the possessive link
to be inferred.
Similarly, connections between this type of pronoun and the subject
are not mandatory, as the next example shows.14 In this case we are not
concerned with the pronoun se, which here is part of the meaning of the
verb, 15 but rather with the pronoun of interest les/to them:
(4) Se les apago la luz
The light (unexpectedly) went out
In this case, les/to them is optionally translated as unexpectedly and, in
particular, no connection has been made between the pronoun of interest
les/to them and the subject la luz/the light (the only other entity available
within the sentence with which to make a connection). This suggests that
the possessive link is not obligatory. Only considerations on the basis of
contextual knowledge will direct us to relevant links and resulting
interpretations.
One of the consequences of the impoverishment suffered by (lb) in the
translation process is that its range of possible interpretations is widened
compared to that of (la), provided the appropriate contextual assumptions
are accessible in the situation. For instance, in (lb) the direct object la
mano/the hand could be referring to a hand which had nothing to do with
Peter. For example, imagine a scenario in which Peter was a murderer
who mutilates his victims and who steals evidence of his crimes. The
possessive connection here between the hand and Peter would not be
present, and the equivalent English text would be the following:
(5) He put the hand in his pocket.
This interpretation, where the hand is not Peter 's but his victim's, is not
compatible with sentence (la), but i t is with (lb).
2.2 Lost content
In example (1), the same content was expressed by both original and
target texts. This, however, may not always be possible. Impoverishment
may sometimes result in inevitable loss of content, particularly of the non-
truth-conditional type. 16 A case in point involves the general type of
pronoun and structure found in (1). The interpretation of these pronouns
14 Taken from Brian Steel, Translation from Spanish (Madrid: SGEL, 1979), 138
15 That is, it is a pronominal verb (see Gomez Torrego, Valores gramaticales de 'se';
see also C. J Pountain, 'Aspect and Voice: Questions about Passivisation in Spanish',
Journal of Hispanic Research, I [1992-93], 167-81, for discussion on this type of sentence).
16 See Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, 'Linguistic Form and Relevance', Lingua
XC, (1993), Nos. 1-2, 1-25, Deirdre Wilson, Varieties of Non-Truth-Conditional Meaning',
MS (1993); Blakemore, Understanding Utterances, 146-51
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tends to vary depending on the context and is quite elusive to translation,
particularly because there often is an element of emotional nuance. Steel
acknowledges this fact , ' t ranslation of the emotional nuance is not always
possible ' , and later goes on to add, 'when .. . [ translation] solutions are
impossible, the nuance . . . , for practical purposes, may be ignored' . 17 In
such cases, loss of content is incurred.
This point is i l lustrated by the following series of examples (taken
from Steel):
(6) a. La chica se nos emborracho
The girl went and got drunk (on us)
b. La vieja se nos ofend 10
The old lady got all offended
c. Se me caso con otro
She went and married someone else
d. Me lo suponfa
I thought so/I expected that
e. Maria se le asusto
Mary got scared
f . Se lo trago
He swallowed it (down)
g. Se lo bebio
He drank it (up/down)
The consti tuents to consider in (6) are the pronouns and their
translations, namely, nos-us (6a,b), me-me (6c,d), le=to him/her (6e) and
se-himself!her self (6f,g):
(7) a. nos = went and got ... (on us)
b. nos -all
c. me-went and
d. me = 0
e. le - 0
f . se = 0
g. se =0
As (7) shows, the translation of this type of pronoun is different in each
case, despite the fact that i ts function is the same throughout, namely, an
object of interest . On this, Stockwell et al . comment, ' the common feature
of meaning in all these sentences is interest or concern—a loose sort of
involvement which is much more expansive than the meaning of the
English indirect object . . . The linguistic and situational context of the
sentence will determine the specific meaning' . 18
17 Steel, Translation from Spanish, 135, 143.
18 R P. Stockwell, J D. Bowen and J. W Martin, The Grammatical Structures of
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In examples (6), i t is precisely the (minimal) context of the sentences
that affects our interpretation of the pronouns. However, in over half of
the cases (6d-g) the pronoun is ignored, with a result ing loss of content.
Thus, in example (6e) the content lost is emotional and in examples
(6d,f ,g) what is lost is some type of beneficiary role adopted by the person
referred to by the pronoun. In none of these cases, however, does the
pronoun seem to contribute to the proposit ional content expressed (i .e. to
the truth-conditional meaning of the utterances), 19 as the following
versions show:
(6')a. La chica se emborracho
The girl got drunk
b. La vieja se ofendio
The old lady got offended
c. Se caso con otro
She married someone else
d. Lo suponia
/ thought so/I expected that
e. Maria se asusto
Mary got scared
f . Lo trago
He swallowed it
g. Lo bebio
He drank it
The contribution made by these pronouns seems to be non-truth-
conditional. 20 In other words, the examples in (6) (with the pronouns) will
be true descriptions of the world, if and only if their counterparts in (6')
(without the pronouns) are true. Their contribution, thus, falls outside
the proposit ional content of the utterances in (6).
This type of pronoun invites us to draw implicatures from the
situations described (e.g. in [6a] that we were not very pleased with the
behaviour of the girl , etc.) . The fact that these pronouns do not contribute
to the proposit ions expressed, but rather to the implicatures we derive,
English and Spanish (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1965), 193.
19 An important distinction is made by Sperber and Wilson between the proposition
expressed by an utterance and its higher-level explicatures. Both are part of the explicit
content communicated by an utterance, but they make different contributions to its overall
interpretation. This point will not be elaborated on in this article for lack of space, but
suffice it to say that the proposition expressed determines the truth-conditional content of
an utterance while the higher-level explicatures contribute various types of non-truth-
conditional content (for further discussion, see Wilson and Sperber, 'Linguistic Form and
Relevance', 5-10, Wilson, ms. cit., 3-4, Blakemore, Understanding Utterances , 65-119).
20 See Wilson and Sperber, 'Linguistic Form and Relevance', 19-23.
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may be the reason why, despite the translation loss, the target texts in (6)
are regarded as acceptable versions.
3 Impoverishment due to contextual assumptions
In this section, the second main type of impoverishment mentioned at the
outset is discussed. This type is dependent on contextual assumptions
rather than simply the grammar. Consider examples (8) through to (10):21
(8) a. Bailamos al son del acordeon
b. We are dancing to the accordion
(9) a. La casa que esta mas alia de la iglesia
b. The house beyond the church
(10) a. A los muchachos que viven all i no les gustan los deportes
b. The boys there don't like sports
All these utterances communicate, in both source language and target
language, the same proposition in the appropriate context. The
propositions are set out below, with the constituents which remain
unencoded in the English version shown in bold:
(8 ) WE ARE DANCINGTO THE SOUND OE THE ACCORDION
(9') THE HOUSETHAT IS BEYONDTHE CHURCH
(10 ) THE BOYSWHO LIVE THERE DON'TLIKESPORTS
Notice that the English text, from a grammatical point of view, could have
encoded the full l inguistic content of the original text. The translator
decides to impoverish the target text because the contextual assumptions
in question are easily accessible on the basis of the situation described
and, moreover, this type of expression is quite standard in English
(reducing processing effort).
The impoverishment undergone by the English utterances, though,
increases their range of possible interpretations beyond what would be
compatible with the Spanish examples. Take, for example, (9b). In this
case, the following interpretations would be compatible with its linguistic
form (shown here in italics):
(11) a. THE HOUSEWHICH YOU CAN SEE BEYOND THE CHURCH
b. THE HOUSE WHICH HAS BEEN BUILT BEYOND THE
CHURCH
c. THE HOUSE WHICH HAS BEEN DESTROYED BEYOND THE
CHURCH
21 Adapted from Esteban Torre, Teoria de la traduccion hteraria (Madrid: Editorial
Sfntesis, 1994), 136
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All these interpretations could be derived by the addressee of (9b), if
he chose to represent the reference of house, in conjunction with the
preposit ion beyond, on the basis of different contextual assumptions.
Hence interl ingual impoverishment of this type can give rise to divergent
representations. These divergent interpretations would not be compatible
with the Spanish original, in which the referential expression is encoded
linguistically.
In the previous cases, the context directed the addressee towards the
same proposit ional form in both the original and target texts. This,
however, may not always be the case in interl ingual impoverishment. At
times, what is communicated is not distributed in the same way in
different languages. In some cases, what is part of the explicatures in one
language may be part of the implicatures or implications in another
language (or lost altogether). 22 Consider the following example taken
from a Mercury Communications manual:
(12) a. International Diall ing codes are listed over the page, you can
use these to dial direct
b. Los prefijos internacionales aparecen listados en la pdgina
siguiente
In this case, the last part of the English text is missing in the Spanish
text:
(13) you can use these to dial direct •
This would seem to be an implicature of the first utterance. That is, if
telephone codes are provided then we should be able to dial the numbers
we want directly, rather than through an operator. This implication
increases the relevance of the first utterance and, furthermore, i t is
reasonable to take the addresser to have made it intentionally manifest .
These considerations together would qualify (13) as an implicature. In the
English version this is encoded, whereas in the Spanish text i t is
implicated. It could be argued that the overall content taking explicatures
and implicatures into account is the same, and what differs is the content
distribution. This would be an extension of the notion of interl ingual
impoverishment as defined above, where the notion of interl ingual
impoverishment was defined in relation to the proposit ion expressed by
the utterances in question, not their implicatures.
22 Implicatures are distinguished from implications in that they are implied
assumptions whose relevance is both intentional and mutually manifest to addresser and
addressee in the communicative situation, whilst implications are assumptions which are
implied but not made intentionally manifest (see Sperber and Wilson, Relevance:
Communication and Cognition, 274—76).
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A more subtle impoverishment (and perhaps an outright translation
mistake) can be seen in the following translation of the Spanish adverb
ademas (i .e. moreover): 23
(14) a. Vi y 01ademas como todos decidimos festejar la buena nueva
financiando con el rubro de reservas una excepcional tarde de
bizcochos.
b. I saw and also heard how we all decided to celebrate the good
news by paying out of the reserve fund for a special afternoon
of biscuits.
The dictionary equivalent of ademds is arguably (as in OSD) moreover,
rather than also. This has consequences for our understanding of the
English target text. The role of the connectors also and moreover is not
the same. 24 Also indicates that the information it l inks is to be processed
in parallel with other information already available. Moreover, in
addition to this, indicates that the information it l inks provides further
evidence for a conclusion drawn from the previous information, thereby
strengthening it . The English addressee is deprived of this important
clue.
This is not to say that (1 4b) cannot communicate that i ts two conjuncts
provide stronger evidence for a conclusion, merely that i t must be done in
addition to the encoded message. In other words, i t is not a guaranteed
interpretation, i t will depend on the contextual assumptions available and
whether it is relevant in the situation. By contrast, if we use moreover,
this interpretation is encouraged by its encoded procedural meaning, 25 as
shown below (where [16] and [17] il lustrate the inferential steps taken):
(15) I saw and, moreover, I heard how we all decided to celebrate
the good news by paying out of the reserve fund for a special
afternoon of biscuits.
(16) If I saw something, then I have first hand evidence that i t
happened.
I saw how we all decided to celebrate the good news by paying
out of the reserve fund for a special afternoon of biscuits
I have first hand evidence that we all decided to celebrate the
good news by paying out of the reserve fund for a special
afternoon of biscuits
23 Taken from Spanish Parallel Text 1, ed J Franco (London Penguin, 1966), 32 ff.
24 See Blakemore, Understanding Utterances, 134—46.
25 Ibid. , 140
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(17) If I heard what I saw, then I have very good first hand
evidence for it
I heard what I saw
I have very good first hand evidence for the fact that we all
decided to celebrate the good news by paying out of the
reserve fund for a special afternoon of biscuits
So far we have considered L2 examples which, whilst encoding less
linguistic content than their LI counterparts, al lowed the addressees to
recover the unencoded content via pragmatic interpretation. In the final
set of examples provided below, the translator has clearly gone too far in
omitt ing information from the original text. This set of examples does not
raise a linguistic theory problem. They are shown here to highlight the
contrast between genuine cases of interl ingual impoverishment and cases
which clearly fall outside its scope. Thus, in the examples shown, 26 the
bold type face indicates that the text is missing in the target language:
(18)
Oh, if you please, sir, Samuel
is down stairs, and he says may
his father see you?'
'Surely' , replied Mr.
Pickwick.
' Thank you, sir' said Mary,
tripping towards the door
again.
' Sam has not been here long,
has he?', inquired Mr.
Pickwick.
'Oh, no, sir' , replied Mary
eagerly.
7/e has only j ust come home.
He is not going to ask you for
any more leave, sir, he says' ,
—Samuel esta
abajo, serior—le dijo
Maria—, y pregunta
si puede usted
recibir a su padre.
(Charles Dickens, The Pickwick Papers)
26 Adapted from J. C. Santoyo, El delito de traducir (Leon: Secretariado de
Publicaciones, Univ de Leon, 1989), 97, 101-02
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(21)
... and gaining more definite ... y ganando batallas
conquests. So it has been mas definidas.
since the days of Hecuba,
and of Hector, Tamer of
horses: inside the gates, the
women with streaming hair
and uplif ted hands offering
prayers, watching the
world's combat from afar,
f i l l ing their long, empty
days with memories and
fears. . .
(George Eliot, The Mill on the Floss)
As noted above, these last two examples are not cases of interl ingual
impoverishment. Clearly, the translator could not reasonably have been
intending to communicate the content of the original interpretation with
his target version. In the first example, only part of the first utterance
was translated, the rest was ignored by the translator. There is no
rational way of recovering the remainder of the English original text on
the basis of the Spanish translation. In the second example again only the
first utterance is translated. The reader cannot be expected to recover the
rest of the original text by pragmatic interpretation alone. , The
translators here were not resorting to the pragmatic processes underlying
interl ingual impoverishment, but rather they were flouting a basic
assumption of translation (particularly of li terary translations), namely,
that the target text purports to resemble the original text interpretively
and often (as in the above examples) to a very high degree.
4 Conclusion
It has been argued that interl ingual impoverishment can explain some of
the discrepancies found in translation. It is not surprising that such
discrepancies arise, since pragmatic interpretation allows us to recover
intended content which is not encoded but is nevertheless communicated.
This process of pragmatic interpretation often overcomes the differences
in encoding between the original and target texts. Thus, the difference
between the two texts becomes one of style. The original text resorts to
explicit means of communication (e.g. encoding), whereas the target text
takes advantage of the implicit ones (e.g. enrichment).
In the first type of interl ingual impoverishment considered, the
grammar does not allow the encoding of certain components of the
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preposit ional form and, as a result , they have to be derived pragmatically.
In the second type, both LI and L2 are capable of the same degree of
explici tness but the translator, in the appropriate context , considers that
certain assumptions are mutually manifest to such a degree that they can
be recovered pragmatically rather than encoded linguist ical ly.
Both types have been discussed in relat ion to the proposit ion
expressed by a given utterance, because that is where the truth-
condit ional content of the texts l ies. In some of these cases, however, part
of the content lost was not recovered through the proposit ional form but
rather through implicatures. These cases fal l outside the notion of
impoverishment as init ial ly defined here. In fact , this dist inction points
to two different types of content lost : truth-condit ional and non-truth-
condit ional . The loss of truth-condit ional content which has not been, or
cannot be, recovered, wil l inevitably detract from the acceptabil i ty of a
translat ion. If , on the other hand, the content lost is non-truth-
condit ional , our judgments of translat ion acceptabil i ty can be more
posit ive altogether.
The limits of impoverishment are the limits of rat ional pragmatic
interpretat ion. We cannot expect content to be recovered when vital
communicative clues or assumptions are missing. Some translat ions
undergo a loss of encoded material not as the result of any interl ingual
impoverishment but wholly in response to the different strategies used by
the translator. As such their acceptabil i ty will depend on the cultural or
contextual expectat ions raised by the translat ions themselves.
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1. Introduction
Approaches to evaluating translations, be they literary or non-literary, have
adopted a diversity of perspectives on the topic. In this article, following Gutt
(1991), two of those approaches will be briefly discussed: the non-theoretical
approaches and the equivalence approaches An attempt will then be made to
develop Gutt's ideas, which are based on a more communicative approach.
The non-theoretical approaches maintain that translation is an art, an
inniitive endeavour and that as such is not amenable to scientific treatment.
This is precisely what Steiner argues, "what we are dealing with is not a
science, but an art" (1975:295). Similarly, Newmark (1988:19) argues:
"In fact translation theory is neither a theory nor a science, but the body of
knowledge that we have and have still to have about the process of translat-
ing..."
Thus, within these approaches there is an inherent limitation to scientific
enquiry, and the type and degree of explanation achievable.
A less restrictive attitude has been shown by the second type of ap-
proach, based on translation equivalence. This approach maintains that the
quality of a translation increases as its equivalence to the original text
deepens (for an introduction to the notion of equivalence, see Baker 1992).
However, this approach faces serious problems (cf. Gutt 1991, chapter
1). Let me briefly run through them. The first is one of over-specification.
Equivalence judgments can only be made in relation to a specific text and
situation; what may be an equivalent translation in one context may fail to be
so in another context. Hence, we can only say that a translation is equivalent
in relation to that particular context. This over-specificity removes all gener-
2alising power of the system, which, as a result, also loses its predictive power.
Generalisation and prediction should both be essential features of an explana-
tory account of translation.
The second problem relates to the value of equivalence. To make evalu-
ative comparisons between alternative translations, it is necessary to know
the ranking of the features to be compared. However, this ranking or hierar-
chical ordering of features is outside equivalence as such. That is, value
judgement on features precedes equivalence comparisons. Therefore, what
produces the evaluation is not the equivalence procedure itself but the value
attached to the hierarchies used. This suggests that something other than
equivalence is required to explain evaluation judgements. It also brings us to
the third problem associated with equivalence approaches, namely, the crite-
rion for the composition of these hierarchies.
The solutions proposed for the problem of hierarchy composition within
equivalence approaches point to ideas such as purpose. That is, the impor-
tance and ranking of the features depend on the purpose of the translation.
However, the problem here is that the purposes themselves are hierarchically
ordered as well and their ordering has to be done prior to equivalence
evaluation. So, what was to be a solution is, in reality, only another intermedi
ate step: the ordering of those categories, such as purposes, has to be carried
out according to some other value judgement. This, again, suggests that some
criterion other than equivalence is required to explain the evaluation of
translations.
2. Communication-based Approach
Gutt argues that, to solve these problems, we need to shift our approach to
translation in two ways. On the one hand, a shift in the domain of translation
by concentrating not merely on products (translations) or processes (translat-
ing), but on the communicative competence that underlies translation On the
other, a shift from descriptive concerns, such as classification of equivalence
features, to the understanding and explanation of the complexities involved in
communication. The evaluation of translations would then be carried out on
the basis of a theory that explains these communicative phenomena from a
cognitive point of view.
Gutt argues for the existence of several types of translation:
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( 1 ) T y p e so f T r a n s l a t i o n
A. By description (e.g. technical translation)
B By resemblance (e.g. literary translation)
B 1 Interpretive (e.g. narrative translation)
B 1 1 Direct (e.g. literal translation)
B 1.2. Indirect (e.g. freer translation)
B.2 Non-interpretive
(e.g. aspccts of poetry translation)
This article will focus on translation by resemblance and, in particular,
the difference between, and the effects of, direct and indirect translation. In
simple terms, a direct translation is a translation that purports to achieve
complete interpretive resemblance between target and original texts (Gutt
1991, chapter 6). Indirect translation, on the other hand, purports to achieve
less than complete interpretive resemblance between the two texts (ibid ).
Interpretive resemblance is defined as the relationship between two proposi-
tions (or, more generally, two stimuli) in terms of the logical and contextual
assumptions they share. The greater the number of these assumptions shared
by the two propositions, the greater the interpretive resemblance between
them. Direct translation, then, is the limiting case of interpretive resemblance
on a continuum in which the remainder is covered by indirect translation:
(2) Degrees of Interpretive Resemblance Continuum
+
I - I
Indirect translation Direct translation
It is along this continuum that most literary translations can be found.
This is because literary translation purports to interpretively resemble the
original, and it attempts to do it to varying (high) degrees of resemblance.
Consider the following examples of direct and indirect translations from
Galician into English:
(3) Original Text
a. Foi Xoan quen mercou o pazo
Direct Translation:
b. It was John who bought the palace
Indirect Translation:
c. John bought the palace
In this simple example, (3b) directly translates (3a), whereas (3c) does it
indirectly. This is because (3c) does not resemble (3a) completely, not all
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communicative clues present in the original are present in the translation.
Crucially, (3c) does not capture a contextual assumption presumed to be
activated and accessible in the context of (3a), namely, that someone had
bought the designated palace. Notice that we could provide even weaker
indirect translations of (3a), lessening their degree of interpretive resem-
blance with (3a):
(4) a. John bought something.
b. John did something.
c. Something happened.
d. John has lots of money.
e. John likes to live like a king.
f. Some people are a bit over the top.
Translations (4a-c) are entailments of the original (sharing increasingly
few of (3a)'s analytical implications) and those in (4d-g) are possible implica-
tures (sharing practically none of (3a)'s analytical implications). Of course,
not all of these indirect translations will be adequate in all contexts. However,
some of them can be quite appropriate in a variety of contexts. For example, if
the translation is for a friend who doesn't understand the language, (4e) could
be an acceptable translation in a conversational situation where the talk was
about life styles. We could roughly locate these translations on our continuum
line as follows:
(5)
- (4e-f) (4c) (4b) (4a) +
| - 1
Indirect translation Direct translation
Although often many different translations are possible for a given text,
not all of them are appropriate in a given context. One of the main sources of
problems of acceptability in translation lies in the expectations raised by the
translation in the audience in question. In other words, the translation creates
a presumption of resemblance in the audience, and the degree of interpretive
resemblance will vary according to what is relevant in that context. It is the
mismatches between the degrees of resemblance intended by the translator
and those expected by the audience that give rise to low judgements of
acceptability. These mismatches can, in turn, cause poor comprehension or
outright breakdown of communication.
So, for instance, if the translator carries out a direct translation but the
audience expects an indirect translation, the audience might have problems in
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interpreting the target text This may be for a number of reasons. It may be
that contextual assumptions expected have not been provided or activated, or
that there is not enough time to process the direct rendering (as in simulta-
neous translation). An example of the first of these two possibilities are quasi-
idioms. Consider the following example in the context of a fight scene (taken
from Baker 1992:74):
(6) Feel the force of my fist, frozen fiend!
Dir werde ich einheizen, du Scheusal!
Back-translation from German:
I will make things hot for you, monster!
Notice that the (first clause of the) English expression is not an outright
idiom since its interpretation is perfectly compatible with a literal reading. On
the other hand, the German text, in this context, is without any doubt an
idiom, i.e. an indirect translation In this case, a direct translation into German
would provide the communicative clues for deriving the intended interpreta-
tion, but will not do it as straightforwardly or lively as might be expected in
the context, as shown below:
(6') Fiihle die Kraft meiner Faust, du Scheusal 1
Hence, an indirect translation such as the one shown above will be,
arguably, more appropriate in the context at hand. Notice here that one of the
defining characteristics of idioms is that they do not have any semantic
meaning as such and that they are acquired as one single unit (Gutt 1991:148
152) We learn to interpret them by memorising the types of contexts in
which they are used. This means that whenever they are cognitively activated
during interpretation, what we access is a flood of encyclopaedic information
telling us directly how we should interpret it. This contrasts with a direct
translation in that, in this case, we have to work out the interpretation
ourselves from scratch. The interpretation of idioms is ready made and stored
in the encyclopaedic entry of the concepts used. As a result, a direct transla-
tion here will cost us more to process cognitively, and given the type of
context in which the reader will find himself reading this text (for instance, at
home after work), he will prefer to invest less rather than more processing
effort in interpreting the text This was foreseen by the translator and hence
the idiomatic rendering.
Another example of this type of mismatch can be found when the
audience lacks enough knowledge to interpret a given term. A direct transla-
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tion would make it difficult for them to interpret the text as intended. Con-
sider the following excerpt from a short story and its attendant direct transla-
tion, where the audience is very likely to fail to understand the meaning of
Lacroze:
(7) Emma pudo salir sin que la advirtieran; en la esquina se subio a un Lacroze ...
(Franco 1966:20)
Emma was able to leave without anyone seeing her; at the corner she got on
a Lacroze ...
Although in this example we have a direct translation, it is not what some
readers, at least, will expect. In particular, when reading a text, one of the
basic expectations for successful communication is to be able to understand
the text. This may not be achievable in (7) by an English reader. The reason is
that they would probably lack a crucial contextual assumption envisaged by
the author, namely, that a Lacroze is a streetcar. In the event, the translation
provided in this case was not direct but rather indirect:
(8) Emma pudo salir sin que la advirtieran; en la esquina se subio a un Lacroze ...
Emma was able to leave without anyone seeing her; at the corner she got on
a Lacroze streetcar (Franco 1966:20-1)
The translator included the said contextual assumption pertaining to
Lacroze explicitly in the target text, although for the original audience this
would have been an implicit contextual assumption.
This addition may not find the approval of all possible audiences. It is
conceivable that this is unacceptable for audiences who have a firm belief in
reading translations which render exactly what was written in the original and
nothing more, and who expect, as readers, to do whatever background re-
search is required to interpret the text. This, however, entails a substantial
extra effort on the part of the reader, who is unlikely to be willing to put so
much effort into the act of communication (particularly in the context of
reading leisurely). A case which clearly reflects this is the following example
of a translation of a Sanskrit poem into English The approach adopted by the
translator, O'Flaherty, was in her own words: "... a very literal, word for word
translation, retaining the long, multiple compounds, and bracketing pairs of
words to represent the puns and doubles entendres with which Sanskrit
abounds" (quoted in Gutt 1991:181) Here only the English version is pro-
vided:
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(9) The moon, grasping with rays like fingers the hair-mass-darkness, kisses
the night p night [~~-faced with closed-
L_evening |_- mouth L_hud-made-
lotus eyes
In explaining her intentions, the translator adds:
"1 had reasoned that the people who were likely to read translations of
Sanskrit poetry were not the same people who read the sort of novels that
one bought in airports; they were people who were genuinely interested in a
foreign culture and who were willing to make a major investment of their
intellectual energy in this enterprise " (O'Flaherty 1987:124)
But the results of her translation made her reconsider her position:
"1 failed to realize two things: that anyone who was interested in fighting
through that sort of translation would he likely to go ahead and learn the
original language; and that people in airports were quite capable of doing
that, too." (ibid.)
So, quite clearly, direct translation is not always the most desirable type
of translation to adopt, particularly when processing costs are taken into
account.
Another possibility for mismatch is if the translator carries out an indi-
rect translation but the audience expects a direct translation, the audience may
as a result reject the target text as being tampered with, unauthentic. A case in
point is pragmatic enrichment (Rosales Sequeiros 1995). From the point of
view of some editors (e.g. Terry Hale, personal communication), examples
such as the following parallel translations of short stories, which include
additions to the original, would not be acceptable;
(10) El agua sali'a hirviendo, y eso compensaba la falta de sol y de aire.
The water from the lap was boiling hot, and this compensated for the lack of
sunlight and fresh air (Lawaetz, 1972:180-1)
(11) HI calor pegajoso le humedecia la camisa, adhinendosela al cuerpo
The sticky heat made his shirt damp, so that it clung to his body, (ibid 14-5)
The offending constituents here arefrom the tap and so that respectively,
which are not present in the original Spanish text, but have been added by the
translator. The reported editorial judgement is interesting regarding these
examples, because the intention of the original editor and translator of (10)
and (11) was to produce literal translations or, in our terms, direct transla-
tions: "The English translations that are printed in (the] parallel text are literal
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rather than literary..." (Franco 1966, on back cover)
This suggests that even amongst editors there is disagreement as to what
is acceptable and, furthermore, there is some uncertainty as to what a literal or
direct translation is. This uncertainty may be a reflection of the fact that the
various types of translation (direct vs. indirect) are not theoretically distinct,
but rather they are part of a continuum (see (2) above), where the difference is
one of degree, not of kind.
In this section, it has been argued that, as far as literary translation is
concerned, the degree of interpretive resemblance judged to be acceptable
can vary from context to context. Moreover, the expectations raised by a
translation in the audience play an important part as to whether the translation
is successful or not. A mismatch between what the translation provides and
what the audience expects may cause communication difficulties and, in
consequence, low acceptability judgments. This raises the question as to
whether interpretive resemblance is necessary at all for translation accept-
ability (in literary cases). The answer to this question is explored in the next
section.
3. Interpretive Resemblance, Expectations and Acceptability
In the examples seen so far, a measure of interpretive resemblance seemed to
be present between original and target texts. Furthermore, the degree of
interpretive resemblance was shown to be quite variable, from complete
resemblance to cursory resemblance (cf. e.g. (3) and (4)). Our acceptability
judgements depended on the adequacy or relevance of the degree of resem
blance to a particular context.
The expectations of interpretive resemblance are not necessarily the
same for a lay person as for an editor or a scholar. In fact, there may well be
readers who are not aware at all that they are reading a translation. In this
case, they would not be concerned with issues of interpretive resemblance. Of
course, from the point of view of the translator, they are not, consequently,
experiencing the full intended import of the translation. In particular, they are
missing the fact that the text purports to interpretively resemble the original.
Similarly, the expectations of a foreign language student reading a
translation will be very different from those of a lay person. Hence, we often
find that students' editions are full of footnotes explaining points of content
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as well as language. There is no doubt that in these cases the student audience
is prepared to invest the extra cognitive effort to gain a more complete
understanding of the original. They, consequently, expect a complete inter-
pretive resemblance between target text and original text. Obviously, the
means to achieve this may vary. For example, we could have a very literal
translation with the addition of footnotes explaining the context, or a less than
literal translation with footnotes explaining both language and context. An
illustration of this can be found in translations mentioned in this article. The
Penguin parallel translations edited by Franco (1966), which are intended
primarily for students of Spanish, contain eight pages of end-notes for a book
of 196 pages. In contrast, the translation of Isabel Allende's The House of the
Spirits (Black Swan, 1994 reissue), which is intended for the general public,
contains no footnotes or end-notes in a book of 491 pages. This is indicative
of the importance to the students, as opposed to the general public, of gaining
as full an understanding of the original text via the translation as possible. In
fact, a student edition which did not contain the extra information in the form
of footnotes and the like would probably not meet the expectations of its
readers and would be deemed to be less acceptable.
Hence, exploring the relevance of a translation for the intended audience
and investigating the expectations it will raise in them as an act of ostensive
communication will provide the necessary clues to make decisions regarding
the degree of interpretive resemblance required.
Literary translation, however, does not always aim at a very high degree
of interpretive resemblance. There are cases, particularly in poetry, where
very little attention is paid to conveying the original content and more is paid
to non-interpretive resemblance, that is, resemblance not of conceptual con-
tent but of physical features. A case in point is phonemic translation, as the
following example shows (quoted in Hervey, Higgins and Haywood
1995:49):
(12) Ille mi par esse deo videlur,
ilie, si fas est, superare divos,
qui sedens adversus identidem te
spectat et audit
dulce redentem, misero quod omnis
eripit sensus mihi; [...]
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Phonemic translation
He'll hie me, par is he? the God divide her,
he'll hie, see fastest, superior deity,
quiz -sitting adverse identity- mate, in-
spect it and audit -
you'll care ridden then, misery holds omens,
air rip the senses from me; [...]
Literal prose translation
He seems to me to be equal to a god, he seems to me, if it is lawful, to surpass
the gods, who, sitting
opposite to you, keeps looking at you and hearing you
sweetly laugh; but this tears away all my senses,
wretch that I am.
What was relevant to the translator in this case were the sounds (i.e.
physical properties) of the original and that was what he set out to reproduce
in the target text, without any serious attempt to convey the meaning of the
original. Thus, for some audiences even a literal translation is not acceptable
enough For these audiences interpretive resemblance is only a secondary
concern, more important to them are non interpretive resemblances Hence,
this again suggests that before embarking on a translation, and in order to
achieve successful communication by means of it, the translator must con-
sider the relevance of the translation to the audience and the expectations it
will raise in them, and then establish what type of translation will match those
expectations. In some cases, as the last example showed, no amount of
interpretive resemblance is required So, how faithful does a translation have
to be?
4. Faithfulness
In the light of what has been said so far, judgements pertaining to faithfulness
will inevitably vary according to the relevance of the translation to, and
expectations of, the audience. A translation will be judged to be faithful to the
original if it resembles it in the relevant aspects. What the relevant aspects are
in any given case will depend on what particular aspects are deemed to be
consistent with pragmatic principles of communication. The proposal advo-
cated in this article is that the pragmatic principle at work is the principle of
relevance, which states that "every act of ostensive communication commu-
nicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance" (Sperber & Wilson
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1995:266-7). Optimal relevance is achieved when an utterance gives rise to
adequate cognitive effects for no unjustifiable effort and in a way that is
compatible with the communicator's preferences and abilities (ibid.:270). In
other words, what should be translated are those aspects of the original text
which the translator reasonably expects both to give rise to an adequate
number of positive cognitive effects and to do so for as little cognitive effort
as possible for the reader.
The reader will be expecting a translation which is worth his effort and
which is the most relevant one compatible with the translator's ability and
preferences.
Faithfulness is subservient to relevance. A translation may be deemed to
be less than faithful and still be relevant and acceptable. For instance, con-
sider the following German poem (quoted in Gutt, 1991:107-8). Which one
of the two alternative translations is more faithful?
(13) Ein Wiesel
sass auf einem Kiesel
inmitten Bachgeriesel
Translation I
(literal)
A weasel
sat on a pebble
in the midst of a ripple of a brook
Translation 2
(non-literal)
A weasel
perched on an easel
within a patch of teasel
Clearly, translation 2 is not faithful to the content of the original, but it is
a relevant translation nevertheless. On the other hand, translation 1 is faithful
to the content of the original and yet it may not always be relevant. This
seems to suggest that the notion of faithfulness is of limited value when we
look at cases such as these, unless it is looked at in conjunction with consider-
ations of relevance.
5. Conclusion
In this article an attempt has been made to discuss issues pertaining to
acceptability in literary translation I have argued that whilst the basis for
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literary translation is resemblance between original and target texts, which,
for the most part, is of an interpretive type, judgements of acceptability
depend on considerations of relevance concerning the translation itself.
Thus, the degree of interpretive resemblance may vary according to what
is relevant in the context. In some contexts, complete interpretive resem-
blance may be required and the result will be a direct translation. This will be
the case when preserving just the literal content of the original text is crucial
to the success of the translation. In other contexts, less than complete inter-
pretive resemblance may suffice and the result will be an indirect translation.
This latter type will cover cases in which considerations other than literalness
are crucial to the success of the translation.
In practice, most translations will be of the indirect type, and subject to a
wide range of interpretive resemblance levels. It is the translator's knowledge
of language and communication that will lead him to make the appropriate
decisiohs regarding the degree of resemblance in each particular case. This
means that faithfulness cannot be viewed in isolation from considerations of
relevance. A translation will only be seen to be faithful (to the appropriate
degree), if it interpretively resembles the original in the relevant aspects.
The account of translation acceptability sketched above is both general
and explanatory in that it resorts to the pragmatic principles which govern our
interpretations (and, ultimately, our judgements) of translations and also
inform translators' decisions in the process of translating. This account
provides the criteria for establishing what aspects of an original text ought to
be rendered in a translation to maximise its chances of success in a given
context.
Notes
This article is based on a paper delivered to The Practices of Literary Translation Conference,
September 1996, University of East Anglia, Norwich, U.K. 1 would like to thank the
participants for their comments and Fiona Doloughan for her help with the translation of (he
abstract into French
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Abstract
This article argues that acceptability in literary translation depends on judgements of
relevance regarding the degree of (non-)interpretive resemblance between the interpreta-
tions intended in the original and target texts Interpretive resemblance is defined as the
relationship between two propositions in terms of the logical and contextual assumptions
shared by them. Faithfulness in translation reflects this degree of interpretive resemblance
and, as a result, is susceptible to varying degrees. The claim is made that for a translation
to be acceptable, its degree of (non-)interpretive resemblance must be such that the
resulting translation ought to meet the expectations of relevance it raises in the audience
Dans cet article nous voulons demontrer que l'acceptabilite dans la traduction htteraire
depend de ce qu'on juge etre pertinent quant au degre de similarite (non )interpretative
entre les interpretations du texte original et du texte traduit La similarite interpretative se
definit comme le rapport entre deux propositions en termes de suppositions logiques et
contextuelles qu'elles partagent La fidelite dans la traduction refletc le degre de similarite
interpretative et par consequent elle y est sensible i differents degres. Nous affirmons
qu'une traduction est acceptable si le degre de similarite (non (interpretative est tel que la
traduction qui en resulte repond a I'attente de pertinence soulevee chez le public
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